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Zusammenfassung 
 
In den 1980ern und 1990er Jahren führten Naturschutz- und 
Konservierungkomponenten in Entwicklungsprojekten zum community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM). Dies leitete einen Paradigmenwechsel im  vom 
System zentralisierter staatlicher Kontrolle hin zu CBNRM ein, wobei lokale 
Gemeinschaften eine aktive Rolle spielen und direkte Kontrolle über die 
Resourcennutzung besitzen. Diese kommunal-basierten Ansätze bedeuten eine 
Abkehr von der  zentralstaatlichen Politik des Mangements natürlicher Ressourcens. 
Da dies sowohl zu Erfolgen als auch zu Fehlschlägen führte, wurde in der indischen 
Entwicklungspolitik die Frage aufgeworfen, warum CBNRM-Projekte daran 
scheiterten die angestrebten Ziele zu erreichen. Akademiker und Aktivisten 
kritisierten die partizipatorischen Interventionen für ihre, durch ein fehlendes 
Machtgleichgewicht entstandene, inhärente Vulnerabilität, die die Fähigkeit 
verschiedener Akteure beeinflusst, an den Entwicklungsprojekten zu partizipieren.  
Das Ziel dieser Studie ist es, unter Verwendung einer Fallstudie im Mathnaa 
Watershed Development Project im Sabarkantha-Distrikt Gujarats in Indien, zu 
verstehen wie sozio-kulturelle Faktoren die partizipatorischen Institutionen und 
Gemeindebildungen beeinflussen, die durch CBNRM-Interventionen in ländlichen 
Gemeinden geschaffen wurden. Diese Dissertation versucht zu verstehen, ob die 
formale Arena der Partizipation, die geschaffen wurde, um die Teilhabe der 
Menschen zu fördern, in der Lage ist eine gerechte Teilhabe in den ländlichen 
Gemeinden zu ermöglichen. 
Die Doktorarbeit greift die die Analyse sozio-kultureller Aspekte auf, die die Teilhabe 
und Strategien der Akteure in verschiedenen Nutzergruppen und anderen Gruppen in 
formellen und informellen Arenen des Wassermanagements beeinflusst. Kaste, Klasse 
und Genderdynamiken sowie ihr Einfluss auf verschiedene Gruppen  werden 
besonders betrachtet. In der Folge wird die Thematik der Rolle von 
Machtverhältnissen in der Verbindung von formellen und informellen Institutionen 
untersucht, die in Mathnaas agieren und die Teilhabe der Schlüsselakteure in den 
Arenen der formellen Teilhabe gestalten.  
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Die Doktorarbeit zeigt auf, wie die Arenen der formellen Teilhabe und Institutionen, 
die durch die Prozesses der Dezentralisierung geschaffen wurden, den Mitgliedern 
marginalisierter Gemeinden die Möglichkeit bieten zu partizipieren. Die 
Machtungleichheiten in einer bestimmten Gemeinde garantieren jedoch mit geringerer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit ‚gerechte Teilhabe’ als Ergebnis einer Intervention. Andererseits 
partizipieren die Akteure an diesen formal geschaffenene Arenen wie dem watershed 
committee oder Nutzergruppen; ihr soziales Leben besteht nicht ausschließlich aus 
formelle Beziehungen, Interaktionen und Verhandlungen. Daher besteht die 
Notwendigkeit zu verstehen welche Rolle das ‚Informelle’ beim Funktionieren der 
‚formellen Arenen der Teilhabe’ spielt. Diese Dissertation umfasst sieben Kapitel 
inklusive eine Schlußfolgerung . Im Folgenden findet sich die Zusammenfassung 
jeden Kapitels.    
 
Kapitel 1: Einleitung 
Das erste Kapitel führt in die Studie ein und legt die Forschungsagenda dar. Das 
Kapitel beginnt mit einer Erörterung des Paradigmenwechsels bei der Intervention im 
Management natürlicher Ressourcen von einem zentralstaatlichen zu einem 
community-based partizipatorischen Ansatz. Auch wenn diese community-based 
Ansätze eine Abkehr von der früheren zentralstaatlichen Politik darstellen (Pretty und 
Shah, 1997), sind widerspüchliche Ergebnisse über die Erfolgsgeschichten und 
Unzulänglichkeiten dieser Ansätze aufgekommen.  
Das Kapitel erklärt in Kürze die Bewegung hin zu CBNRM, das in den später 
1980ern startete, um die Fähigkeiten lokaler Gemeinden zu verstehen natürliche 
Ressourcen zu verwalten (Berkes, 1989; Agrawal, 2001; Agrawal und Gibson, 2001; 
Baland und Plateau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 2002; Chambers, Pacey und 
Thrupp, 1990). Das ersetzte die weltweite Propaganda welche die ‚Gemeinde’ für 
unvernünftige Ausbeutung natürlicher Ressourcen für eigennützige Bedürfnisse für 
verantwortlich hielt, weithin bekannt als die ‚tragedy of commons’ (Hardin, 1968). 
Die Beweise führten zur Propagierung und Ausbreitung von 
Entwicklungsanstrengungen um CBNRM als eine Lösung der ‚tragedy of commons’  
voranzubringen (Agrawal und Gibson, 1999). 
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Aber eine neue Welle von Forschungsergebnissen in den späten 1990ern betonte die 
Notwendigkeit, das Machtgleichgewicht unter den ländlichen Gemeinden zu 
verstehen, so dass die ländliche lokale Elite nicht das community-based mangement 
System dominiert, indem die Armen, Frauen und Machtlosen von der 
Gewinnverteilung eines verbesserten Management der natürlichen Ressourcen  
ausgeschlossen werden (Agrawal und Gibson, 1999; Leach et al., 1999; Meinzen-
Dick und Zwarteveen, 2001). Deshalb wird in Indien und andernorts conservation 
intervention in CBNRM, aufgrund der Rolle verschiedener Akteure, die von der 
‚Gemeinde’ und Institutionen umfasst werden, die die Ergebnisse der CBNRM-
Interventionen beeinflussen, formen und tranformieren, stark diskutiert, sowohl in 
wissenschaftlichen Kreisen als auch in der Politik. Auf diese Weise kommen Fragen 
über die Besonderheiten und Parameter zur Identifikation von Gemeindegrenzen auf; 
so wie: Wo liegen diese und wo enden sie? Wer ist innnerhalb und wer außerhalb der 
Gemeindegrenzen? Was konstituiert die Gemeinde? 
Um die Probleme zu überwinden, die auftreten, wenn eine stark zentralisierte 
öffentliche Behörde verwendet wird, um natürliche Ressourcen an verschiedenen 
Orten zu verwalten, wurde Dezentralisierung empfohlen (Ostrom et al., 1993). 
Dezentralisierung koinzidiert mit dem Etablieren partizipatorischer Ansätze in der 
Entwicklungstheorie und –praxis, die dafür plädieren, dass lokale Gemeinden eine 
größere Rolle im Management natürlicher Ressourcen spielen sollen (Chambers, 
1995, 1993). In letzter Zeit haben CBNRM-Studien damit begonnen die Heterogenität 
von Gemeinden und wie die Dezentralisierung des Ressourcenmanagements die 
verschiedenen Gruppen innerhalb von Gemeinschaften wie die Landlosen, die unteren 
Kasten, religiös-ethnische Gruppen und Frauen beeinflusst werden, zu untersuchen 
(Meinzen-Dick und Zwarteveen, 2001; Mehta, 2005; Mosse, 1994).  
Im Licht der oben genannten Diskussion verschiedener kontextabhängiger und 
umstrittener Themen, die die dezentralisierten CBNRM-Interventionen 
charakterisieren, habe ich die speziellen Themen untersucht, die für die Partizipation 
der Gemeinschaften durch dezentralisierenden Interventionen entstehen.  
Diese Studie greift die Kaste, Klasse und Genderdynamiken auf, die die 
Funktionsfähigkeit verschiedener Gruppen, wie dem ex-watershed committee, 
Nutzergruppen, Gruppen von Wasserverkäufern und –käufern der 
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Grundwassermärkte, sowie collectively-borewell1 ownership groups beeinflussen und 
analysiert sie aus einem akteursorientiertem Ansatz2 heraus. Mit Hilfe des 
akteursorientierten Ansatzes sollen in dieser Studie die verschiedenen Gruppen, die in 
Mathnaa durch Interventionsprozesse und –praktiken gebildet wurden, untersucht 
werden. Diese Studie bildet die aufkommenden sporadischen Interaktionen zwischen 
den Akteuren ab, wie sie auf die Interventionsprozesse reagieren, in dem sie sich auf 
ihre informellen Netzwerke stützen, indem sie ihre informellen Netzwerke aufziehen. 
Diese Arbeit macht den Versuch die Rollen und Strategien, die von den 
Schlüsselakteuren  in den verschiedenen Gruppen  in Mathnaa angewendet werden, 
aufzuzeichnen, indem eine ethnographische Untersuchung als Methode eingesetzt 
wird. Es werden die Interaktionen und Verhandlungen der Schlüsselakteure, die ihre 
Teilhabe im formal geschaffenene Raum des watershed development project 
charakterisieren, dargestellt. Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dieser Untersuchung um 
ein besseres Verständnis des vielfältigen Wesens der ländlichen Sozialstruktur und 
ihrer Implikationen für gegenwärtige und zukünftige CBNRM-Interventionen zu 
erlangen. Es wurde der Versuch unternommen, die alltäglichen Interaktionen, 
Verhandlungen und sozialen Beziehungen, die eher in den informellen Arenen und 
Netzwerken erfolgen, zu beleuchten. Dafür wird der Zugang zu und die Kontrolle des 
Wassers in den Nutzergruppen rund um check dams, collective borewell ownerships 
und auf Kastenzugehörigkeit basierender Austausch von Grundwasser definiert. 
Darüber hinaus argumentiert diese Studie, dass das oft gezeichnete Bild einer 
„Gemeinschaft und ihrer Partizipation“ im Kontext von CBNRM unvollständig ist, da 
es das komplexe Netz von Interaktionen, informellen Institutionen und Streitfragen 
über Ressourcenkontrolle und –zugang innerhalb der Gruppen der partizipierenden 
Gemeinde, übersieht. Weiterhin besteht die Hoffnung, dass diese Studie an der 
Debatte über Entstehung und Partizipation von Gemeinschaften in 
Entwicklungsprojekten beitragen kann, indem die sozio-kulturellen Faktoren, die den 
Zugang zu Wasser und das Wassermanagement regulieren, mit Hilfe des 
akteursorientierten Ansatzes, ermittelt werden. Die Forschungsziele dieser Studie 
                                                           
1
 Borewell ist eine Quelle bestehend aus einem Rohr, das in einem Bohrloch plaziert wird, um einen 
oder mehrere Grundwasseraquifere anzuzapfen.  
2
 Der akteursorientierte Ansatz ermöglicht Beobachtungen aus der Akteursperpektive, welche nicht 
notwendigerweise auf das Verhalten des Akteurs in einer rational choice theory fixiert ist (Long und 
van der Ploeg, 1989). 
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sind: a) die sozio-kulturellen Bedeutungen, die mit Wasser im community based 
Wassermangement verbunden werden zu untersuchen. b) die Verbindungen zwischen 
formellen und informellen Institutionen, die die Teilhabe der Akteure im community 
based Wassermanagement bestimmen, zu untersuchen. c) die Hauptakteure, ihre 
Rollen, Interessen und die Macht in den formellen und informellen partizipatorischen 
Arenen im community based Wassermanagement, zu identifizieren.  
Das Kapitel diskutiert außerdem den methodischen Ansatz dieser Studie, welches o 
ethnographischer Natur ist. Vier Schlüsselmethoden wurden verwendet: 
Haushaltsbefragungen mit strukturierten Fragebögen, Diskussionen mit 
Fokusgruppen, teilnehmende Beobachtung inklusiveinformeller Interviews.  
 
Kapitel 2: Wassermanagement über Zeit und Raum in Indien 
Indien hat eine lange Geschichte menschlicher Interventionen im Wassermanagement, 
da es markante klimatische Bedingungen, mit intensivem Monsun, gefolgt von 
ausgedehnten Dürren, aufweist. Wassermanagement war in Indien, aufgrund von 
sozio-ökonomisch-politischen und ökologischen Gründen, die die Politik des 
Wassermanagements quer über verschiedene soziale Gruppen betraf, immer ein 
heikles Thema. Deshalb ist es das Ziel dieses rückblickenden Kapitels zu erklären, 
wie eine Gemeinde als Institution die Bewässerungssysteme, im historischen Kontext 
vom vor- bis zum nachkolonialen Indien, verwaltet hat, und wie das Konzept des 
community management sich im Laufe der Zeit aufgelöst hat. Darüber hinaus wurde 
der Versuch unternommen die Institutionen des Wassermanagements in den 
Gemeinden wiederzubeleben. Ihre erfolgreiche Anwendung wird wird im folgenden 
Abschnitt ebenfalls behandelt.  
Der Abschnitt über Wassermanagement in der vorkolonialen Phase in Indien 
beschreibt wie Könige, Feudalherren und lokale Gemeinden Wasser als Ressource 
verwaltet haben. Es wird die Relevanz von Karl Wittfogels ‚hydraulischer 
Gesellschaft’ in Bezug zu Wassermanagement im vorkolonialen Indien in Frage 
gestellt. Weiterhin wird die Multidimensionalität des Wassermanagements im 
vorkolonialen Indien erklärt. Im Abschnitt über Wassermanagement unter der 
Kolonialherrschaft wird ausgearbeitet, wie Wassermanagement im kolonialen Indien 
mechanisiert und zentralisiert wurde; und wie Indien ein Bannerträger der Welt in der 
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Anwendung moderner Wissenschaft und Ingenieurwesens bei der Gestaltung riesiger 
und vielfältiger Bewässerungsstrukturen wurde. Der Abschnitt über die Politik des 
Wassermanagement im unabhängigen Indien illustriert die Tragfähigkeit des 
kolonialen Vermächtnisses im Wassermanagement. Abschließend wird argumentiert 
wie Faktoren wie die Unterschiede zwischen verschiedenen Kasten und Klassen, die 
Heterogenität der Bauern, städtisch-ländliche Dichotomien, Gender, instituionelle 
Ausrichtungen der Regierung und extreme Unterschiede in den ökologischen 
Bedingungen das Wassermanagement beeinflusst haben.  
Erschwerend kommt hinzu, dass das Wassermanagement durch vote bank politics, 
fehlender Koordination zwischen der Bewässerungsbürokratie, der Politikgestaltung 
und verschiedenen sektoralen Abteilungen, die ihr eigenes Wasserprogramm realisiert 
haben, in vielfacher Hinsicht beeinflusst wurde. In dieser vielfältigen Ordnung hat 
Indien sein Wassermanagement in seine Waserpolitik aufgenommen, aber es bleibt 
bei der bloßen Absicht. Das wird durch Ministerien, die verschiedene, oft 
konkurrierende und widersprüchliche Programme einbringen, verkompliziert. 
Infolgedessen ist Wassermanagement in Indien eine verzwickte Angelegenheit, 
weshalb es erforderlich ist, in Indien ‚smartere’ Methoden des Wassermanagements 
einzuführen.  
 
Kapitel 3: Konzeptioneller Rahmen zur Analyse des ‚Community-Based Natural 
Resource Management’ 
In diesem Kapitel wird der konzeptionelle Rahmen von Gemeinden und ihrer 
Teilhabe an CBNRM erarbeitet und die Grundlage zur Erkundung der Natur der 
Interaktionen der verschiedenen Akteure im CBNRM unter Verwendung des 
akteursorientierten Ansatzes gelegt. Das Kapitel erklärt wie in der 
sozialwissenschaftlichen Literatur das Erfassen der Essenz des Begriffs ‚community’ 
eine unerfüllte Aufgabe geblieben ist (Gauld, 2000). Gemeinschaft als die unterste 
Ebene von Verdichtung zu verstehen, auf der die Menschen in gemeinsamer 
Anstrengung z.B. kleine, homogene, harmonische und territorial gebundene Einheiten 
organisieren (Kumar, 2005), hat eine Debatte in den Sozialwissenschaften ausgelöst.  
Dieses Kapitel erklärt weiterhin wie unlängst CBNRM-Studien begonnen haben die 
Heterogenität von Gemeinden zu untersuchen und wie Dezentralisierung von 
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Ressourcenmangement die verschiedenen Gruppen innerhalb von Gemeinschaften, 
wie z.B. Kasten (Sangameswaran, 2008) oder Frauen (Mainzen-Dick und 
Zwarteveen, 2001) beeinflusst hat. Man muss vorsichtig sein, wenn man dieses 
Konzept der Partizipation als ein Mittel zur Gewährleistung einer besseren 
Einbeziehung von Gemeinden in CBNRM verwendet, da Partizipation viele Formen 
Ausmaße hat. Es gibt eine Debatte unter Autoren, wer das Konzept der Partizipation, 
unter Berücksichtigung der Natur und des Ausmaßes oder der Mittel und Grenzen von 
Partizipation, theoretisiert hat. Eine Zeit lang hat der Begriff ‚Partizipation’ 
verschiedene Bedeutungen erlangt und ist weiterhin ein unscharfes Konzept (Ibid).  
In dieser Studie wird Agrawals Typologie angewendet, um zu untersuchen wie 
verschiedene Teile der Gemeinden partizipieren um die Machtverhältnisse innerhalb 
der Gemeinde Mathnaa hervorzuheben, und ihren Einfluss auf partizipatorische 
Prozesse innerhalb des Kontextes der Intervention. Diese Arbeit verwendet einen 
akteursorientierten Ansatz, um die Wege und Formen zu bemessen, mit denen die 
Akteure versuchen Kontrolle über natürliche Ressourcen (wie Wasser in dieser 
Fallstudie) erlangen, im Verhältnis zu anderen Akteuren, inklusive der Art wie 
schwächere Akteure ihren mächtigen Gegenüber im Dorf widerstehen. Dies hilft zu 
verstehen wie verschiedene Akteure in heterogenen Gemeinden arbeiten, um ihre 
Wünsche und Interessen zu erreichen.  
Der akteursorientirte Ansatz, zusammen mit dem Konzept von agency und Macht3 ist 
nützlich für diese Studie, da es den Akteur ins Zentrum des Diskurses um das 
Management natürlicher Ressourcen stellt, unter Anerkennung der Tatsache, dass es 
eine Vielfalt an verschiedenen Akteuren gibt. Abschließend ergänzte der 
akteursorientierte Ansatz meine Studie, die von ethnographisch Natur ist, in dem sie 
die Orte und Rollen  aufdeckte, die Akteure (als Gruppen oder Individuen in 
Interaktionsprozessen) spielen und am besten ihre Möglichkeiten unter den gegebenen 
Umständen koordinieren. Dies sind einige der signifikantesten Beobachtungen, die 
ich gemacht habe, um den methodischen Ansatz hinsichtlich des verwendeten 
Modells und politischer Dynamiken unter denen ich gearbeitet habe zu untermauern.  
 
                                                           
3
 Alle Akteure üben eine Art von ‚Macht’, Einfluss und manipulativen Strategien aus, wohingegen 
solche, die in untergeordneter Position sind auch Spielmacher im Spiel sind (Long, 2001).  
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Kapitel 4: Wasser Resourcen Management in Gujarat: Ein Überblick  
Gujarat war führend bei der Debatte über Wasserknappheit und der Absenkung des 
Grundwasserspiegels. Um die Wasserressourcen Gujarats zu entwickeln und das 
Problem der Wasserknappheit, was sowohl die Bewässerung als auch die 
Grundwasserversorgung betrifft, zu lösen, hat die Regierung Gujarats verschiedene 
politische Strategien und Pläne angewendet. Wasserknappheit ist sowohl ein Problem 
der Verteilung als auch der Beziehungen, da es sich auf verschiedene soziale Gruppen 
unterschiedlich starken Einfluss hat. Deshalb ist es das Ziel des 
Wasserressourcenmanagements in Gujarat Wasser auf eine effiziente, gerechte und 
nachhaltige Art und Weise für ganz Gujarat anzubieten. Grundwasser governance ist 
zu einer ernsten Angelegenheit für die Regierung geworden, da Gujarat in einer Reihe 
mit anderen indischen Bundesstaaten mit schwacher Grundwasser governance steht, 
da sie gescheitert sind eine wertvolle Ressource gut zu verwalten.  
Dieses Kapitel führt in das Wassermanagementszenario im Staat Gujarat ein und 
arbeitet die Anstrengungen der Regierung aus community-based Wassermanagement 
voranzubringen, um Wasserknappheit zu bekämpfenund die Wasserressourcen in 
Gujarat zu verwalten. Weiterhin erarbeitet dieses Kapitel die Grundwasserhydrologie 
Gujarats und den Grund für die Beliebtheit der Grundwassernutzung in diesem Staat, 
sowie die Entwicklung privater Brunnen  und Grundwassermärkte. Es diskutiert die 
governance -Krise in Gujarat, indem die Politik der Regierung, Maßnahmen und 
Projekte erklärt wird, mit der versucht wird das Bewässerungs- und 
Trinkwasserproblem des Staates zu lösen, und wie weit man in Fragen der Effektivität 
(Ineffektivität) im Wasserressourcenmanagement vorangekommen ist. Abschließend 
diskutiert das Kapitel die Faktoren wie die Politik Gujarats, Kaste, Klasse und 
Machtverhältnisse, die die Wasser governance Gujarats beeinflussen und es wird 
argumentiert, dass das Wassermanagement eher von sozio-politischen, institutionellen 
und ökologischen Faktoren beeinflusst wird, als nur eine Frage zu Politik zu sein. 
Demzufolge betreffen soziale Unterschiede Wassermodelle in Gujarat sowohl auf 
Makro- als auch auf Mikroebene.  
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Kapitel 5: Die Wasserwelt in Mathnaa  
Dieses Kapitel führt empririsch in die Region und das Dorf, in dem die Fallstudie 
durchgeführt wurde ein: seine sozialen Strukturen, sein Kastengefüge und die Rolle, 
die die Kastenhierarchien in der Wasserregelung spielen Wasser nimmt eine zentrale 
Rolle im Leben der Menschen in Mathnaa ein, da die Nutzung der verschiedenen 
Wasserquellen des Dorf durch die sozialen, ökologischen und institutionellen 
Grundlagen geregelt werde, die in diesem Kapitel erklärt werden. Zusätzlich müssen 
die Thematik des Wassers in diesem Dorf zusammen dem Kastensystem, der 
Genderfrage, dem Wohlstand, der Politik und Macht gesehen werden. Die 
Sozialstruktur, das Kastensystem und die Hierarchie innerhalb des Kastensystems 
spielen eine wichtige Rolle bei der Wasserordnung in Mathnaa. Betrachtet man die 
Sozialstruktur des Dorfes kann die Dorfgemeinschaft nicht als eine ‚whole unified 
community’ bezeichnen, da diese aus vielen verschiedenen Ebenen besteht, wie der 
Kaste, der Klasse, dem Geschlecht, der Ethnizität, des Wohlstandes etc. Die 
Genderhierarchie bedingt durch die Kastenzugehörigkeit führt zu einer Ungleichheit 
in Fragen des Zugangs und des Managements von Wasser in Mathnaa. Belege, die in 
der Diskussion angeführt wurden, zeigen, dass Entscheidungen in Bezug auf 
Wassermanagement in Form des watershed committee, den Preisen für Wasser auf 
dem Grundwassermarkt oder den Erhalt der check dams zeigen die Unterordnung 
weiblicher Entscheidungen über alle Kastengrenzen hinweg. 
Schließlich wird das Wassermanagement in Mathnaa vom Kastensystem dominiert, 
sowohl bei Fragen des Zugangs, als auch bei der Verteilung, dem Besitz und der 
Teilhabe bei Entscheidungen zur Regelung von wasserbezogenen Fragen. 
Unabhängig davon, ob es sich um Maßnahmen der Regierung oder von NGOs 
handelt, wie z.B. Handpumpen, Bohrbrunnen, Schachtbrunnen, watershed oder 
Wasserversorgung durch Pumpen, alles folgt dem gleiche Schema von 
Beanspruchung und Konkurrenz des Besitzes. Das Kastensystem wiederum 
beeinflusst alle anderen Aspekte, wie Gender, Landbesitz, Eigentum der 
Bohrbrunnen, Zugang zu Technologie, den Grundwassermarkt, das watershed 
Projekt, Nutzergruppen etc.; es beeinflusst das gesamte Wassereigentums und –
managementsystem in Mathnaa.  
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Kapitel 6: Soziale Organisation im Watershed Development Project in Mathnaa  
Oft wird die Partizipation lokaler Gemeinden als Mittel angesehen equitable goals zu 
erreichen, Es wird jedoch die Frage aufgeworfen, was eine Gemeinschaft ausmacht 
und und wie Faktoren indentifiziert werden, die ihre Partizipation im watershed 
developement ermöglicht. Dieses Kapitel stellt empirisch Qualität und Form von 
kommunaler Partizipation innerhalb der watershed community, die in großem Maße 
von den Charakteristiken der lokalen Gemeinden abhängt. Das Kapitel zeigt auf, dass 
die Dorfgemeinschaft vom Kastensystem, der Klasse, von Gender, Ethnizität, 
Wohlstand etc. beeinflusst wird und Akteure mit unterscheidlichen Interessen 
beinhaltet, die in das Ergebnis der Gestaltung einiger Entwicklungsinterventionen, 
wie dem watershed Projekt im Falle Mathnaas, involviert sind. Darüber hinaus erklärt 
das Kapitel wie Geschlechterbeziehungen in Mathnaa, im Kontext von Partizipation 
am water development project, charakterisiert und sozial durch Normen, Bedeutungen 
und Praktiken konstruiert sind. Weiterhin wird erklärt wie formelle Arenen der 
Partizipation, die für die Partizipation geschaffen wurden, die erwünschten Resultate 
gerechter Teilhabe verfehlt haben.  
Das Kapitel illustriert weiter wie der Austausch von Grundwasser in die lokalen 
Institutionen eingebettet ist und von diesen geregelt wird. Diese Institutionen sind 
wiederum, zusammen mit anderen sozialen Faktoren, die den Wasseraustausch und 
das Grundwassermanagement in Mathnaa beeinflussen, tief im Kastensystem 
verankert. Dieses Kapitel erklärt außerdem die sozialen, hydrologische und 
politischen Faktoren, die die Entwicklung und das Management des Grundwasser 
durch Bohrbrunnen Elektrizitätssystem (vor und nach Jyotirgram Yojana) und check 
dams beeinflussen. Überdies zeigt das Kapitel wie die Gemeinde intelligent die 
bereits bestehenden verschiedenen Eigentumsrechte kombiniert, um Zugang zu 
Wasser zu erlangen. 
 
Kapitel 7: Zusammenfassung, Fazit und zukünftige Forschung 
Aspekte des Schutzes und des Erhalts in Entwicklungsprojekten in den 1980ern und 
1990ern führten zur Entwicklung des community-based natural resource management 
(CBNRM). In CBNRM-Interventionen haben Dezentralisierung ein prominenten Platz 
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eingenommen. Dabei gibt der Staat die Verantwortung für das Management der 
natürlichen Ressourcen, über Institutionen wie das watershed committee und water 
associations, an die lokalen Gemeinden ab. Die Verfechter von Dezentralisierung 
rechtfertigen dieses Konzept damit, dass es zu mehr Teilhabe, Effektivität und 
Gleicheit führt, wobei andererseits die meisten Anstrengungen ohne eine 
Verbesserung der Verhandlungsmacht der lokalen Gemeinden endeten (Agrawal und 
Ribot, 1999). Die Akteure, die die Verantwortung für diese Institutionen übernahmen 
neigten dazu sich an andauernden Verhandlungen zu beteiligen, während sie sich 
gleichzeitig direkt und indirekt sowohl an formellen Institutionen wie dem watershed 
committee, als auch an informellen instituionellen Strukturen wie den lokalen sozialen 
Netzwerken beteiligten.  
Die Ergebnisse bestätigen die Behauptung der akteursorientierten Wissenschaftler, 
dass soziale Tätigkeiten sowohl akteursorientiert, als auch gleichzeitig in größere 
soziale Gegebenheiten, die die Entscheidungen des Akteurs beeinflussen, eingebettet 
sind (Long, 1992; Long und van der Ploeg, 1989). Einige der wichtigsten 
theoretischen Erkenntnisse dieser Studie werden um die Thematik von 
Gemeinscahften , Kosmologie des Wassers, Wasser und Macht und dir Koexistenz 
verschiedener Regime des Eigentumsrechtes herum, unten detailliert diskutiert, um 
die die gefundene Antwort durch die Linse der Forschungsziele zu konkretisieren.  
a) Konzeptionalisierung von Gemeinschaft 
Es wurde durch diese Arbeit gezeigt, dass die community-based Akteure Mathnaas, 
aufgrund ihrer unterscheidlichen sozio-ökonomischen und politischen Hintergründe, 
sehr unterschiedlich sind und verschiedene Wahrnehmungen, Fähigkeiten und 
institutionelle Eigenschaften haben. Geschlechterunterschiede existieren in Mathnaa 
in Fragen der Kastenhierarchie und Geschlechterbeziehungen werden als, durch 
Normen, Bedeutungen und Parktiken, sozial konstruiert charakterisiert. In Mathnaa 
agiert ein Set von sozialen, ökonomischen, kulturellen und machtolitischen 
Dynamiken in einer vorgegebenen Gesellschaft, die die Verhältnisse zwischen 
formellem und informellem Institutionen des Ressourcenmanagements beeinflussen.  
b) Kosmologie des Wassers 
Wasser besetzt einen zentralen Platz im Leben der Menschen von Mathnaa. Darüber 
hinaus ist Mathnaas water world in Fragen von wasserbezogenen Praktiken tief in der 
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Religion und Kosmologie verwurzelt. Der Grundwassermarkt in Mathnaa hängt von 
sozialen Strukturen, sozialen Normen und Praktiken Mathnaas ab, die tief in das 
Kastensystem eingebettet sind. Dabei wird bei Bewässerung und der 
Trinkwasserversorgung auf Dorfebene auf Sakrales und Profanes Rücksicht 
genommen.  
c) Wasser und Macht  
In Mathnaa wird jeder Aspekt des Wassermanagements vom Kastensystem dominiert, 
bei Zugang, Verteilung, Eigentum und Teilhabe an der Regelung. Wasser ist in 
Mathnaa ein von Männern dominierte Arena, alle wasserbezogenen Fragen und 
Bereiche werden von Männern kontrolliert. Des Weiteren können community-based 
Wasserprojekte nicht losgelöst von lokaler Machtpolitik betrachtet werden. Weiterhin 
sind Wasserfragen in Mathnaa  Fragen  von Kaste, Klasse, Gender, Wohlstand, Politik 
und Macht. 
d) Die Koexistenz von verschiedenen Eigentumssystemen 
Im Falle von Wasserressourcen variieren der Besitz und die Nutzungsrechte bei 
Wasserquellen und –nutzung. Die Anstrengungen einer Gemeinde bei der 
Speicherung von Regenwasser, das durch check dams frei zugänglich ist, ist ein 
gemeinschaftliches Eigentumssystem und hat geholfen die Bohrbrunnen 
wiederaufzufüllen. Dies resultierte in dem Aufbau eines privaten Eigentumssystem an 
Grundwasser, das nicht gerecht unter allen Mitgliedern der Gemeinde aufgeteilt wird. 
Das bedeutet, dass das Auffüllen der Bohrbrunnen, die in privatem Besitz sind, durch 
das öffentlich bezahlte watershed development programme, dazu führt, dass eine 
öffentliche Investition privater Besitz wird. 
Dadurch ist Grundwasser in Mathnaa eine ‚restricted open access’ Ressource und 
wird zu einem privaten Besitz, sobald der Besitzer des Pumpe es gefördert hat. 
Darüber hinaus sehen wir in Mathnaa die Koexistenz von drei Eigentumssystemen4, 
die gleichzeitig funktionieren und die Gemeinde nutzt sie, um Zugang zum Wasser zu 
erhalten, indem sie verscheidenen Technologien wie Bohrbrunnen und check dams 
nutzt. 
 
                                                           
4
 Allgemeiner Besitz, privater Besitz und freier Zugang. 
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Politische Implikationen 
Oft wird in Regierungs- oder NGO-Projekten den Themen ‚Dorfgemeinschaft’ und 
‚Partuizipation’ große Bedeutung zugemessen. Die Teilhabe- und die 
Dorfgemeinschaft neigen rhetorisch oft dazu die soziale Zusammensetzung der 
Dorfgemeinschaft und Interessenkonflikte innerhalb und zwischen den Gemeinden zu 
ignorieren. Das hat ernste Implikationen für den Erfolg des Projektes und auf seine 
Akteure, die die wahren Partizipierenden des Projektes sind. Es ist nicht gesagt, dass 
ein an einem Ort erfolgreiches Projekt an einem anderen ebenfalls erfolgreich sein 
muss. Die sozialen Gegebenheit an jedem ländlichen Ort Indiens sind einzigartig. Mit 
dem Aufstieg einer neuen dominanten Kaste im 21. Jahrhundert in Indien haben sich 
neuere Definitionen und Paradigmen, neben den traditionellen patriarcharlichen im 
Feudalismus begründeten, entwickelt. Obwohl Indien eine aufsteigende Macht ist, ist 
seine Gesellschaft auch heute noch stark vom Kastensystem beeinflusst. Das war 
einer der Erwägungspunkte der indischen Regierung, 2011 einen Kastenzensus 
durchzuführen.  
Nachdem das Konzept der Gemeinschaft aus verschiedenen Perspektiven betrachtet 
und diskutiert wurde, ist es evident, dass die Vorstellung der Gemeinschaft in der 
Politik der CBNRM eine Reflektion der schlecht empirische erfassten Realität ist und 
damit ein in die Irre führender Orientierungspunkt für praktische 
Interventionsstrategien ist. Eine Dorfgemeinschaft setzt sich aus verschiedenen 
kleinen sozialen Gruppen mit jeweils eigenen Interessen und Inspirationen zusammen. 
Es muss nicht diskutiert werden, dass sie eine Wert im aktuellen Kontext weiterer 
Debatten zur Erreichung der Ziele nachhaltigen Management natürlicher Ressourcen 
besitzen. Es gibt mehrere Studien, in denen ‚romatisierende’ Repräsentationen von 
des Begriffs Gemeinschaft  und seiner Anwendung erfolgreiche Resultate 
aufgewiesen haben. Die Anwendung von CBNRM ist unvermeidbar kontrovers und 
verschiedene Beispiele haben gezeigt, dass Fortschritt schwerfällig ist. Die 
Schwachstellen kommen von der zugrundeliegenden Annahme, dass Gemeinden 
homogen sind und zusammenarbeiten, um allgemeine Entwicklung der ganzen 
Gemeinde zu erreichen, sodass Gleicheit erreicht wird. Damit das Projekt jeden Teil 
der Dorfgemeinschaft berücksichtigt, muss sich das partizipatorische Management 
entlang verschiedener Linien in unterschiedlichen ländlichen und kulturellen 
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Gegebenheiten entwickeln; immer die besondere Zusammensetzung der 
Dorfgemeinschaft beachtend. Daüber hinaus ist community-based Besitz und 
Verständnis sozialer Unterschiede, im Zusammenhang mit Ressourcenzugang, die 
Hauptdeterminante für ein erfolgreiches Funktionieren der formellen 
partizipatorischen Institutionen, das Management natürlicher ressourcen im 
allgemeinen und CBNRM im speziellen. 
Zukünftige Forschung 
1) Dies ist eine Studie auf Mikroebene, die den sozio-kulturellen Kontext der 
Dorfgemeinschaft mehr beachtet, als das Gesamtbild des Staates Gujarat. Deshalb 
wäre es ein wichtiger Versuch nicht nur die sozio-kulturellen, sondern auch die 
ökologischen Bedingungen Gujarats in den theoretischen Rahmen zu integrieren. Zum 
Beispiel würde der Effekt wasserbezogener Legislative verschiedener Staaten auf 
verschiedene ökologische Zonen Gujarats eine fruchtbare Forschung darstellen.  
2) Es wäre ebenfalls eine wertvolle Untersuchung, eine vergleichende Studie auf 
Basis von zwei oder mehr Dörfern zu machen und auf die unterschiedlichen 
Mechanismen, bei denen Kaste, Gender und religiöse Zugehörigkeiten eine Rolle 
spielen für die Erklräung von Grundwassermanagement zu schauen.  
3) Es wäre interessant für eine weitere Analyse zu untersuchen, welche sozio-
kulturellen Praktiken sich um Wasserknappheit herum zentrieren, sowie den Effekt, 
den es auf lokale Gemeinden in Hinsicht auf Gesundheit und sanitären Bedingungen 
und anderen Aspekten menschlicher Entwicklung hat, die aufgrund von 
Wasserknappheit entstehen und jenseits des Rahmens dieser Dissertation liegen.  
Die Idee des Wassermanagements mit seinen weitreichenden und deskriptiv 
beträchtlichen Schlussfolgerungen kommt zusammen mit seinen eigenen 
Hindernissen und einem Wesen der Ungleicheit. Deshalb sollte die Rolle des Wassers 
im seiner Gänze und Realität gesehen werden, die Dynamiken Durkheims, der in der 
Kultur spezifischen gesellschaftlichen Gegebenheiten, bezeugend. 
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Abstract 
Failure of the state-led development projects and the growing concerns for 
participation, in the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM). This in turn led to a paradigm shift in natural resource 
management from centralised state control towards CBNRM, in which the local 
communities now play actively and have direct control over resource use and 
management. These community-based approaches are a departure from the state-
centered government polices of natural resource management. But the mixed 
successes and failures of these approaches have led to a question in the Indian 
development policy context, namely why CBNRM projects fail to achieve their 
expected level of results and equity. Academics and activists have criticised 
participatory interventions, for their inherent vulnerability due to power imbalances, 
which in turn affect various actors’ capacity to participate in a development project. 
Using the case study of the Mathnaa watershed development project in the 
Sabarkantha district of Gujarat, this study aims to understand how socio-cultural 
factors influence participatory institutions and community formation created in 
CBNRM interventions in rural communities. In addition, it examines how the formal 
participatory arena is able to give space to the vulnerable and less powerful groups in 
the village.  
Due to the widespread notion that CBNRM project would be successful and 
egalitarian in nature which would lead to a true representation and the participation of 
all sections of society, functioning on the principle of democracy and equity. This 
thesis takes up the analysis of socio-cultural aspects affecting actors’ participation and 
strategies in various water-related community groups in the formal and informal 
participatory arenas of managing water. Caste, class and gender dynamics are focused 
upon, and their influence on various water-related community group. In pursuit of 
these aspects, the thesis examines the role of power relations in the linkages between 
the formal and informal institutions operating in Mathnaa society, as well as shaping 
the participation of the key actors in the formal participatory arenas.  
The thesis demonstrates that the formal participatory arenas and institutions created 
by the process of decentralisation do provide the opportunities for marginalised 
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community members to participate, although the power imbalances in a given 
community are less likely to guarantee ‘equitable participation’ as an intervention 
outcome. On the contrary, for actors participating in these formal invited arenas, such 
as a watershed committee or user group, their social life does not simply consist of 
formal relations, interactions and negotiations alone; hence, there is a need to 
understand what the ‘informal’ holds in the functioning of ‘formal participatory 
arenas’.  
Therefore, a need to acknowledge the central role played by any kind of community 
water-related intervention involves building on and feeding into existing social and 
power relations and any inequity in the benefits of the CBNRM project through 
formal participation. 
Keywords: Water Management, CBNRM, Gender, Decentralization, Formal and 
Informal Institutions, Groundwater, India, Gujarat 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The paradigm shift in natural resource management intervention from state-centered 
to community-based participatory approaches has been credited to facilitating 
people’s participation over resource use and management. Although these 
community-based approaches are a departure from earlier state-centered government 
policies (Pretty and Shah, 1997), contradictory responses have emerged on their 
successes and shortcomings. There have been concerns in the international 
development policy context about why community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) projects fail to achieve their expected level of equity (Ellis 
and Allison, 2004; Saint, 1995; Tyler, 2006). Academics and activists alike have 
criticised participatory interventions for their inherent vulnerabilities, due to power 
imbalances, which in turn affects various actors’ capacity to participate in a 
development project. In developing general and natural resource management (NRM) 
in particular, the word ‘participation’ has become a motto over the last two decades. 
Terms like “collective action”, “community driven development”, “community-based 
natural resource management”, decentralised governance” and “bottom-up-approach” 
suggest that the inherent processes are participatory in nature (Joy et al., 2004).  
Using the case study of the Mathnaa (a pseudonym)5 watershed development project 
in the Sabarkantha district of Gujarat, India, this study aims to understand how socio-
cultural factors influence participatory institutions and community formation created 
through CBNRM interventions in rural communities. Further, it reveals that the 
formal participatory arena,6 created for the purpose of facilitating people’s 
participation, results in social groups with diverse interests, which by default integrate 
diverse resources for their livelihood.  
                                                           
5
 As an ethical responsibility towards the general welfare of my respondents their real identities have 
been withheld in order to protect the confidentiality while writing this thesis. Thus to ensure their 
safety, pseudonyms are used for the people and the study village. Mathnaa is a pseudonym given to the 
village understudy in Sabarkantha district. 
6
 Arena is the social location or situations where actors contests over issues, values, representations and 
resources; (Oliver de Sardan, 1995). In Mathnaa, the arena was the Watershed Development Project 
where various actors involved had varied interests. 
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1.2 Movement towards Community-Based Natural Resource Management 
In the late 1980s, a gradual movement toward understanding local communities’ 
ability to manage natural resources started to emerge (Agrawal, 2001; Agrawal and 
Gibson, 2001; Baland and Plateau, 1996; Berkes, 1989; Chambers, Pacey and Thrupp, 
1990; Mckean, 1992; Murphree, 1991; Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Ostrom et al., 2002; 
Wade, 1987), which replaced the worldwide propaganda holding ‘communities’ 
responsible for the irrational exploitation of natural resources for selfish needs, widely 
known as the ‘tragedy of commons’ (Hardin, 1968). This evidence led to promoting 
CBNRM (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999) as a solution to the ‘tragedy’. Ostrom’s work 
on common pool resource management (1990) in particular established how collective 
action could uplift poor communities and sustainably manage the natural resources 
(McCay, 1995; McCay and Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990; Rose, 1994).  
However, a new wave of research findings in the late 1990s highlighted the need to 
understand the power equation amongst rural communities, so that rural local elites 
would not dominate the community-based management system by excluding the poor, 
women and powerless from the benefit of improved natural resource management 
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Leach et al., 1999; Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen, 
2001). The resultant effect of these findings specifically pointed out CBNRM’s 
aggregation problems on two fronts: firstly, the communities are not essentially 
visibly bounded social or geographic units; secondly, they are not likely to be 
homogenous entities with single or agreed interests (Uphoff, 1998). There is 
inadequacy in the conceptualisation of communities as a spatial unit, a homogenous 
structure and a set of shared understandings leading to equality, democracy and 
reciprocity in public transactions, commonly put forward by the advocates of 
‘community’-based conservation (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Mosse, 1998). 
Another important factor which is often overlooked is that natural resources are also 
heterogeneous such as water, forest etc. Thus for example, the conceptualisation of 
‘community’ for the management of harvested resources such as timber, pastures and 
fisheries will be different from that of wildlife conservation (Kumar, 2005). In the 
same way, ‘community’ in managing the watershed poses challenges to upstream and 
downstream communities’ who have diverse interests (Ibid). Hence, the way in which 
‘community’ is conceptualised and interpreted for implementation in CBNRM has a 
major drawback. As a result, questions arise on the specifics and parameters of 
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identifying ‘community’ boundaries such as: Where do they begin and end? Who is 
inside and outside ‘community’ boundaries? Who makes up the ‘community’? 
Moreover, the questions of inequality, repressive social hierarchies and discrimination 
are overlooked in CBNRM (Guijt and Shah, 1998). Nonetheless, communities are not 
always homogeneous entities but socially differentiated and dissimilar on the grounds 
of gender, caste,7 class, wealth, age and origins, which divide and cut across so-called 
‘community’ boundaries (Leach et al., 1997a), breed conflicting values and involve 
them in struggles and bargaining over limited resources (Carney and Watts, 1991; 
Leach, 1994; Moore, 1993). This might not involve true participation by the 
community, as a project might continue to be top-down with just token involvement 
from community members (Sangameswaran, 2008). The actual and potential fissures 
within communities along the lines of caste, status, religion and gender – and the 
ensuing inequalities –are often ignored in CBNRM (Leach et al., 1999; 
Sangameswaran, 2008). Therefore, in India and elsewhere, conservation intervention 
in CBNRM is highly debated in both academic and policy circles due to the roles of 
various actors comprising ‘the community’ and institutions which influence, shape 
and transform the outcomes of CBNRM interventions.  
1.3 Decentralisation, Participation, Institutions and Power8 in the CBNRM 
Decentralisation in various forms since the 1970s has been recommended as a way of 
reducing problems of development, resource management and poverty alleviation; 
that occur when a highly centralised public agency is used to manage natural 
resources in different localities (Ostrom et al., 1993). The decentralisation process 
aims to empower local communities by involving them in resource conservation and 
management through active engagement in decision making processes. The advocates 
of decentralisation argue that when local actors, are involved in the decision making 
                                                           
7
 Caste system is a pan-Indian phenomenon. Caste system is based on social inequality and in principle 
all castes within a locality can be ranked within a single hierarchy. Moreover castes are endogamous 
and segmentary in nature, as all castes are normally divided into sub-caste.   
8
 Power is considered to be a strategy as it constituted in social relationships such as networks, 
alliances and conflicts (Foucault, 1979). The concept of power is explained in detail in chapter 3: 
Conceptual Framework for Analysing Community-Based Natural Resource Management. In this thesis 
power, participation and institutions are seen within the framework of CBNRM and this framework 
helps in recognizing that actors (as individuals or groups) may wield power and exercise of such power 
is usually mediated by a variety of factors grounded in the contexts in which power operates.  
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process, they tend to invest substantial as amounts of time and labour in ensuring the 
sustainable utilisation of those resources (Cernea, 1985). In the decentralisation 
process, existing power roles, responsibility for planning and implementation and 
administrative capacity are redefined by the state at various levels in order to ensure 
that regulation, management and control over decision making within the scope of the 
conservation intervention are transferred to local communities (Agrawal and Gibson, 
1999). 
In worldwide CBNRM programmes various forms of decentralisation have been 
recommended as way of reducing the problems that occur when extremely centralised 
state machinery is used to manage natural resources (Ostrom et al., 1993). 
Decentralisation is defined as the transfer of powers from central government to lower 
levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy (Agarwal and Ribot, 
1999:3-4), and occurs in two forms, either through ‘deconcentration’ or ‘devolution’. 
In the former style, central government transfers some of its power to lower levels, 
but these remain responsible and accountable to central government, which reserves 
the right to supervise, overturn or withdraw the entrustments (Ostrom et al., 1993). 
Ostrom et al. (1993:164) refer to deconcentration as the ‘temporary devolution’ of 
authority within a bureaucracy to lower level officials, combined with enhanced 
opportunities for citizen participation.   
The form of decentralisation where authority is transferred to the representative, and 
downwardly accountable actors have autonomous, discretionary decision making 
power and resources to make decisions significant to the lives of local people, is 
known as ‘permanent devolution’. In this form, entrustments are transferred more or 
less completely to the local authorities or users (Ostrom et al., 1993). Most CBNRM 
initiatives aim at devolving entrustments to local communities.  
The prominence on communities as an instrumental medium for the conservation and 
maintenance of natural resources has happened recently (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; 
Chambers and McBeth, 1992; Etzioni, 1996). Furthermore, decentralisation has 
coincided with the mainstreaming of participatory approaches in development theory 
and practice, advocating that the local community should play a greater role in the 
management of natural resources (Chambers, 1993, 1995). The participatory 
development model led by Chambers (1994) advocated ‘participation’ as the foremost 
technique for achieving equitable resource management goals, which would help poor 
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and the marginalised sections of the community to have greater access and control in 
the decision making process regarding natural resource management (Mansuri and 
Rao, 2003). Hence, the creation of an arena enabling people’s involvement presumes 
that everyone will have an equal opportunity in the local community to participate and 
benefit accordingly. Often, development practitioners believe that community-based 
management interventions will lead to conservation, sustainable use and the 
development of a wide spectrum of actors. It is only recently that CBNRM studies 
have begun to look into the heterogeneity of communities and how resource 
management decentralisation has affected different community groups such as the 
landless, lower castes, religious-ethno groups and women (Mehta, 2005; Meinzen-
Dick and Zwarteveen, 2001). The danger involved in the direct transfer of power to 
communities in participatory interventions results in diverse and often 
counterproductive outcomes for the participating community. As power imbalances in 
a given community or among diverse actors often lead to powerful elitism within a 
community, they use this opportunity to consolidate their own positions.  
The belief behind participatory approaches in CBNRM is that they address 
inequalities by helping to sell and distribute the benefits of local management 
initiatives within the community. Moreover, the concept of ‘participation’ has not 
been foolproof, as the social reality of rural societies is complex and can have 
negative connotations for the people involved (Agarwal, 2001; Agrawal and Gibson, 
2001; Guijit and Shah, 1998).  
In fact, participation itself is a socially embedded phenomenon and not something that 
can be elicited at will (Nemarunde, 1995:11), hence unequal relations need to be 
assessed in relation to the power that each actor commands and how they influence 
CBNRM outcomes. Participation may take many forms, as it occurs along a 
continuum from tokenism (nominal participation) to interactive participation9 and 
there are different perspectives on who is expected to participate, what exactly is to be 
achieved and how it should be brought about (Pretty, 1995). Often, though, donor-
funded CBNRM facilitators, while designing community base management 
interventions attach ‘participatory tags’ as rhetorical gesticulation, as a matter of 
formality to acknowledge the concerned community’s role, empowerment of the 
                                                           
9
 The concept, nature, ranges and form of participation is discussed in detail in the chapter 3: 
Conceptual Framework for Analysing Community-Based Natural Resource Management. 
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concerned community and to demonstrate the state machinery’s commitment to the 
devolution of power.  
In the decentralisation of resource management discourse, there has also been a 
renewed debate on the role of institutions in natural resource management in the 
context of CBNRM. Within the literature on institutions, differences between 
institutions and organisations come to the fore. Institutions represent the ‘rules of the 
game’ while organisations are taken to be “players”, or the groups of actors are 
“bound together by some common purpose” (North, 1990:5). This thesis takes into 
account the role of both formal and informal institutions within CBNRM. Informal 
institutions are not legally recognised by the state through cultural norms, beliefs, 
practices, values or social network and kinship ties; instead, they are upheld by 
mutual agreement (unwritten), which is enforced endogenously (Cousins, 1997). 
Informal institutions themselves shape and are shaped by the everyday negotiations 
and power relations between diverse actors, whereas formal institutions represent 
rules that require third party enforcement and apply to law courts (Leach et al., 1999). 
As a result, the image of ‘community institutions’ in the context of CBNRM is 
incomplete if it overlooks the complex webs of interactions, informal institutions and 
contestations over resource control within groups from participating communities. 
Therefore, in everyday practices formal and informal boundaries often become 
blurred,10 as the actors’ who are positioned in formal and informal institutions, their 
participation is directly influenced by the power dynamics operating at grassroots 
level.  
In the light of the above discussion relating to various contextual and contested issues 
characterising decentralised, community-based natural resource management 
interventions, I now proceed to investigate the specific issues arising from community 
participation in these decentralised interventions. The ‘Mathnaa watershed project’ 
provides an ideal case for examining the influence of caste, class and gender on 
actors’11 participation in managing water to overcome water scarcity in the village.12 
                                                           
10
 The term ‘formal’ i.e., modern, bureaucratic and organizational and ‘informal’ i.e., social and 
traditional institutions are expedient but misleading, as traditional and social institutions may be highly 
formalized though not necessarily in the bureaucratic forms that are often recognize (Cleaver, 2001). 
11
 The term actor in the study is used here to refer to an individual human being who is actively doing 
something and/or group of actors who are capable of performing actions as a cohesive unit (Magadlela, 
2000). 
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This thesis aims to analyse socio-cultural aspects affecting actors’ participation in and 
their strategies concerning water management by various community groups, and how 
their capacity to participate is determined directly by their agency and relative power 
position within their communities.  
The present study considers caste, class and gender dynamics13 which influence the 
functioning of various water-related community groups such as ex-watershed 
committees, user groups, groups of water sellers and buyers in the groundwater 
market, as well as borewell14 ownership groups. These will be analysed using an 
actor-oriented approach. 
1.4 Actor-Oriented Approach 
The actor-oriented approach is concerned primarily with mapping relationships and 
flows of information to provide a basis for reflection and action (Biggs and Matsaert, 
2004). The actor-oriented approach given by Long derives from an internactionist 
social anthropology whose injunctions have been buttressed both by the failures of 
structuralist/interventionist approaches and by the early rise of postmodernist thought 
(Preston, 1996:302). The fundamental claim in the actor-oriented approach is that 
those involved in the interaction must be seen as agents, with their own 
understandings of situations, expectations of change and strategies for securing 
objectives (Preston, 1996). The approach also helps in making observations from 
actors’ perspectives, which is not necessarily fixed to the behaviour of actors in a 
rational choice theory (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989), and is interpretative and helps 
in understanding the role of actors in CBNRM.15  
There have been a number of studies related to CBNRM within the context of 
developing countries, which significantly examine the various analytical aspects of 
efficacy and the rationale behind community formation and participation in water 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12
 Thus by examining the watershed project related activity, ex-watershed committee, maintenance of 
check dams, and development of groundwater market; I will be analyzing how the power, institutions 
and participation work in Mathnaa in the thesis. 
13
 This is explained in detail in chapter 6: Social Organisation in Watershed Development Project of 
Mathnaa. 
14
 Borewell is a well consisting of pipe placed in hole bored into the ground to tap groundwater 
supplies from one or more aquifers. 
15
 The actor-oriented approach and its advantages are described in detail in chapter 3: Conceptual 
Framework for Analysing Community-Based Natural Resource Management. 
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conservation interventions across actor-oriented lines.16 Through the actor-oriented 
approach, the present study aims to investigate the various water-related community 
groups formed in Mathnaa through intervention processes and practices. This study 
maps the emerging sporadic interactions between actors as they respond to the 
intervention processes while drawing on their informal networks.17  
In addition, I attempt to adopt ethnographic enquiry18 as a methodological tool to map 
the roles and strategies taken on by the key actors in the various water-related 
community groups in Mathnaa.19 This thesis maps the interactions and negotiations 
which characterise their participation in the formal invited space of the watershed 
development project. The informal everyday cultural practices and local traditions 
that are followed at Mathnaa community level are also mapped to gain insight into the 
immediacy and meanings attached to water in everyday occurrences. This thesis also 
engages with these inquests in order to gain a better understanding of the multifaceted 
nature of the rural social fabric and its implications for contemporary and future 
CBNRM interventions through informal arenas and networks – thus defining access 
to and the control of water in user groups around check dams, collective borewell 
ownerships and in caste-based groundwater market exchange practices.      
The study makes a contribution, theoretically, to the problematisation of assumption 
attributed to a homogenous community – as portrayed through development agencies 
which consequently ignore the presence of socially differentiated stakeholders with 
different priorities, benefits and losses. Social identities are also multiple and 
overlapping – as in the case of caste in user groups, groundwater markets and 
watershed committee or self-help groups. Hence, the community should not be 
considered as a set of passive recipients; rather, it comprises various social actors who 
have diverse interests and shape the outcome of an intervention, by using 
opportunities to further their best interests. Moreover, this study argues that the image 
                                                           
16
 Some of the studies contributing to the CBNRM knowledge pool in context of water conservation 
interventions are Ahluwalia, 1997; Chhotray, 2004; Leach et al., 1999; Mosse, 1997a; Sangameswaran, 
2008; Saravanan, 2010a, 2010b. 
17
 This is discussed in detail in chapter 6: Social Organisation in Watershed Development Project of 
Mathnaa. 
18
 Ethnography enquiry is an act of direct observation of the activity of members of a particular social 
group, and producing a written description thereof (Marshall, 2001). 
19
 The various activities of people in Mathnaa in relation to water have been described in detail in 
chapter 5: The World of Water in Mathnaa. 
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often portrayed of “community and community participation” in the context of 
CBNRM is incomplete, as it overlooks complex webs of interaction, informal 
institutions and contestations over resource control and access within the groups 
within participating communities. More so, this study hopes to contribute to the 
debate on community formation and community participation in a development 
intervention project, by determining the socio-cultural factors that regulate access to 
water and water management and by using the actor-oriented approach.  
The case study focused on a community-based micro watershed development project 
at Mathnaa, a small village highly characterised by sharp social differentiations along 
the lines of caste, tribe and gender, in the Sabarkantha district of Gujarat and 
implemented by a local NGO based in Ahmedabad. The case study demonstrates that 
Mathnaa, which is a rainfed village, faces water problems, and how various actors in 
the village make use of different water-related programmes in the form of watershed 
projects (check dams), flat electricity tariffs, JGS (Jyotirgram Scheme)20 and borewell 
technology for devising strategies to manage water and combat water scarcity at 
community level. However, natural resource management remains an arena of 
conflict, and in the case of Mathnaa, it is water scarcity in particular which leads to 
various social actors trying to monopolise the situation for their own vested interests 
through user groups, collective borewell ownership or groundwater market exchange.   
1.5 Research Aim and Objectives 
This study intends to focus on the micro realities of the everyday lives of Mathnaa 
community members, by examining how socio-cultural factors influence the various 
water-related community groups to negotiate, gain access to and control the benefits 
of community-based water management. The research objectives of this study are as 
follows: 
i) To examine the socio-cultural meanings attached to water in 
community-based water management. 
ii) To examine the linkages between formal and informal institutions 
that shape actors’ participation in community-based water 
management. 
                                                           
20
 Under this scheme separate electricity supply is provided to domestic and agriculture related activity 
in the villages in Gujarat. This scheme is discussed in detail in chapter 4: Water Resource Management 
in Gujarat- An Overview. 
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iii) To identify the major actors, their roles, interests and power in 
formal and informal participatory arenas in community-based 
water management.  
 
The state of Gujarat was selected, as it has many sorts of soil and water-related 
problems, and the majority of the population survives on rainfed agriculture for their 
livelihood. As a result, the watershed development approach holds key importance for 
the state of Gujarat. Moreover, Gujarat has predominately dry land conditions and is 
one of the five major states where the Watershed Development Programme (WDP) 
has a significant presence and in particular a strong NGO base, which is reflected in 
their significant involvement as project implementing agencies (PIAs) for the projects 
(Shah, 2001). Gujarat was one of 11 states21 in which the first watershed guidelines of 
1995-96 were implemented. The Sabarkantha district of Gujarat has been selected as 
the study locale based on the fact that research pertaining to community involvement 
in watershed impact assessment in Gujarat so far has focused mostly on districts 
which are either totally tribal or based on caste groups. In contrast, the present study 
aims at understanding community participation in various water-related community 
groups between actors belonging to highly stratified social communities like Mathnaa, 
the demographic composition of which boasts of tribes constituting a significant 
percentage of the village population, along with a few other caste groups. 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003:13). Some of the particular features that 
distinguish the case study method from other qualitative research methods are: i) the 
fact that only one case is selected, although it is also accepted that several may exist; 
ii) the fact that the study is detailed and intensive; iii) the fact that the phenomenon is 
studied in context and iv) the use of multiple data collection methods (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003:52). I adopted this method in order to make my study and empirical 
inquiry deep and substantial. The strength of the case study approach lies in its 
contextual exploration of a problem, traded off against the limited capacity of other 
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 The 11 states in which watershed programme was implemented under the1995-96 guidelines were 
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil 
Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. 
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cases, since sampling is small and purposive, rather than purely random (Ragin, 
1992:3). The Mathnaa village was selected for the following reasons: 
i) It has a highly stratified village community bearing a composition 
of Hindu multi-castes and tribes, thus making it appropriate to 
study social differences between various communities in the village 
in relation to water. 
ii) It is a semi-arid village, having irrigated as well as non-irrigated 
farming; thus, most of the potential users of water could be 
covered. 
iii) It was one of the villages having heterogeneous population 
composition where watershed project has been completed, thus 
making it suitable for studying the sustainability of institutions in 
tandem with water management after the project ended. 
1.6 Research Methods 
Qualitative data collected through observation, semi-structured interviews and focus 
group discussions were analysed manually.22 According to Long (1992: 38), “social 
sciences have always been characterised by a multiplicity of paradigms”, so no 
method or technique can be foolproof and totally reliable. For the present inquiry, 
multiple research methods and techniques (both qualitative and quantitative method) 
were used in order to collect the data in triangulated format, which would leave less 
scope for error. The value and nature of the research findings significantly depend on 
the richness of information proffered by the cases and informants (Layder, 1998; 
Miles and Huberman, 1994). Therefore, entire households in Mathnaa were taken into 
consideration in order to gain a holistic picture, while purposive sampling was carried 
out on groups engaged in groundwater market exchange.23   
The ethnographic study of the village on water management was based on four key 
methods of data collection: household survey with a structured questionnaire, focused 
group discussions, participation observation including informal interviews. The main 
objective of the household survey, which covered 200 households,24 was to generate 
quantitative evidence of the characteristics of rural households in terms of caste and 
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 99 semi-structured interviews and 9 focus group discussions were conducted to get a broad 
understanding of the water management problem in the region and to identify the actors’ strategies to 
manage water. 
23
 200 heads of household were surveyed, in order to understand the household perspective on the 
water problem. 25 farmers from each water buying and selling groups were purposively selected in 
order to understand the working of groundwater market exchange in Mathnaa. 
24
 This has been elaborated in detail in chapter 5: The World of Water in Mathnaa. 
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tribe ratio, kinship lineage and level and scope of knowledge about the watershed 
project. The main reason for carrying out this baseline survey was to introduce the 
researcher to the villagers and to explain the purpose of my visit and how it related to 
the rural economy. This was done while keeping in mind the insider-outsider 
suspicions attached to the researcher from the villagers’ perspective. Nonetheless, I 
could not afford to risk the multiple identities which I carried with great precaution 
and trust. I wanted a clear understanding between the researcher and subjects being 
studied.25  
The participation observation26 comprised composite techniques such as informal 
interviews, observation of the physical and social settings and participating in local 
events and sub-cultures. Focus group discussions helped in understanding the 
historical aspects of various issues. While conducting informal interviews, I placed 
particular importance on the cadence, emotion and non-verbal reaction of the 
respondent, which helped me to understand their worldview and the meaning they 
attached to objects in their social interaction. Figure 1, below, gives an overview of 
the research methods, variables and units of analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
25
 Subjects here mean the people of Mathnaa.  
26
 The method of participation observation is integral to anthropological and ethnographic research 
because it provides “direct experimental and observational access to the insiders’ world of meaning” 
(Jorgenson, 1989:15). 
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Figure I: Summary of the Research Methods 
 
 
   
  
    
    
  
   
 
 
 
    
 
 
The thesis also maps an element of construction of the recent past through local 
histories spanning ten years. Living within the Mathnaa community proved very 
helpful, as it played a significant part in gaining acceptance and access to the local 
social network.27 Staying with the community also proved helpful for observing the 
everyday interactions and strategies adopted by the various social actors while 
engaging in various formal and informal arenas. The ethnographic study helped me to 
understand that water, which is natural resource, can become a contested commodity, 
as various meanings are attached to it over a given period of time. For different social 
actors during their social interactions, water is interlinked with caste and becomes 
central to everyday social life. 
The findings from the present study depend totally upon the data collected over a 
period of ten months during 2008-09 in Mathnaa village. Moreover, my initial efforts 
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 For the detail on the politics of carrying out the fieldwork, see Annexure I. 
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to tape record the interviews proved to be counterproductive, so making notes on a 
daily basis of the observations became an imperative and regular activity. 
Nonetheless, the data I collected during my stay 2008-09 in Mathnaa represents only a 
small snapshot of the multiple realties existing in Mathnaa people’s lives.  
1.6.1 Limitations of the Study  
The limitations of the study on methodological level include its specific focus on the 
micro realties of water around the everyday lives of the Mathnaa people, which 
renders it partially blind to the larger picture of water management at the Gujarat state 
level. Moreover, a case study methodology does not allow for making impact 
assessments, as possible through statistical methods, but it does offer an outstanding 
portrayal into the nuances and contextualised meanings around water management, 
which would otherwise not be possible through the adoption of quantitative methods. 
Consequently, this study uses qualitative and ethnographic modes of enquiry, and 
simultaneously provides an entry point for building triangulation into data collection 
and analysis processes to ensure validity and the ability to generalise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
 
Figure II: Thesis Structures 
Part 1                                                                                              Part 2 
Literature Review/Methodology/Theoretical Base          Ethnographic Description of 
Case Study 
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The thesis is organised into two parts, as depicted by Figure II. The first part has four 
chapters (1-4). The first chapter serves as an introduction to the thesis by outlining the 
study and setting out the research agenda. It briefly explores the relevant concepts 
used in the present study such as decentralisation, power, institutions, participation 
and CBNRM. It also discusses the theoretical framework of the actor-oriented 
approach in brief. Moreover, this chapter illustrates the methodological approaches 
used in the study and also explains the research questions and objectives. 
The second chapter gives a conceptual review of the spatial and temporal 
management of water in India. This chapter explains how community as an institution 
has managed irrigation systems in the historical context, from pre- to post-colonial 
Chapter 1 
Introduction, Methodology and 
overview of the thesis 
Chapter 4 
Gujarat Water Resource 
Management and its implications on 
various actors 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion, Findings and Policy 
Implications 
Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework (Concepts of 
Participation, CBNRM, Actor-
Oriented Approach, Power, Agency) 
Chapter 2 
Conceptual Review of Water 
Management in India: Pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial 
Chapter 5 
Ethnography of the World of Water in 
Mathnaa 
 
Chapter 6 
Social Organization/Participation in 
Water Related Groups and Groundwater 
Development  
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India, how the concept of community management has disintegrated over time and 
what attempts have been made to revive the institutions for community water 
management – and how far have they been successful. This chapter further argues 
why water management in India has been a tricky affair and how community-based 
water management is multidimensional in nature, as it is driven by socio-cultural 
factors such as caste, class, gender and institutions. Finally, we reveal a gap in the 
research regarding understanding the ability of a community to integrate by default a 
number of diverse technologies to achieve their social goal of survival. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the theoretical base and discusses the various theoretical 
trends of understanding community in policy debates. It uses the concept of 
community as an entry point for discussing CBNRM and critiques the global literature 
on community composition and participation in CBNRM, by highlighting the variety 
of models of common property resource management. This chapter further discusses 
theoretical concepts such as participation, power, agency and the relevance of, for 
example, an actor-oriented analytical approach for investigating the role of actors (as 
individuals or in groups) in the interaction process.  
Chapter 4 offers a brief overview of Gujarat Government measures related to 
groundwater and surface water management in terms of policies, projects and 
schemes. Furthermore, it gives details of how water management in Gujarat is 
influenced by socio-political, cultural, institutional and ecological factors. The chapter 
also highlights the issue of ‘communitarian ideal attachment’ by policymakers and 
social researchers, i.e. the notion that people cooperate to take over the participatory 
and democratic management of anything, whether it is watersheds, groundwater, 
irrigation systems or river basins. The chapter explains how the policy makers use this 
issue of ‘communitarian ideals’ for making the design of major programs of 
institutional reforms. But on contrary, fact such as local politics, caste, class, power 
relation affect the water governance of Gujarat which affect the ground reality of 
water management is discussed. 
Part 2 of the thesis consist of Chapters 5-7. Chapter 5 sketches the ethnographic 
picture of the Mathnaa village community and presents in detail ‘The World of Water 
in  Mathnaa’ and how various water-related aspects are negotiated in the day-to-day 
practices and interactions of social actors. This chapter empirically introduces the 
village, its social fabric, caste arrangement and the role that caste hierarchies play in 
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water arrangements. Moreover, the chapter also illustrates the village’s social 
structure, while a socio-cultural matrix centered on water arrangements and 
ownership is also typified and power dynamics in terms of wealth, land ownership 
and access to water are elucidated.  
Chapter 6 explores how local communities participate in the watershed development 
programme and how different social actors voice and stake their claims in the 
negotiation process to secure mutually beneficial interventions. This chapter also 
explores how gendered power relations and social exclusion influence the roles of 
women and other marginalised groups within the formal and informal participatory 
arenas, and how participatory arenas created through watershed committees and user 
groups are occupied and managed. This chapter further highlights the diversity of 
communities in these water-related groups and how they benefit the households, 
whose borewells are within the command area of the check dams. Moreover, it 
concentrates on the changes in groundwater development in relation to the 
groundwater market, brought about by watershed development, borewells and the 
Jyotirgram electricity scheme in the village, and how various actors use these 
interventions in the context of a diverse property rights regime to manage water.  
Chapter 7 synthesises the findings by summarising the whole thesis and discussing 
how various water groups manage water in highly stratified communities (along the 
lines of caste, class and gender) such as Mathnaa, when policies and development 
interventions happen together by default, and present the possible angle of further 
research. It also offers policy recommendations for a contextual and more adaptive 
community-based participation in Gujarat.  
This work aims to carry forward the hypothesis results and other dependent variables 
in order to focus sharply on the exigencies of water and its surrounding location of 
power apparatus in everyday social life. In a way, it is the ‘Baudrillardian’ approach 
which offers a cultural critique of the commodity (water) in a consumer society. The 
rural hinterland is not detached and oblivious to the complexities this commodity has 
to offer in the micro world of Mathnaa. Hence, the subsequent chapters will elaborate 
on the issues highlighted in this introductory chapter.  
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Chapter 2 Water Management across Space and Time in India 
2.1 Introduction 
India is credited with having a long history of human intervention in the management 
of water because of its distinctive climatic conditions, such as intense monsoons 
followed by prolonged droughts. Furthermore, rainfall is confined to a few months in 
the year, while uncertain, erratic and uneven traits make Indian agriculture dependent 
on different sources of irrigation. This dependence has led people and the successive 
ruling regimes, from pre-colonial to colonial and the post-colonial times, to make 
choices across space and time from a wide range of technologies28 for water control 
and distribution. Moreover, two major political and policy positions shape questions 
around water resources and their development in the country. The first is an 
environmentalist critique of the modernising strategies of the centralised state and the 
dominance of ‘western’ technical over indigenous community perspectives on 
irrigation and water resources (Mosse, 2007:218). The second is a reformist policy for 
the devolution of irrigation management responsibilities from the state to 
communities of users, which forms part of an international consensus on public sector 
reform, underpinned by ideologies of privatisation, the free market and a reduced role 
for development (Ibid:219). Therefore, this review chapter aims to explain how water 
management has interplayed between cooperation and conflict in India.  
Water holds binding ties to culture and is spirituality laden with economic value. 
Water management has been a sensitive issue in India due to socio-economic-political 
and ecological issues across diverse social groups. This chapter explains how the 
community as an institution has managed irrigation systems in the historical context 
and how the concept of community management has disintegrated over time. 
Furthermore, the attempts that have been made to revive institutions for community 
water management and their successful implementation are also dealt with in the 
following paragraphs. The next section describes water management during the pre-
colonial period in India, explaining how kings, feudal lords and local communities 
managed water as a resource. It questions the relevance of Karl Wittfogel’s ‘hydraulic 
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 Here the word technology is used in sociological sense. It means machines; equipments, productive 
techniques associated with them, and type of social relationship dictated by the technical organization 
and mechanization of work (Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, 2004). 
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society’ to water management in this particular era29 and explains how it was 
multidimensional. The second section elaborates on water management under colonial 
rule and how this was mechanised and centralised. It is striking and surprising to 
know that community conception found no place in colonial water management 
policies. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact and paradox, India became a standard bearer 
for the world in the use of modern science and engineering in the design of huge and 
multifarious irrigation structures. The third section illustrates the carrying forward of 
the colonial legacy in independent India’s water management policies and 
programmes and aims to study the attempts that have been made to revive 
community-based water management and its successful implementation by the 
government. Finally, the chapter argues why water management in India has been a 
tricky and cautious affair, as well as how community-based water management is 
multidimensional in nature.  
2.2 Water management in pre-colonial India 
Karl Wittfogel published his classic work ‘Oriental Despotism’ in 1957, in which he 
elaborated how, in many parts of the world; a specific form of social order had been 
prevalent since pre-historic times due to large-scale water management. Wittfogel 
(1957) argued that “oriental societies are characterised by strong centralised control 
over water resources which gave rise to despotism, as the state was seen to embody 
the community of users”. He studied the ancient hydraulic societies of Egypt and 
China and propounded the theory that control and knowledge over water resources 
went hand in hand with state control and domination.30 He further stated that in order 
to regulate water for irrigation, and to cope with natural disasters, hydraulic structures 
such as canal embankments were built, which created a social order characterised by a 
strong organisational structure of rule. Hence, considering such civilisations as 
hydraulic or agro bureaucratic in nature because they possess a great ability in 
organising, coordinating and managing water regulation for agricultural production; 
                                                           
29
 Karl Wittfogel in his book ‘Oriental Despotism’ (1957) mentions that in oriental societies, in order to 
regulate water for irrigation and to cope up with natural disasters, hydraulic structures like canals, 
embankments were build. This created a social order which were characterized by strong organization 
structure of rule, making it a hydraulic society or state. 
30
 Certainly, it is wrong to assume that all large hydraulic works are despotic. The case of the Balinese 
water temples in Indonesia (Geertz, 1972) is an excellent case to be pointed out here. These are 
centralized, but certainly not despotic. And have flexibility for decentralized forms of religious and 
cultural organization. 
20 
 
indicates the existence of a strong state bureaucracy required for water management 
and building heavy hydraulic works (Evers and Benedikter, 2009). 
In the context of India, however, there were various forms of irrigation in pre-colonial 
India; thus it could not be characterised as a ‘hydraulic society’ in the sense used by 
Karl Wittfogel (Hardiman, 2008). Wittfogel’s work characterised societies by their 
material base, arguing that hydraulic systems created particular kinds of social, 
economic, political, religious and cultural structures (Ibid). In India, claims of 
sovereignty and ideologies of total control were annulled, time and again, by the 
realities of local water distribution according to the political power of different groups 
within the local communities (Ibid). Therefore, in ancient and medieval India, farming 
was, effectively, ‘hydro-agriculture,’ involving the strong role of village communities, 
rather than hydraulic farming under state domination (Shah, 2009).  
Evidence of water management in pre-colonial India can be found in ancient texts, 
inscriptions, local traditions and archaeological remains (Agarwal and Narain, 1997). 
Moreover, ancient religious texts, commentaries and stone inscriptions provide 
references to governing principles such as ethical, moral, spiritual, social and 
ecological values, which were applied to water management during pre-colonial 
Hindu and Muslim rule in India (Vani, 2009a). The Arthashastra,31 one of the ancient 
historical canonical works written by Kautilya in the 3rd century BC, gives a clear 
account of water management in the Mauryan Empire. It states that the local 
communities were very well aware about rainfall regimes, soil varieties and irrigation 
techniques in the specific micro-ecological context. Furthermore, the Arthashastra 
mentions that the state rendered help and support and promoted small water 
harvesting structures (Agarwal and Narain, 1997). 
Traditional Indian32 irrigation/water structures were large in nature33 and built at the 
behest of kings seeking agricultural prosperity and to increase state revenue, along 
with religious sentiments attached to the building of such constructions (Agarwal and 
Narain, 1997). Indian kings also encouraged nobles, ordinary people and temples to 
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 Arthashastra was the book written by Kautilya the chief adviser to India’s first emperor, 
Chandragupta Maurya (321-297 B.C) of the Mauryan dynasty, on politics and statecraft. 
32
 In this chapter, for the pre-colonial India, the word traditional India is being used: that is ancient and 
the medieval history time period of India. 
33
 Such as tanks, wells and canals. 
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construct water harvesting structures by giving grants in the form of revenue-free 
lands, provided local communities were willing to invest in the construction and 
maintenance of the structures (Ibid). Let us take the example of the tanks34 
development, where for centuries work was done through the support of local chiefs 
with technical guidance from specialist surveyors and craftsmen. The villagers made 
their own arrangements for the construction, maintenance and operation of the tanks 
as a common property resource (Bottrall, 1992). Often, the tanks were built in a 
chronological manner, with smaller systems upstream of a catchment and moving 
with increasing size downstream. Each successive tank was built in a chain/cascade, 
and by maintaining the respective rights of upstream and downstream users the height 
of each was calculated. Thus, a way of regulating the amount of catchment runoff and 
its flow on to others was devised (Ibid). In some areas supra-village organisations 
existed, which had the power to mediate over inter-tank water disputes (Bottrall, 
1992; Agarwal and Narain, 1997). The political systems of the pre-colonial state 
generated resource flows and delineated authoritative positions in this matter (Mosse, 
1999); nonetheless, the investment and operation of tank systems were linked to the 
legitimate political overlordship, thereby establishing a link between the honour-
linked caste hierarchy and tank irrigation works in the articulation of authority at 
different layers of administrative levels. In total, this made it one of the most 
significant community management systems in contemporary times (Ibid). 
Whereas in the larger delta systems of South India major finance and organisation 
derived from the kings, day-to-day management was entrusted to local cultivators 
(Ludden, 1978; Sengupta, 1991). Small community-managed schemes were also 
developed in other parts of India, for example tanks such as the ahar-pynes35 of South 
Bihar (Pant, 1998). The pynes36 fed many ahars37 and spawned numerous tributaries. 
Irrigation organisation was designed in such a way that all the irrigators needed to 
cooperate in order to get water from a single tributary (ayacut) (Sengupta, 1985). The 
landholding of each farmer was fragmented, leading to the formation of small groups 
of people (goam) for the maintenance of the ahar-pynes (Ibid). Pant (1998) argues 
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 Tank is a man-made reservoir created by a simple earthen construction (the bund) that captures 
surface run-off. 
35
 Ahar-Pyne is a floodwater harvesting system. 
36
 Pynes are channels constructed to utilize the water flowing through the hilly rivers of Bihar. 
37
 Ahars are rectangular catchments basin with embankments on three sides. 
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that zamindars38 maintained the ahar-pyne system, as they had the capital and vested 
interest. In the river diversion system of Himalayan kuhls, descent and affinity, as 
well as local customs, played a key role in their management (Coward, 1990). In 
multi-village kuhls, inter-village coordination for channel repairs, maintenance and 
water distribution was practiced (Baker, 2003). 
In water-managed agriculture, wells played an important role in supplementing the 
surface water irrigation systems of Northern and Western India. Open-lined and 
unlined wells were used for domestic water needs and for complementing irrigation 
needs, about which evidence in the Vedic literature is available. It was the 
Satwahanas of ancient India who introduced ring wells – dug wells for irrigation use 
(Shah, 2009), whereas privately owned open wells operated manually or were 
powered by animals in the high water table areas of the Upper Gangetic Basin 
(Whitcombe, 1972). During the Mughal period, some large-scale canal constructions 
were undertaken, but their contribution to irrigated agriculture was relatively 
irrelevant (Habib, 1982); in fact, irrigation through wells was far more important at 
that time (Habib, 1970).  
The productivity-enhancing potential of well irrigation was acknowledged in the 
revenue calculus of ancient and medieval rulers; therefore, well construction was 
encouraged through incentives and tax remissions. From the time of Arthashastra 
(third century B.C.) to Mughal rule through the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, 
and later on even during the colonial era, land irrigated with wells was assessed at a 
higher rate than rainfed lands (Hardiman, 1998). Wells were mostly owned and 
constructed by individual peasant families, usually from dominant castes. Their 
control over water enhanced their local power, predominantly over lower castes and 
untouchables (Hardiman, 2008), while in the flood-prone Eastern Gangetic Plains 
agriculture was largely rainfed, although there was some partial additional irrigation 
from surface sources, known as ‘overflow irrigation,’ through small, private low-lift 
devices  (Willcocks, 1984). River embankments in the Gangetic delta were built by 
zamindars in the pre-colonial period for flood protection during monsoons through 
deliberate post-monsoon breaching for flood irrigation (Ibid).  
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 Zamindars are the landlords. 
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Hence, in pre-colonial India, community-based irrigation structures such as tanks, 
ahar-pynes, kuhls enjoyed significant technical sophistication, with decentralised 
institutional arrangements, aimed at water management, and well-defined local water 
rights (Bottrall, 1992), but not in a simplified way of functioning. Whether it was in 
the case of tanks, where relations of power and authority existed in the form of caste 
dynamics or honour-linked caste hierarchy, its symbiotic relationship with the wider 
set of political relations of the decentralised or segmentary pre-colonial state was 
pivotal (Mosse, 1999). In the case of ahar-pynes, they required a system of 
cooperation and consensus between landholders willing to benefit from the ayacut 
and form groups and the power dynamics of large landholders (zamindars), who had 
the capital to invest in the maintenance of the ahar-pyne system (Pant, 1998). 
Conversely, the kuhl system constituted a dense web of interlocking irrigation systems 
and channels, whereby one village used water from several different kuhls to irrigate 
fields at different elevations, or concurrently one kuhl irrigated fields in as many as 
30-40 different villages, therefore requiring inter-village coordination for channel 
repair and water distribution (Baker, 2003). Moreover, networks of inter-kuhl social 
relations, set up to address environmental shocks such as flooding and earthquakes, 
led to joint kuhl management and inter-kuhl water transfer (Ibid). Thus, in the pre-
colonial community-based water structure, wider networks of cooperation and conflict 
were embedded in the individual systems of water management, and local community 
leaders facilitated the process of water governance at the local level.  
As a result, water was a multifaceted resource in pre-colonial India, and its 
relationship with society has had many dimensions, such as cultural, spiritual and 
symbolic39 meanings for local communities, apart from economic significance. 
Therefore, simply viewing water through an economic lens can undermine its 
embeddedness in the everyday symbolic, cultural and social contexts within which 
communities live their lives. And through social institutions,40 water was controlled 
and regulated in pre-colonial India. The next section deals with water management 
during British rule over India. 
                                                           
39
 By symbolic dimension it is meant: the social status and power in this study. 
40
 Social institution forms an element in a more general concept, known as social structure (Wells, 
1970). Social structure will include all sets of social relations (Hodgson, 2006). 
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2.3 Water management in colonial India 
‘Environments’ are in essence models of the relationship between 
communities and the natural world around them, and as such, they 
are, like all models, ‘made by humans for specific communities’ 
(Gudeman, 1986:37). 
A quantum leap in irrigation was initiated in the 1830s through the works of Sir 
Arthur Cotton and Major Cautley in Southern India and Northern India, respectively. 
By this time the East India Company ruled most of India and realised the immense 
opportunity in irrigation of combining the interests of charity and commerce 
(Whitcombe, 2005) in repairing one of the greatest irrigation works of pre-colonial 
times, the Grand Anicut in Tanjore41 and the Jamuna canals42 in the Delhi region. The 
canal systems of Tamil Nadu and the East Jamuna Canal, which were improved and 
extended in the 1820s, were the only exceptions to this rule (Hardiman, 2008). In 
order to gain quick economic returns from water development, the colonial 
government attempted to instigate large-scale irrigation projects in the Deccan region, 
which were not successful. This initial debacle provoked the British Raj to look 
towards the reintroduction of the traditional irrigation tanks system. Attempts to 
facilitate this scheme collapsed due to a failure to understand the complex social 
system involved over its management. One of the efforts was the revival of the 
Kudimaramat.43  
Other factors which added to the demise of tanks in South India were (a) the colonial 
commercialisation of dry agriculture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries; (b) the establishment of a centralised colonial government and build up of 
technocratic irrigation bureaucracy from the 1850s; (c) the consolidation of British 
power, its revenue systems and property law by the 1840s and (d) the dismantling of 
South Indian ‘old regimes’ around 1800 (Mosse, 1999: 307-308).   
In Bengal, the traditional irrigation system of building embankments along flood-
prone rivers served the purpose of irrigation as well as flood protection. Peasants who 
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 This refers to the repair of Grand Anicut on river Cauvery by the Colonial Government. 
42
 These canals were originally dugout in the regime of Firoz Shah Tughlaq about 600 years ago 
(Habib, 1982:49). 
43
 The term Kudimaramat is a amalgamated of the Tamil word kuti- meaning ‘inhabitant’ or ‘subject’ 
and the Arabic word  maramat- meaning ‘repairs’ (Mosse, 1999). For detail on Kudimaramat , see 
annexure-II. 
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required water for irrigation would simply breach the embankment and divert water, 
which was termed ‘overflow irrigation’ by Willcocks (1984). However, with the 
zamindari settlement of Bengal presidency, colonial engineers were less concerned 
with water issues, and due to their indifferent attitudes they were not able to 
understand the principle and prohibited breaching in 1855, and later brought it under 
their direct control (Sengupta, 1985). For railways, roads and for flood control the 
British Government constructed many new embankments, which only led to water 
logging, drainage problems and loss of irrigation benefits (Ibid). When agricultural 
production started declining rapidly in prosperous Bengal, the British Government 
invited William Willcocks, a British irrigation expert, to advise them on a 
development programme. In a series of lectures delivered in Calcutta in the 1920s, 
Willcocks astonished everyone by arguing that the best the government could do was 
to revive Bengal’s ancient flood irrigation system (Willcocks, 1984).  
Thus, the colonial rulers redefined property relationships and took absolute control 
through ownership of all resources such as land, water, forests and minerals, without 
understanding the dynamics of how irrigation systems functioned. Furthermore, the 
government levied taxes of all kinds such as land taxes, water taxes, well taxes, 
subsoil water taxes, canal charges, etc. (Hardiman, 2008), which imposed an immense 
burden on the communities. 
The failure to understand traditional irrigation systems, in order to fill the coffers of 
the British regime, paved the way for India’s colonial rulers to resort to large-scale, 
publicly funded irrigation development. For example, in the Southern Deltas, 
operational responsibility for structural renovation work started by Sir Arthur Cotton 
on the Grand Anicut on the Cauvery River could not be left to long-established local 
institutions (Bottrall, 1992). Grand Anicut’s reconstruction in 1838, and the 
redevelopment of the Jamuna canals, launched a phase of massive canal construction 
activity by the colonial rulers, which led to a paradigm shift in irrigation thinking 
(Shah, 2009).  
In the lower rainfall territory of the Upper Ganges Region, colonial engineers started 
constructing a vast network of new canals, which later became the mode of 
development (Stone, 1984). The British Raj focused first on ‘productive’ canal 
irrigation works that could generate annual revenues equal to the interest on their 
capital cost (Stone, 1984: 25) In 1880, the Indian Famine Commission made visible 
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the indirect returns of irrigation work in the form of the curtailment of famine relief 
expenditure (Stone, 1984). This judicious ruling led the British Raj to shift to 
‘protective’ irrigation works in the form of constructing large-scale storage dams and 
canals in the Bombay Deccan (Attwood, 2007). 
The completion of the Upper Ganga Canal (UGC) in 1847, the first great 
northwestern scheme, led to the establishment of the fact that artificial irrigation was 
best suited for the topography of the area (Stone, 1984), as its simple operational 
design went hand in hand with the homogeneity of the physical environment (Bottrall, 
1992). The rational supply of water by proportional flow through an uncontrolled 
watercourse to as many farms with strict upstream control was possible, due to the 
design layout of the water distribution pattern of the canals (Berkoff, 1990). This was 
best suited to the three main colonial objectives: a) financial (low operational costs, 
high revenue), b) socio-political (famine and drought preclusion) and c) 
administrative (limited field staff with little possibility of conspiring with farmers in 
manoeuvring the centrally determined water schedules) (Bottrall, 1992). 
As a consequence, a new specialist cadre of irrigation engineers was created in order 
to govern canal management with the passing of 1873 North India Canal and 
Drainage Act. In the canal irrigation system, the Irrigation Department (ID) was 
vested with all rights such as control over the regulation of water supplies and the 
power to withdraw water supplies to non-cooperating farmers (Stone, 1984). British 
colonial policy in the nineteenth century drew from an international discourse of 
water engineering, which had its roots in the transformation of water into a 
commodity (Worster, 1985). The outlook of British irrigation engineers towards the 
environment was that of seeing it as a mathematically modelled system, which 
included the modelling of flow, distribution and the use of water (Gilmartin, 1995). 
The capitalist state promoted science and technology “to extract from every river 
whatever cash it can produce” and thus transformed water into a commodity (Worster, 
1985). The mathematical creation of an integrated hydraulic environment gave its 
colonial colour to colonial India. Moreover, the British regarded local communities 
“in a language of ‘naturalism’ that defined them as parts of the ‘natural’ environment 
to be modeled and controlled” (Gilmartin, 1995). In 1860s and 1870s, British 
irrigation policy, though principally inclined for larger strategic, financial and 
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political concerns, endorsed local initiatives in private or semi-private canal building 
by local landlords and tribal chiefs (Ibid).  
For the first time under British rule, water was carried on a vast scale from one river 
to another. “For some engineers (and other administrators), the effective control of the 
state over the larger environment simply empowered the state to frame rules of proper 
irrigator behaviour44 that would enable them to control people as canal controlled 
water” (Gilmartin, 1995:224). One of the finest examples of the colonial irrigation 
policy is that of Punjab’s ‘canal colonies’, as these lands were called, which were 
brought under cultivation by the interlinked irrigation canals.45 The other was the Nira 
Left Bank Canal,46 where a ‘block system’47 was introduced and turned out to be 
successful with the introduction of sugarcane cultivation along with food crop 
rotation. 
On the one hand, northwestern canal schemes were outstandingly successful during 
the British period. The Raj enormously increased agricultural production and incomes 
in what were viewed as ‘backward’ areas, and the Punjab settlement later became the 
pioneer of modern agriculture and irrigation (Stone, 1984). The widespread layout of 
the canals made it possible for the government to earn massive profits, thus leading to 
high standards of operation and maintenance of the canals (Stone, 1984). On the other 
hand, canal schemes have been criticised on environmental grounds (Whitcombe, 
1972; Stone, 1984). 
Although the canal schemes were highly centralised and bureaucratically controlled, 
they did serve the interests of their users48 for three main reasons. Firstly, the physical 
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 Here ‘proper irrigator behavior’ means farmers following a) the correct rules of irrigating the fields, 
b) not wasting water, c) following the rules of proper construction and clearance of village 
watercourses, and d) not growing crops which were forbidden like rice in certain areas etc (Gilmartin, 
1995).     
45
 Series of interlinked irrigation canals in Western Punjab brought about 14 million acres of arid land 
under agricultural colonization and settlement (Gilmartin, 2003). 
46
 Nira Left Bank Canal was constructed in the Deccan region of Bombay Presidency as a famine relief 
work during 1876-85 and was initially conceived for the purpose of ‘protective irrigation’ (Attwood, 
2007; Bolding  et al., 1995). 
47
 In the course of time, ‘block system’, was introduced in the Nira canal which was based on the 
traditional crop rotation system, the phad system (Phad was a community managed irrigation system in 
which series of dams were built on rivers to divert water for agricultural use), which was practiced in 
Northern district of Bombay Presidency (Bolding et al., 1995). 
48
 Users here are the farmers who were getting water for irrigation from the Northwestern canal 
schemes (Bottrall, 1992). 
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and technical: the environment of the northwestern plains was best suited for the 
adoption of a supply-driven water rationing system which was cheap, efficient and 
equitable, but in practice it was difficult to manipulate. Secondly, political and social 
factors: there was a lack of strong political forces capable of challenging the authority 
of the colonial government on the issue of water rates throughout that period. Thirdly, 
the source of inducement to perform: although ID staff were not legally accountable 
to the water users, they were under constant pressure from higher authorities in the 
colonial government to ensure that the canals’ financial and famine prevention goals 
should be fruitfully met (Bottrall, 1992).  
Thus, the canals’ design and management systems were the products of a long and 
continual process of learning, adjustment and refinement over a long period of time – 
a full century after the completion of the Upper Ganga Canal (UGC) and up to India’s 
independence. In fact, many serious canal design mistakes were made, and with the 
introduction of adjustable proportional modules (APMs) in the 1920s a strictly 
controlled management system became widespread (Bottrall, 1992; Stone, 1984). 
From 1900 onwards, colonial engineers began to realise that low cost canal 
development sites for run-of-the-river schemes were slowly declining in the northwest 
of India, although new work continued in the Punjab province and was extended into 
Sind in the 1920s and 1930s (Stone, 1984). The construction of the Sharda canal in 
central Uttar Pradesh (UP) in the1920s highlighted that in the Gangetic Plains the 
expansion of canals and their management would be difficult due to higher rainfall 
and higher water table areas vulnerable to water logging (Ibid).  
In order to carry forward their agenda of profit making through water development for 
irrigation, the colonial administration started identifying new areas such as upper river 
valleys of southern India and Deccan. They were identified for constructing large and 
medium canal schemes, and small surface systems such as tanks and mechanised 
groundwater development schemes were considered a viable option for water 
development (Bottrall, 1992). Uncertainty surrounding economic returns because of 
the high construction costs of canals due to uneven topography and rainfall conditions 
led to only modest upstream canal development in the south and west of India (Ibid). 
The rehabilitation of tanks by the colonial government was very much undertaken, but 
with little success and insignificant impact (Sengupta, 1985).  
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Consequently, the British had established the commercial viability of canal irrigation 
by the end of colonial rule (Whitcombe, 2005), but the performance of Indian 
agriculture, thanks to canal irrigation facilities, has been controversial, with scholars 
such as Mason (2006) glorifying that the canal irrigation curtailed famines in India. 
Conversely, others were of the opinion that the ‘unbalanced irrigation development’ 
of irrigation projects and investment in Punjab, Madras and United Provinces failed to 
feed the rest of India and could not prevent the Bengal famine of 1942, which led to 
the death of four million people through starvation (Shah, 2009). 
The colonial government was more interested in canal construction for obvious 
reasons, but in the state of Gujarat they encouraged well construction through tax 
exemptions, as they believed that irrigation could only be effectively carried out in 
Gujarat through wells (Hardiman, 1998). In Gujarat (as in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab), 
well irrigation was the most important source of irrigation, even during colonial times, 
as there were no major colonial canal projects in this part of India (Ibid). During the 
1930s, about 78 per cent of the irrigated area of British Gujarat was irrigated by wells 
and only 10 per cent by the canals (Desai, 1948), whereas in the northwest the use of 
groundwater started increasing slowly through bullock-powered lifts from small 
private open wells during the 1900s, although the cost per unit of water lifted was 
high due to higher labour and energy costs (Stone, 1984; Bottrall, 1992). This resulted 
in low crop yields, and cheap surface water in the canal areas became a hindrance in 
the expansion of groundwater development (Ibid). 
In the provinces of Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Punjab, mechanised tubewells were 
promoted by the Agricultural Department, but due to the availability of cheap energy 
sources, tubewell costs remained high in comparison to the returns. Colonial research 
led to the conclusion that the best option for developing groundwater was to promote 
large-capacity deep tubewells (DTWs) rather than shallow wells. With the passage of 
time, a large capacity deep tubewells (DTWs) scheme was promoted by the colonial 
government and around 1,500 public tubewells were installed in Western UP in 1934, 
with each well irrigating 150-200 hectares of land (Dhawan, 1982). With the aim of 
increasing irrigation in all possible ways, significant steps were taken by the colonial 
government in the context of research and development (R&D) at the turn of the 
century by creating the Provincial Agriculture Department, which would provide 
professional expertise on issues relating to water and agriculture. Furthermore, in 
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1928, the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India (RCAI) provided a 14-volume 
report about irrigation issues (Bottrall, 1992) in order to set priorities for the overall 
development of water issues in the country.  
It can therefore be summarised that the main interest of the colonial government was 
to maximise revenue generation, which led to a massive canal construction 
programme. A highly centralised system of irrigation management, with a huge 
bureaucratic structure extending even to Britain, emerged, laying the foundations for a 
new irrigation ideology that would open up vast – often unpopulated – areas for 
farming, by manipulating the large untapped rivers and reconfiguring the basin 
hydrology. For example, the history of Punjab’s ‘canal colonies’ depicted a complex 
character of a relationship between the state, science and nature in a colonial context, 
by linking science and the colonial empire in a manner that controlled and 
commodified Nature in order to tap its productive powers (Gilmartin, 2003). 
Moreover, an unbalanced irrigation development without regional equity was initiated 
through centralised structures for constructing and managing large irrigation systems 
on commercial lines.  
Water in colonial India was not seen as having multidimensional meanings. The 
particular use of water in terms of economic profits was the primary goal of colonial 
rulers. Water for irrigation had had many meanings and relationships attached to it, 
for example in the case of ‘overflow irrigation’, where embankments built by local 
zamindars had a crucial role in flood management for the local communities, which 
the British engineers failed to understand. Similarly, in the case of tanks and 
kudimaramat, the British Government failed to understand the community 
mobilisation of funds for managing and maintaining the tanks. Colonial India’s water 
governance was mechanised and centralised, with very little or no role for local water 
users/communities. Developing water as a resource was considered critical and 
pertinent to the enhanced British government income, and also to the new forms of 
state power. Thus, increasingly, state control over water – and then over land – led to 
a new framework of control over the local ‘communities’.  
Colonial irrigation in India successfully advocated that the state, in partnership with 
science, could tame rivers and subsequently improve human welfare. This ideology 
survived until the end of British reign and began dominating the water management 
discourse in post-colonial, independent India. The last two decades before India’s 
31 
 
independence were marked by economic recession, the approaching end of 
colonisation and World War II. Each of these factors contributed to a slowdown in 
irrigation development, and the country became a standard bearer for the world in the 
use of modern design engineering techniques for huge and multifarious irrigation 
structures only during the colonial era. The modern epoch of constructing big dams 
had its roots in nineteenth century India (Postel, 1999), and it was only in the colonial 
period that India experienced its role as a hydraulic society with strong, centralised 
bureaucratic control over water development and its management. India’s 
independence resulted in partition, which brought about new forms of water 
management and strategies to manage water for irrigation. The next section deals with 
this in detail.  
2.4 Water management in independent India 
India attained its independence from British rule in August, 1947. With independence 
came partition and the loss of a huge swathe of productive irrigated lands to Pakistan. 
In addition, the bulk of the public irrigation networks that the British had created 
ended up in Pakistan (Shah, 2009). The new Government of India’s main aim after 
independence was to accelerate development and address the regional disparity of 
investment, as it was facing serious food grain shortages and rapid rates of population 
increase. The slow pace of irrigation development during the last decades of colonial 
regime had also aggravated the current problem of food shortages.  
2.4.1 Large-scale irrigation schemes as ‘temples of modern India’ 
To overcome grain shortages, a huge investment in a large-scale irrigation project was 
considered the best option. This was apparent from the Five-Year Plans (FYPs), 
which started in 1951. Investment in the large-scale surface irrigation was targeted 
under the first two plans, and giant projects like Bhakra-Nagal, the Damodar Valley 
and Hirakud were undertaken during that time. Minor irrigation projects49 did receive 
some attention, but the major focus was afforded to major50 and medium51 irrigation 
projects after independence. The large-scale irrigation schemes were multi-purpose 
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 Minor irrigation schemes is the one in which the arable command area is less than 2000 hectares. 
50
 Major irrigation schemes is the one in which the arable command area is more than 10,000 hectares. 
51
 Medium irrigation schemes is the one in which the arable command area is more than 2000 hectares 
but less than 10,000 hectares. 
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and depended on reservoirs, unlike the run-of-the-river irrigation schemes of colonial 
India. 
The early post-independence era took pride in launching these vast new projects, and 
large dams were seen as ‘modern temples of modern India’, keeping in view the 
vision of Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of the newly independent 
country. More than 90 per cent of public investments in agriculture were allocated for 
large-scale projects during the first 40 years after independence (Kishore, 2002). The 
post-independence era has seen an impressive increase in irrigated areas by large 
surface systems under state management, and since independence the expansion of 
irrigated area by canals has been significant, from 8.3 million hectares in 1950-51 to 
18 million hectares in 1999-00 (Government of India, 2006a). This also led to 
lobbyism by engineers, irrigation bureaucrats and contractors who had vested interests 
in the construction of large dams in the Hydel projects. This led to further severe 
deterioration in the quality of programme planning and project design during the 
second five-year plan from 1955-60 (FYP) (Hanson, 1966). 
These ‘temples of modern India’ were flawed on three counts. Firstly, the 
construction of big projects at many places led to major delays in project completion 
due to budget constraints (Hanson, 1966; Bottrall, 1992). Secondly, these projects 
failed to take into consideration the complex topographic environmental conditions 
that deemed it was not viable to build and extend canals in areas such as eastern 
floodplains or in Deccan (Bottrall, 1992). Finally, the old colonial legislation of 
giving unlimited powers to the government and the ID continued to be practiced in all 
matters relating to surface water development and management, leaving no rights for 
water users (Ibid).  
Although there were very few exceptions, the new schemes introduced in the 
northwest of India led to the disappearance of the centralised bureaucratic canal 
management system introduced during colonial times (Bottrall, 1992). The northwest 
supply-driven rationing principles, and the delta water management of the south, were 
neither appropriate nor implementable due to the rigidly designed and often 
incomplete delivery systems. The strict formal allocation rules issued by ID officials, 
vulnerable to pressure from influential farmers to mismanage the distribution of water 
to their mutual advantage, led to a large network of corrupt actors, including local 
politicians, farmers and contractors, influencing the planning and construction phases 
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of surface water development as well as its management (Pant, 1981; Wade, 1982). 
Falls in water rates and the squeezing of budgets corresponding to the fall of the 
salary levels of ID staff further added to the mismanagement and poor performance of 
big irrigation projects (Chambers, 1988).  
Widespread official acknowledgment of large schemes having severe water 
management problems began from the early 1970s, after the second Irrigation 
Commission (IC) report was released by the Ministry of Irrigation and Power under 
the Government of India. Nevertheless, for a long time ID professed that the main 
problems with water management happened because of farmers, so the need of the 
hour was to educate them on how to use water effectively and properly (Chambers, 
1988). Thus, in 1974-75, the Central Government initiated the Command Area 
Development Programme (CADP) for water management in the command areas, but 
the programme did not take account of studying the vital central issue of system 
design and management practice (Bottrall, 1992).  
To summarise, India’s peak years of dam construction were from 1970-89, when 2256 
out of a current total of 4291 dams were built, according to the study on India 
prepared by the World Commission on Dams (Attwood, 2007). Instead of becoming 
technically and economically more efficient though, canal systems have been wasteful 
in terms of cost and financial mismanagement, which fits the picture of massive waste 
and inefficiency generated by India’s state-managed “development projects in the 
period from 1950-1991” (Rangachari et al., 2000). Hence, India’s ability to feed its 
growing population in the future now depends to a large extent on how it can make 
significant improvements in the efficiency of poorly designed and irresponsibly 
managed irrigation systems (Attwood, 2007).  
2.4.2 Small-scale revolution 
Independent India’s water management can be further divided into small-scale, 
community-based management and groundwater revolution. In the 1980s, attempts 
were made to bring about reform in the management practices of the ID through the 
World Bank-supported National Water Management Project (NWMP),52 but none of 
these programmes made an effort to address the issue of the department’s legal 
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 For detail see ‘Irrigation Management in South India: The Approach of The National Water 
Management Project (Berkoff, 1988). 
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powers, lack of accountability in system management and the monopolistic control of 
public funds assigned for surface water development (Bottrall, 1992). During the 
early 1990s in India, participatory irrigation management (PIM), through irrigation 
management transfer (IMT) to farmers, was officially acknowledged as the best 
method to bring about the efficient utilisation of irrigation water, its equitable 
distribution and a sustainable irrigation service (Swain and Das, 2008).  
The concept of PIM in India has evolved through three distinct phases. Firstly, in the 
early 1980s, the concept was limited to farmers’ participation through their 
representatives in project management committees, but this was not very successful. 
In the latter part of the 1980s, farmers’ organisations such as chak (outlet) committees 
were formed, but many of these remained only on paper and became dysfunctional 
after a while. Finally, in the early part of the 1990s, the concept of creating farmers’ 
organisations and was adopted through the World Bank-funded Water Resources 
Consolidation Project, through which thousands of water users associations (WUAs) 
were formed to take responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the 
downstream parts of irrigation systems, distribution of water among water users and 
collection of water rates from the farmers (Maloney and Raju, 1994; Swain and Das 
2008). Nonetheless, the implementation of PIM has been a bumpy ride in India 
because of the heterogeneity of farmers, caste-class differences, physical system 
inefficiency, half-hearted support from irrigation bureaucracy, inadequate capacity 
building and a lack of proper incentives and committed local leadership (Swain and 
Das 2008). 
Furthermore, in regard to community participation in irrigation management, the 
Government of India also launched the National Water Policy (NWP) of 1987, 
placing emphasis on farmers’ participation in the management of irrigation systems, 
especially in water distribution and the collection of water charges (Randhawa and 
Sharma, 1997). The NWP of 2002 emphasises a participatory approach for the 
management of water, by encouraging cooperation between various governmental 
agencies and other stakeholders. This includes including women in various aspects of 
the planning, design, development and management of water resources schemes. 
Moreover, involving local bodies such as municipalities and gram panchayats53 in the 
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 Gram Panchayat is the council of elected or nominated villagers. 
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operation, maintenance and management of the water infrastructure was achieved, 
keeping in view the eventual transfer of management rights to user groups 
(Government of India, 2002a).   
Conversely, in the post-colonial era, small water surface systems under community 
management continued to decline due to the low level of public investment and 
government measures designed to increase legal and administrative control. For 
example, the kuhl system (farmer-managed gravity flow irrigation) of Himachal 
Pradesh ranges from kuhl regimes which operate independently of any state 
involvement to regimes which are totally managed by the Himachal Pradesh Irrigation 
and Public Health Department54 (Baker, 1997). The phads55 of Maharashtra have been 
physically absorbed into large new canal schemes, whereas in the tank systems, 
population pressure on the upper catchments has resulted in rapid siltation, denudation 
and erosion of the areas on which they depended for their run-off. Secondly, the 
expansion of modern groundwater extraction technology, along with the Green 
Revolution of the 1960-70s, acted as key factors in the demise of the tanks (Mosse, 
1999). 
The micro-watershed-based approach to natural resource management has been 
hampered due to the compartmentalisation of various government programmes and 
the centralisation of various programmes meant for water development. For example, 
the Community Development Programme (CDP) was started in 1952 with the aim of 
community participation in the development of the village (Neale, 1983), but it 
resulted only in the administrative and developmental functions of a centralised state 
in the form of replacement by introducing from the 1960s centrally sponsored 
programmes and schemes for individual departments (Jain, 1985).  
Indian watershed development programmes had begun in the 1970s to increase land 
productivity by concentrating on soil and water conservation issues, but up to this 
point watershed development had held no special significance for the development 
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 Tensions have been generated within kuhl regimes due to increasing nonfarm employment. As those 
who have access to new economic opportunities are not very keen to contribute labor in voluntarily 
cleaning of canals and other resources, required for the upkeep of kuhl irrigation, as that time spent 
could be used in earning a wage (Baker, 1997). 
55
 Phad was a community managed irrigation system in which series of dams were built on rivers to 
divert water for agriculture use. The Phad system was prevalent in northwestern Maharashtra and came 
into existence 300-400 years ago; the Phad system operated on three rivers in the Tapi basin- Panjhra, 
Mosam and Aram in Maharashtra (Agarwal and Narain, 1997).   
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community (Yoganand and Gebremedhin, 2006). Indian watershed projects started 
spreading wider in the late 1980s and 1990s, with the aim of developing semi-arid 
areas that the Green Revolution had circumvented (Government of India, 1990, 
1994a; World Bank, 1990). Watershed project approaches evolved from the highly 
technocratic, large-scale top-down approach to greater local participation and use of 
local technologies, which resulted in better performance in terms of conservation and 
productivity (Farrington et al., 1999; Hanumantha Rao, 2000; Hinchcliffe et al., 
1999). Three extremely successful village-level projects initiated in the 1970s were: 
Sukhomajri, Ralegaon Siddhi and Pani Panchayat, which focused on the link between 
soil conservation and water harvesting. These are seen as having the modern roots of 
the centuries old assortment of soil and water conservation efforts in India (Kerr, 
2002).  
In order to replicate the success of these three projects several large-scale projects 
were started in the 1980s.56 All of these projects operated in relatively poor degraded 
areas and adopted the technological approaches of Sukhomajri, Ralegaon Siddhi and 
Pani Panchayat, but none of them adopted institutional arrangements, with no or little 
effort made to organise communities, as benefits and cost were unevenly distributed 
in the watershed development project (Government of India, 1990, 1994a; World 
Bank, 1990). The projects failed to take note that collective action to manage the 
common pool was tough because benefits were gradual, incremental and unevenly 
distributed (World Bank, 2007). 
In 1994, the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) produced a set of guidelines for 
implementing its watershed programmes and for making watershed development 
people-centered. This paradigm shift was aimed at gaining decentralised governance 
and increased participatory approaches to natural resource management, which would 
strengthen the capacity of the local community (Yoganand and Gebremedhin, 2006). 
Thus, a significant step for participatory and decentralised forms of decision making 
and fund allocation started with the comprehensive common guideline evolved for all 
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 Such as, Government of Maharashtra initiated a major watershed scheme called the Comprehensive 
Watershed Development Project (COWDEP) for water harvesting (Pangare and Gondhalekar, 1998). 
Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) reorganized its Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP) 
around water harvesting in 1987 (Government of India, 1994a). World Bank supported Pilot Project on 
Watershed Development and the Model Watershed Program of the Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research (World Bank, 1990; Kerr, 2007). And in late 1980s the Ministry of Agriculture began the 
National Watershed Development Project for Rainfed Areas  (NWDPRA) which was also on the lines 
of World Bank projects (Government of India, 1990). 
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programmes, with the recommendation of the Hanumantha Rao Committee in 1994 
(Kerr, 2002, 2007; Kerr et al., 2000). The watershed guidelines of 1994 advocated the 
need for different institutional arrangements at various levels to fulfill the task of 
community-based watershed management. The guidelines aimed to begin a state-
NGO partnership oriented approach to address environmental problems, in order to 
achieve the best possible utilisation of natural resources, employment generation, the 
restoration of ecological balance and to alleviate poverty through community-based 
watershed management (CBWM) (Government of India, 1994b). The 1994 guidelines 
were revolutionary in the fact that they went hand in hand with the literature on 
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), which at that time 
focused on local people’s ability to manage their own natural resources under some 
enabling conditions (Kerr, 2002). 
Over the years many modifications have been made to the 1994 Common Guidelines. 
In 2001, for instance, the Revised Watershed Guideline was introduced, which placed 
importance on seeking a combination of the government and NGOs as a project 
implementation agency (PIA) (Government of India, 2001). Hariyali57 guidelines 
launched in 2003 gave importance to Panchayati Raj by recognising it as the 
implementing authority, rather than forming a watershed committee, thus placing the 
watershed programme directly under the supervision of the village panchayat58 
(Government of India, 2003)  
Again, some changes in Hariyali guidelines were made in 2006 under the name of the 
Neeranchal Guidelines (Government of India, 2006b), which aimed at establishing 
the series of institutional structures to govern watershed management in the country. 
The National Authority for Sustainable Development of Rainfed Areas (NASDORA), 
a quasi-independent authority, was created to manage the central government-funded 
watershed programmes. Recently, again in 2008, modifications were made to the New 
Common Guideline of 2008 (Government of India, 2008), which gives prime 
importance to community participation, by involving all the stakeholders at the centre 
of planning, budgeting, implementation and management of watershed projects. 
Hence, the New Common Guideline of 2008 emphasises making community 
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 Hariyali means greenery. 
58
 Village panchayat is the elected village governing council. 
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organisations more closely associated with and accountable to gram sabha59 in project 
activities. 
Hence, participatory60 watershed development in India is widely advocated by 
governmental and non-governmental organisations alike, with the additional support 
of various donor agencies. There is no doubt that significant progress has been made 
over the years in bringing greater convergence in the historically different approaches 
of the central Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the Ministry of Rural Development 
(MoRD). Nevertheless, partial success only has been achieved and the imperative 
questions are frequently raised about participation and the distribution of benefits in 
highly socially stratified local settings.  
2.4.2.1 Groundwater Revolution – Taming the Anarchy  
With an estimated usage of around 230 cubic kilometres per year, India is the largest 
groundwater user in the world (Pahuja, 2010). Groundwater plays a key role in the 
country’s agrarian economy, as it accounts for 53 per cent of net irrigated area 
(Vaidyanathan, 1999) and around 70-80 per cent of irrigation value added to 
agriculture (Dains and Pawar, 1987 cited in World Bank, 1998). Moreover, 
groundwater provides 80 per cent of the water required for domestic use in rural areas 
(Government of India, 2002b) and is a vital resource for rural areas, as more than 60 
per cent61 of irrigated agriculture and 85 per cent of drinking water supplies depend on 
it (Pahuja, 2010). Furthermore, the development of groundwater has been 
predominantly achieved through the individual or cooperative efforts of farmers, 
mainly in the case of groundwater structures such as dug wells, shallow tubewells and 
public tubewells (Vani, 2009b).  
The National Commission on Integrated Water Resources Development (IWRD) has 
estimated that 431 billion cubic metres of groundwater is available in India, of which 
396 billion cubic metres is annually recharged and could be used (Phansalkar and 
Kher, 2006). Groundwater distribution in India is not uniform and is subject to wide 
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 Gram Sabha is the assembly of all inhabitants of a village. 
60
 Moreover participation can be conceptualized at two levels in the watershed context; firstly in terms 
of attempt to involve local communities in the watershed management process; secondly to examine 
the individual actors’ participation in the watershed related management process. 
61
 Based on the estimate made by Government of India in 2005; but other estimates are higher for 
example India’s National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) in 2005 designated that 69 percent of 
kharif and 76 percent of rabi irrigated areas depended on groundwater (Pahuja, 2010). 
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spatio-temporal variations, as it is a huge country with diverse hydro-geological areas 
resulting from a varied geological, climatological and topographic set-up 
(Government of India, 2002). In spite of a favourable situation with regard to the 
availability of groundwater in the country, the depletion and scarcity of groundwater 
has developed through ‘over-exploitation’ (Vani, 2009a). Around 5.4 per cent of a 
total 4,272 blocks in the country have been categorised as ‘over-exploited’, whereas 
2.5 per cent are categorized as ‘dark’62 (Vani, 2009b). The Gravity Recovery and 
Climate Experiment (GRACE) satellite mission, launched in March 2002 as a joint 
effort by NASA and the German Aerospace Center, has provided a better picture of 
Indian groundwater. GRACE’s determined depletion rate implies that it has been 
pumped out 70 per cent faster in this decade than the Central Ground Water Board of 
India estimated in the mid-1990s (Kerr, 2009). 
Mechanised lift irrigation with groundwater started in the mid-1960s with the advent 
of new pumping technology, which made it possible to bore deep wells and extract 
water in large quantities. With the advent of the Green Revolution, a voracious 
demand for water was created for high-yielding hybrid crop varieties (Hardiman, 
2007). Green Revolution agrarian technology and the groundwater revolution played 
a significant role in increasing the productivity of India’s irrigated agriculture. 
Furthermore, the promising aspects of deep borewells in water-scarce hard rock areas 
made groundwater technology popular, because of its capacity to provide water on 
demand, twice as high production levels than canals, per unit of water provided and 
three times higher than the tanks (Chambers et al., 1989).  
The total number of groundwater structures estimated by the Third Minor Irrigation 
Census of 2001 was 18.5 million, out of which 9.6 million were dug wells, 8.3 million 
shallow tubewells and 0.05 million public tubewells (Vani, 2009b). In addition, well-
irrigated areas have increased from 6 million hectares to 34 million hectares during 
the last 50 years (Government of India, 2006a). In 1999-2000, well irrigation 
accounted for nearly 59 per cent of the total irrigated area as compared to only 29 per 
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 The Central Ground Water Board categorizes the groundwater blocks according to the decline in 
water level and the stage of groundwater use (the stage of groundwater use is the annual groundwater 
draft expressed as a    percentage of net annual groundwater availability). Semi-critical or grey (stage > 
70% and < 100%; significant long-term decline in pre- or post monsoonal water level); critical or dark 
(stage > 90% and < 100%; significant long-term decline in both pre- and post monsoonal water levels); 
overexploited (stage > 100%; significant long-term decline in pre or post monsoonal water level or 
both). 
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cent in 1950-51 (Ibid). Wells and tubewells constitute the major share of this figure 
(58.7 per cent) followed by canals (31.5 per cent) (Ibid). Table I, below, depicts the 
change in the area share of different irrigation sources in India from 1950-51 to 1999-
2000. Figure III illustrates the share of various irrigation sources as a percentage in 
India from 1950-51 to 1999-2000. 
Table I: Irrigated Area under Different Irrigation Sources in India 
Sources of  Irrigation 
 
1950-51 
Area (m.ha) 
1999-00 
Area (m.ha) 
Canals 8.3 18 
Wells and tube wells 6 33.6 
Tanks 3.6 2.7 
Other sources 3 2.9 
Total 20.9 57.2 
Source: Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Statistical Abstract, India, 2002 
 
   Figure III: Different Irrigation Sources in India (in %) 1950-51 to 1999-00 
      
Source: Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Statistical Abstract, India, 2002 
 
The expansion of groundwater irrigation has been largely due to improved drilling 
and lifting technologies, liberal credit provision, a lower per unit cost of water 
pumping and an enormous, subsidised rural electricity programme (Marothia, 2003). 
Unfortunately, the absence of effective institutional control measures and checks has 
led to severe over-exploitation of groundwater. Farmers with adequate resources have 
constructed deep tubewells with submersible pumps, and in the process have been 
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more interested in their private gains and ignored the social cost of over-exploitation 
(Dhawan, 1995; Joshi and Tyagi, 1991; Vaidyanathan, 1996).  
Further, under the private property regime, water markets have developed in many 
parts of the country (Shah, 1993). Various empirical studies have highlighted the 
exchange of groundwater in, for example, Punjab (Tiwari, 2007), Bihar (Pant 1992; 
Shah and Ballabh, 1997; Wood, 1995), Uttar Pradesh (Pant, 1992), Tamil Nadu 
(Janakarajan, 1993, 1994), West Bengal (Mukherji, 2007) and Gujarat (Aggarwal, 
1999; Dubash, 2002; Prakash, 2005; Shah, 1993). In places like Gujarat ‘tubewell 
companies’63 can be found, the 50-100 members of which are mostly richer farmers 
who own huge amounts of land. These tubewell companies work like ‘joint stock 
companies’ and are mostly found in the Mehsana and Banaskantha districts of 
Gujarat. The large amount of investment and the risk of failure associated with 
installing deep tubewells, which are fitted with 90 to 120 horsepower submersible 
pumps and underground pipeline networks for water distribution, have led to farmers 
coming together to form ‘tubewell companies,’ thus doing away with individually 
owned tubewells (Shah and Bhattacharya, 1993).  
Groundwater markets in India are informal, as they are not based on well defined 
property rights and are actually regulated by informal institutions rather than formal 
bodies (Singh, 1990). Groundwater use is governed by a legal framework that ties 
rights to groundwater to land ownership, and there is no legal limit to the amount of 
water a landowner can draw from the ground. Groundwater is neither a true open 
access resource, because the ability to extract water is limited by well ownership, nor 
is it a common property resource (CPR), because it lacks an identifiable group of 
users with equal rights (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975).   
In order to prevent the over-exploitation of groundwater, the Indian Government 
drafted a Model Bill in 1970 for adoption by state governments. The Model Bill 
empowered them to tackle the drinking water situation, and the Bill was further 
revised subsequently in 1972, 1992 and in 1996. The latest version, unveiled in 
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 Tubewells are organized as ‘companies’ where farmers own shares, contribute capital, get water, 
bear profit and loss all in proportion to the land they have in command. (For more details on Gujarat 
Tubewell Companies see Capitalism: Groundwater Development and Agrarian Change in Gujarat by 
Navroz K. Dubash, 2002). 
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2005,64 has more influence on legislative activity because groundwater regulation has 
become a priority in many states. The Bill gives state governments power and 
authority over groundwater control by imposing the registration of all groundwater 
infrastructure and providing a basis for introducing permits for groundwater 
extraction in regions where groundwater is over-exploited (Cullet and Gupta, 2009; 
Phansalkar and Kher, 2006). Some states have adopted many groundwater Acts over 
the past decades.65 The Model Bill included the constitution of State Ground Water 
Authority (SGWA) and the modalities for regulating groundwater resources. The 
Central Ground Water Authority (CGWA) was created under subsection (3) of the 
environment (Protection) Act, 1986 on 14th January 1997 for the purpose of 
groundwater development and management.66 The authority has the mandate to 
regulate and control groundwater withdrawal in ‘over-exploited’ and ‘critical’ areas, 
but does not have a broad mandate to regulate groundwater in general and is therefore 
unable to make much difference to groundwater management (Shah, 2008).  
To summarise, the groundwater institutions we find today in India were embryonic in 
the early years of the nineteenth century and are now fully operational. The jointly 
owned wells in nineteenth-century Punjab (Islam, 1997) operated like the tubewell 
companies of North Gujarat (Shah and Bhattacharya, 1993) and Punjab (Tiwari, 
2007) of today. In 2003, India’s National Sample Survey Organisation conducted a 
study on the source of irrigation used by cultivators in kharif (rainy season crops) and 
rabi (winter crops), by surveying 51,770 cultivators from 6,770 villages. The study 
found that 69 per cent of kharif acreage and 76 per cent of rabi acreage were irrigated 
by wells or tubewells (Shah, 2009). Therefore, mechanised tubewells with small 
pumps have transformed irrigated agriculture in India, thereby giving a whole new 
meaning and dimension to water management.  
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 For detail see ‘Model Bill to Regulate and Control the Development and Management of 
Groundwater 2005’, available at http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0506.pdf. 
65
 Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal, Himachal Pradesh and Union Territories 
Lakshadweep and Pondicherry have enacted and implemented groundwater legislation. 
66
 For detail see ‘Groundwater Management and Ownership - Report of the Expert Group (Planning 
Commission, 2007, Government of India, New Delhi). 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Water management has been a contentious and tricky affair in India due to socio-
economic, political and ecological reasons. Factors such as caste-class differences, 
farmer heterogeneity, the rural–urban dichotomy, gender, institutional government 
arrangements and extremely different environmental conditions have influenced water 
management. To complicate the matter further, vote bank politics, a lack of 
coordination between irrigation bureaucrats, policymaking and various sectoral 
departments carrying out their own water programmes have affected water 
management in many ways. In this diverse regime, India has been embracing water 
management in its water policies, but they remain a mere proposition. This is 
complicated further by ministries proposing different policies and programmes, which 
often compete and conflict with one another.  
Issues such as the conceptualisation of ‘community’ in community-based water 
management are a matter of debate in India. One important factor which is often 
overlooked in the community-based water management discourse is that communities 
are not always enclosed, homogeneous entities but are socially differentiated and 
dissimilar on the grounds of gender, caste and class, which divide and cut across so-
called ‘community’. The participation and implication of water management has to be 
examined by disaggregating the ‘local community’ in terms of different social 
sections, i.e. class, caste, gender and ethnicity, and then assessing the subsequent 
differential impacts. The following paragraphs address these factors individually. 
Equity: Class, caste and gender contribute almost exclusively to how inequity 
manifests itself in access to natural resources. To elaborate on this point, I cite the 
example of watershed management. The aspect to note here is that a watershed is a 
hydrological unit rather than a natural unit of human social organisation (Rhoades 
1999; Swallow et al., 2001). In the case of community-based watershed management, 
watersheds pose challenges to upstream and downstream communities’ diverse 
interests. In the case of water, one’s location (upper reaches versus valley positions) 
often determines access, as people who own land in the valley benefit most from the 
augmented resource.  
Costs and benefits are unevenly distributed, which results from spatial variations and 
the conflicting use of natural resources in the watershed. A large proportion of 
uncultivated common land is often found in the upper watershed areas, and re-
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planting crops requires protection against erosion, which in turn leads to cordoning 
off areas which would otherwise be used for grazing and firewood collection 
(Farrington et al., 1999). The poor, women, landless and lower castes who are heavily 
dependent on these lands are severely affected, whereas the water harvesting benefits 
are also disproportionately benefiting those whose land is near the check dams 
(mostly wealthy farmers who own the majority of irrigable land). Hence, watershed 
projects are unlikely to result in conservation and productivity benefits due to the 
uneven distribution of these fringe benefits, where conformity cannot be achieved or 
where downstream users and upstream users do not work in close harmony and 
cooperation (Kerr, 2002).  
Similarly, in the forming of water user associations in the PIM, various dynamics are 
at play, which often act to hinder the smooth functioning of the PIM. There are often 
different levels of access to water for the farmers who are at the ‘head reach, middle 
reach and tail end’ of the command area of the canal. Usually, the lands at the ‘head 
reach’ are owned by the rural elite, who have more access to canal water, often 
illegally, by installing pumps in the channels. This results in different access 
opportunities to canal water, which is often a source of conflict between farmers.  
In the case of groundwater extraction, farmers with adequate resources construct deep 
tubewells by making use of credits and subsidies provided by public agencies, 
although this inevitably means that they are more interested with private gain than the 
social cost of over-exploitation. This course of action places them in an excellent 
position to drill wells and sell the water for personal gain, leading to wider scarcity. 
As Singh (1997:53) indicates, “once again, like the canal and dam technology, 
affluent sections of society benefited from the tubewells”. Hence there exists inequity 
in accessing water resources, even within so-called ‘village communities’. Therefore, 
groundwater irrigation has promoted private property rights, as it is not a public 
resource leading to differentiation in the access of water between the rich and the 
poor.  
Caste-class dynamics: In a heterogeneous and stratified society there exist several 
layers of caste and class cleavage, and community-based water management in these 
societies is often confronted with the problem of caste politics. It is often difficult to 
inculcate community feeling and facilitate people’s participation in water 
management within a socially and economically differentiated spectrum. 
45 
 
Manipulation by the rural elite, often by upper castes, to turn any water-related project 
to their own benefit is quite rampant, whether it is found in a watershed committee or 
in water user associations. Often, different castes have varied political affiliations, and 
differences in opinion play a role by influencing the smooth functioning of any 
development project in the village. Caste loyalties also play a significant role in 
selecting group members and at times rampant potential candidates are persuaded in 
various contrived ways not to contest the election/selection process. Moreover, most 
watershed development involves land-based programmes, in which case the lower 
castes (Harijans/untouchables) are invariably left behind, as class and caste 
convergence produce a situation in which lower castes (Harijans/untouchables) do not 
have access to resources, especially land. Even in the rare cases where they do own 
land, it is generally degraded and located in the upper catchments, and they have 
separate wells/ponds to access water. Hence, class and caste map on to locational 
advantages and disadvantages in the context of water accessibility.  
Gender: gender cuts across households and other dimensions of intra-community 
differentiation and hierarchy such as class, caste and ethnicity (Meinzen-Dick and 
Zwarteveen, 2001:66). Female social identities are myriad.67 Overlapping is the 
manner in which women are involved in natural resource management, as gender 
relations in a community are also influenced by the same identities they complement. 
The caste system is often articulated by gender in terms of hierarchies and boundaries 
in how members participate in water management groups and associations. Farmers 
are mostly men, as women do not own land formally because India is a patriarchal 
society where land is owned by the male. In addition, women are invisible in formal 
the decision making structure due to caste-based seclusion norms. Even if 
participation takes place in formal water committees, it is done to fulfill government 
criteria, as any power rests in the hands of male family members. Hence, despite the 
efforts that have been made to improve women’s participation and positions through 
the processes of empowerment, their presence remains highly constrained and 
contested (Agarwal, 1997; Cleaver and Elson, 1995; Mosse, 1994).  
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 Women having multiple social identities have been explained in detail in chapter 5: The World of 
Water in Mathnaa and in chapter 6: Social Organisation in Watershed Development Project of Mathnaa 
respectively.  
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Institutional Organisation: Water management-related policies, laws and programmes 
in post-colonial India have been shaped largely by the legacy of colonial times, which 
has resulted in disjointed programmes for large-scale irrigation projects.  
The existing institutional arrangement for water resource management in the country 
is fragmented, with a number of independent organisations dealing with water at 
central and state levels. At the union level, water affairs are run by the Ministry of 
Water Resources (MoWR), agriculture is under the rubric of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA), rural development is conducted through the Ministry of Rural 
Development (MoRD) and forestry affairs are handled by the Ministry of 
Environment and Forest (MoEF). Each of these ministries has its own research and 
development sections and policies to guide specific programmes. Interestingly, the 
MoWR only lays down policy guidelines and programmes for the development and 
regulation of the country’s water resources68 (Government of India, 2003). As such, it 
has no institutional structure to support implementation at state level, thus creating a 
vacuum at the level of policy implementation between central and state government. 
The exception to this lies with inter-state and international water issues. While the 
Ministry of Water Resources remains mainly an advisory body and performs a 
monitoring role, other ministries (agriculture, forest and rural development) and 
agencies (state irrigation departments) related to water play an additional regulatory 
role through delegated responsibilities. The vacuum created illustrates the drawbacks 
in the mechanisms employed by the Ministry of Water Resources, which does not 
have much validity beyond making policies and generating information. The 
ministries seize the opportunity presented by the all-encompassing concept of 
‘integrated’ and ‘community-based water resource management’ to push their 
objectives forward and to overcome financial deficit, together with their proclaimed 
adherence to democratic commitment. State governments have exploited the concept 
to remain at the forefront of ecological and social transformation, by using a vehicle 
of centralised single focus technology mission.  
Although water management is the overall responsibility of the state government, as 
per the constitutional provision of India, it falls under the state subject (Dhiman, 
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 Though the MoWR has about 8 federal-level organizations performing different functions along with 
10 ad-hoc boards and commissions having responsibilities for the execution of specific engineering 
objectives within river basins (Pitman, 2002:5). 
47 
 
2007). State agencies play a major role in the development and management of water 
resources under their jurisdiction through water-related sectoral units (agriculture, 
forest, rural development, urban development) other than those provided by the 
Ministry of Water Resources. Though there are diverse departments and agencies 
involved over water resource management, their roles remain fragmented (World 
Bank, 1998). Irrigation uses the largest amount of water in all states. Interestingly, 
there is no separate department for irrigation; rather, it comes under the state 
department of public works (PWD), which is mainly entrusted with constructing roads 
and governmental buildings, and provides materials and the construction of 
infrastructure for drinking water and irrigation water needs. In a way, the PWD is 
strongly oriented towards civil works construction, resulting in limited attention to 
water planning and management. Though a few states have created a water resources 
organisation (WRO), like Tamil Nadu and Orissa, they have merely remained in 
renaming the existing PWD with specialist function of irrigation management 
(Thakkar, 1998). 
India has no separate water legislation, which instead is dispersed across various 
sectors between central and state provisions (Saleth, 2004). The legislation governing 
water issues fails to recognise the structural system and process for providing secure, 
defensible and enforceable surface water rights. The Indian legal system accepts the 
riparian rights of the individual to extract surface water from natural systems, without 
disturbing the similar benefits of other riparians, as natural rights.69 As such, socially 
embedded rules are left in legal limbo, with individuals seeking the time-consuming 
and expensive Indian court system for their grievances. The problem is further 
compounded by an increasing demand for new water resources, such as industrial and 
environmental needs.   
Of the various sources of water, groundwater is purely a private good, with rights 
linked to land ownership. All groundwater existing and found beneath private 
property (land) is fully under the control of the owner, who is free to extract and use it 
as he or she sees fit. The process of groundwater development has been institutionally 
(not hydrologically) independent from surface water development, which is controlled 
by CPR or state agencies, whereas groundwater is governed by minimal legislation, as 
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 This does not apply to waters flowing in irrigation canals and stored in man-made reservoirs, in 
which case water can be drawn only with a governance-issued permit. 
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it remains an open access resource and provides pump owners with unlimited rights to 
extract water from aquifers under their land.  
The regulation of groundwater is limited70 to a few states and metropolitan cities. 
However, regulations through indirect means via the National Bank for Agricultural 
and Rural Development (NABARD) and state electricity boards have been adopted, 
while providing electrical connections and credit for investment in wells and pump 
sets. Such acts have been frequently overlooked, often affecting the poor. For 
instance, the Jyotirgram scheme has shrunk the water markets in Gujarat and had a 
direct impact on the livelihoods of many people.71 To sum-up, groundwater is largely 
governed by farm size, the depth and number of wells, pumping capacity and 
economic power (Saleth, 2004:11).  
In view of these complexities, legislations and regulations put forth by the national 
government are only a small part of the motivation for actors’ behaviour. These 
conventional forms of legislation co-exist and interact with multiple legal orders such 
as customary, religious, project and local laws – all of which provide the basis for 
actors to claim access to water (Von Benda-Beckman et al., 1997), especially in 
countries like India that have centuries-old, archaic management practices. These 
multiple legal institutions existing at various levels in the social spectrum help actors 
in “forum shopping” for one or another of these legal frameworks to access water 
(Spiertz, 2000:191). Essentially, institutions through which these legal forms are 
negotiated and renegotiated are crucial for water resource management (Bruns and 
Meinzen Dick, 2000). 
Finally, research on cooperatives in the rural areas of India has revealed that 
widespread inefficiency and inequities stem mainly from top-down management by 
state bureaucracies. Hence, to counter this, participatory management has started, 
although ‘participatory’ rhetoric often tends to ignore conflicts of interest within and 
between communities, political divergences and water management government 
policies with regard to the compartmentalisation of the administrative structure. 
Moreover, in highly differentiated communities, the straightforward transfer of 
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 Only Chennai Metropolitan area, state of Maharashtra, Karnataka and Gujarat have enacted ground 
water regulation acts (Saleth, 2004). 
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 For detail see ‘Groundwater Governance through Electricity Supply Management: Assessing an 
Innovative Intervention in Gujarat, Western India (Shah et al., 2008). 
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decision making power to the ‘community’ often turns out to be the handing over of 
decisions to dominant sections within the local community. This participatory 
approach may backfire, especially if technocrats take a successful experiment in one 
location and seek to replicate it by top-down planning and regulation elsewhere, 
without taking into account social differences existing in any given community. 
Hence, water has not been treated in a multidimensional sense in community-based 
water management in India. Additionally, interventions have failed to understand the 
complex interaction of factors such as caste, class, gender, inequity and existing 
fragmented institutional arrangements. 
Hence, the way in which community is conceptualised in community-based water 
management ignores the individual differences in a village, assuming that the 
common good for the village will override these differences. Moreover, it is believed 
that the new-institutionalist perspective will facilitate the cooperation of the village 
community by developing institutions which will enable differences to be resolved. 
Thus, the way community construction is conceptualised in the implementation of 
various government-backed programmes and policies has serious drawbacks. As a 
springboard, questions arise for identifying ‘community’ boundaries: Where do they 
begin and end? Who is inside and outside the ‘community’ boundaries? Who 
constitutes the ‘community’? The questions of caste, class, gender and institutional 
governance and inequity require careful study and usage in community-based water 
management. Consequently, the need of the hour is to adopt ‘smarter’ water 
management techniques and practices by making better use of water appropriated 
through existing systems. 
The demand and supply mechanism attributed to commodity market forces can be 
applied routinely to the dictum of water management. It is no surprise that the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM),72 which is being 
presently used in city space, is witnessing a paradigm shift towards involving private 
players in water supply and management. For example, in Mysore, under JnNURM 
the entire water supply has been contracted to JUSCO, a TATA company. Private 
firms make no investment and the state has to pay these companies many times more 
than it ever spent when it managed these services. The state is contractually obliged to 
                                                           
72
 For detail on JnNURM see http://jnnurm.nic.in/nurmudweb/toolkit/Overview.pdf. 
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provide brand new infrastructure, purified bulk water, overhead tank filling and to 
allocate its staff to work for the private company – and pay them as well (Urs, 2011). 
It is these private players who might call the shots in the long run if the 
implementation is sketchy and irreconcilable at government level.  
The next chapters will deal with the issues highlighted in this chapter, with caste 
rabidity as a reference point.  
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Chapter 3 Conceptual Framework for Analysing Community-Based 
Natural Resource Management 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets the foundation for exploring the nature of interaction between 
various actors in community-based natural resource management. Power relations and 
situated practices of different actors are explained by using the actor-oriented 
approach. In addition, this chapter elaborates on the conceptual framework of 
community and its participation in CBNRM. 
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
Local resources are often creditably considered to be better managed by local 
communities, and the contemporary policy idea is that the present level of resource 
degradation is the result of traditional institutional arrangements for sustainable 
resource use (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). The principal cause of the demise of 
traditional systems for sustainable resource use is often attributed to intervention by 
the state – and particularly the colonial state’s assertion of proprietary rights over non-
private resources such as water and forests (Gadgil and Guha, 1992). The growing 
popularity of this approach was advocated by the argument that traditional 
communities possess local knowledge to conserve and efficiently use resources, as 
they have a harmonious relationship with nature, which in turn leads to the recovery 
of lost traditions of community responsibility (Agarwal and Narain, 1997; Gadgil and 
Guha, 1995). Nonetheless, national governments have failed to make any alternative 
arrangements for local resource management regimes, which has resulted in a shift 
towards uncontrolled ‘open access’ to non-private resources (Bromley and Cernea, 
1989).  
In order to solve this problem, policy solutions such as the re-establishment of local 
users’ rights and building social organisations have been advocated (Bromley and 
Cernea, 1989). Consequently, programmes of local institution building and 
encouraging local organisations such as user groups, village water users’ associations 
and forest protection committees have been established on the premise of recovering 
traditional management practices (Mosse, 1999). In recent years, the argument for the 
revival of the community has been put forward because of the increasing use without 
its exploration and relevance to application, which has led to criticism from the 
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accepted view about ‘community participation’ (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Thus 
failing to conceptualise ‘community’, has made the ‘community participation’ 
projects ambiguous, in terms of its utility as the ‘means’ or ‘end’ to the development 
programme (Kumar, 2005).  
3.3 Defining Community in Various Fields of Study 
Many social science definitions exist to describe ‘community’ in the literature. For 
instance, sociologists emphasise social interactions and networks, economists 
emphasise work and markets and geographers place emphasis on spatial aspects. 
Hillery (1955) found in the scientific literature 94 different definitions of 
‘community’, all using some kind of combination of space, people and social 
interactions. Within the social science literature, capturing the essence of 
‘community’ remains an unfulfilled aspiration (Gauld, 2000). The way ‘community’ 
is currently conceptualised in natural resource management can be traced to the 
‘community’ development movements of the 1950s and 1960s of many third world 
countries (Midgley et al., 1986). It was with the emergence of ‘participatory’ 
methods, primarily in the 1980s (Chambers, 1983), that the concept of ‘community’ 
gained eminence. However, although it was central to the issue of participatory 
development, it was poorly defined (Midgley et al., 1986). As a consequence, 
thinking of community as the lowest level of aggregation, at which people organise 
themselves into small, homogenous, harmonious and territorially bound units in the 
most generic sense (Kumar, 2005), has raised a debate in social sciences.  
3.3.1 The Concept of Community in Sociological and Development Policy Debate 
Development agencies are often confronted with the question, what defines a 
community? Although there is a debate on the nationality of community within the 
spectrum of social and political theory, two approaches define the constitutive aspects 
of community formation. The first is based on ‘consensus’ or ‘shared’ aspects; 
Durkheim’s conscience collective or mechanical solidarity exists on the totality of 
shared beliefs, rules, morals and sentiments (Durkheim, 1960). Taking into account 
Durkheim and Talcott Parsons’ perceptions on community, it is regarded as having 
social identity and solidarity. The continuity of community is assured by passing 
down shared norms, customs and traditions from generation to generation (Rhoads, 
1991).  
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The second definition is Ferdinand Tönnies’ concept of community, which is different 
from civil society because such a distinction is linked with the transition from 
tradition to modernity. According to Tönnies, real and organic (Gemeinschaft) forms 
of living together in a community are based upon familiarity of relations, solidarity 
and belongingness from the mechanical (Gesellschaft) and superficial (the space of 
civil society or society) forms of coming together –all based on the convergence of 
interests (Tönnies, 1957). Community in this sense is synonymous with traditional 
society, which is based on relations of trust, and with the advent of modernity, trust is 
replaced by contracts (Kaviraj, 2001). 
The conflict theory emphasises a clash of interests rather than a consensus of values in 
the concept of community. Taking into account the conflict theory propounded by 
Karl Marx and Max Weber, value consensus is an illusion perpetuated by ideology 
and power whereby structural differences among individuals, groups and communities 
are subsequently formed from various interest groups with different vested interests, 
and are often riddled with conflicts (Rhoads, 1991). Thus, conflict theory emphasises 
a clash of interests rather than a consensus of values. 
The development policy for the formation of community-based associations gives 
significant importance to consensus (Manor, 1998). Keeping in mind social capital, 
one of the most important aims of development agencies is to support and create 
shared networks, norms and trust among members of a community to solve common 
problems. Development planning has also been inspired by the Habermas notion of 
communicative rationality. Habermas advocated that through arguments and 
counterarguments, rational and reasoned consensus could be built from amongst 
opposing viewpoints (Habermas, 1984). As a result, the actions of agents involved are 
coordinated, not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of 
reaching an understanding. “In communicative action, participants are not primarily 
oriented to their own successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition 
that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation 
definitions” (Habermas, 1984: 286).  
Other than these aspects, developments that have triggered community-based 
management issues include the failure of large-scale dams projected as politically-, 
administratively- and contractor friendly, protests from the people (who have been 
displaced and alienated) and civil society against dam construction, media reporting 
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all over the world about a looming water crisis in the twenty-first century, debates 
about future global wars for water and natural resources and as a result the discovery 
of the viability of community participation as a means of reviving community-based 
management. 
3. 3.2 Community in ‘Community’-Based Natural Resource Management      
The irony of the word ‘community’ was characteristically put forward by Agrawal 
(1999), who advocated that its complexity and heterogeneity guarantee that it cannot 
easily be defined or measured simultaneously, yet its centrality to everyday life means 
that it cannot be displaced or dismissed. According to Young (1990), there is no 
universally shared concept of ‘community’; rather, articulations that overlap in the 
process complement one another. In the 1980s and 1990s, coalescing development 
and protection/conservation issues gave rise to ‘community’-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) projects (Kumar, 2005). Different advocates imagine that 
‘community’ in CBNRM is different, and it has therefore become more of a 
conceptual idea loaded with complexity in its implementation (Ibid). Many consider 
the notion of ‘community’ as a myth and have discarded it, while some critics argue 
that it is impossible to lose or to reform what we never had (Etzioni, 1996). 
During the 1980s and ‘90s, CBNRM started to gain importance due to several 
concomitant factors such as dissatisfaction with the results of large-scale, capital-
intensive and centrally planned conservation and development projects that excluded 
local populations from resource consumption (Horowitz and Painter, 1986); the 
success of participatory projects and growing criticism of non-representative 
development gave momentum to the CBNRM. Scholars like Li (1996) advocated that 
rural or traditional communities are in harmony with the environment and have 
demonstrated long-established patterns of sustainable and equitable use of resources. 
Local resource management was supported by the developing goals of social justice, 
environmental health and sustainability, and so gained wider acceptance on these 
grounds (Brosius, Tsing and Zerner, 1998).  
The focus also shifted onto ‘community’ due to the emergence of analyses which 
showed that many changes in resource status are not primarily the result of human 
actions or interventions (Leach and Mearns, 1996; Uphoff, 1998). The further 
popularity of the concept also came to the fore because of the role played by various 
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NGOs and an increasing preference for participatory approaches by donor agencies 
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). 
Defining CBNRM is not an easy task (Kumar, 2005)73. Various governments have 
demonstrated importance in the ‘participation’ of ‘community’ owing to political 
economic pressure (Lele, 2000; Thompson, 1995). The protection of biological 
diversity and habitat integrity, and the involvement of local people in wider 
conservation and resource management, been advocated by conservationists 
(McNeely, 1995). The agenda of donor agencies is to promote local participation for 
the ‘sustainable’ management of natural resources and rural development, through 
transferring resource management into the hands of local communities (Hecht and 
Cockburn, 1989; Kothari et al., 1998). On the other hand, representatives of the 
indigenous people advocate respect for local rights, knowledge and cultures in order 
to better serve local interests (Croll and Parkin, 1992). 
Based on the premise that local people have greater interest in the sustainable use of 
resources than the state, along with suppositions that local communities are more 
aware of the details of local ecological processes and practices and in a cyclical 
manner are more able to effectively manage local resources through traditional forms 
of access, CBNRM programmes are grounded and endorsed (Brosius, Tsing and 
Zerner, 1998; Li, 2002). Moreover, in the CBNRM discourse, local communities are 
usually empowered to run appropriate institutions for natural resource management 
(Murphree, 1991). Hence, local communities are considered more organisationally 
cost-effective, as their members are expected to be in everyday social contact – 
leading to informal peer pressure to mitigate high transition costs – while CBNRM 
initiatives often draw inspiration from the abovementioned images of a community. 
Nevertheless, not all ‘community’ decisions and actions with regard to natural 
resources are benign (Uphoff, 1998). Many times, ‘face-to-face’ relationships often 
considered benign for participation, may lead to ‘face-offs’ leading to conflicts 
(Saravanan, 2002:115). Hence, images of the ‘community’ are central to the issues of 
project implementation. Literature, policies and projects dealing with the issue of 
CBNRM have depicted communities as a distinct social group in one geographical 
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 A vocabulary of diverse definitions of CBNRM based on type of resource and practice in various 
parts of the world is available at www.cbnrm.net. 
56 
 
location, having a common culture and living in harmony (Leach et al., 1999; Li, 
1996).   
Moreover, common property theorists have propagated in their arguments about the 
unified homogenous notion of community, the importance of informal institutions, 
efficiency, equity and sustainability (Agrawal, 2001). By emphasising the role of local 
institutions in making local communities capable of cooperating with each other, for 
the access and control of natural resources, the common property theorists have 
underestimated power dimensions. This reinforces the notions of ‘community’ further 
in natural resource management (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Berkes, 1989; Bromley 
and Cernea, 1989; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988).  
Common property resources (CPRs) literature was formulated in response to Hardin’s 
(1968) cynical ‘tragedy of the commons’. CPRs literature makes a distinction between 
open access situations (to which Hardin’s thesis could be somewhat applicable) and 
true common situations in which institutions play an important role in regulating 
resource use and its management (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). A large body of 
literature on CPR management has been fundamental in establishing the significance 
of local institutions in natural resource management. Common property theorists have 
suggested that individuals will collectively manage common resources when the 
benefits from the institutional set-up (i.e. rules and means of enforcement) are limited 
to a small and stable community (Berkes, 1993; McCay and Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 
1990). Common property theorists like Ostrom (1990) take their theoretical grounding 
from game theory to look at the collective action dilemma, and state that institutions 
or rules can be purposively crafted to produce collective action and to perform certain 
natural resource management functions. Ostrom, through comparative studies, finds 
that the successful management of commonly pooled resources by local communities 
often shares a set of eight ‘design principles’: i) clearly defined boundaries; ii) rules 
congruent with local conditions; iii) individuals affected can participate in modifying 
operational rules; iv) monitors are accountable to the appropriators; v) graduated 
sanctions against violators; vi) ready access to conflict-resolution mechanisms; vii) 
recognition of rights to organise by external government authorities and viii) nested 
enterprises, where the resource is part of a larger system (Ostrom, 1990).  
A design principle for Ostrom is “an essential element or condition that helps to 
account for the success of these institutions in sustaining the CPRs, and gaining the 
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consent of generation after generation of appropriators to the rules in use” (Ostrom, 
1990:90). Most of the CPR literature considers local situations and establishes 
conditions (widely known as Ostrom principles), which will lead to collective action 
by indicating clear resource boundaries and socio-economic homogeneity among 
users (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988). Consequently, historical and contemporary 
evidence on the ‘commons’ has shown that resource users often create institutional 
arrangements and management regimes that help them to distribute benefits 
justifiably, over long periods and with only limited efficiency losses (Agrawal, 1999; 
McKean, 1992; Ostrom, 1992). Therefore reversing Hardin’s (1968) perspective of 
the tragedy of the commons.  
Although empirical evidence suggests that the design principle sees communities as 
homogenous entities, in reality there is great diversity in communities in terms of 
caste, class, wealth, age, gender, ethnicity and religion (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; 
Ahluwalia, 1997; Leach et al., 1997a; Mehta, 1997, 2005, 2007; Mosse, 1998; 
Sangameswaran, 2008). Similarly, and based on empirical evidence, scholars have 
suggested that only very small groups can organise themselves effectively in the 
manner suggested by design principles, because they presume that size is related to 
homogeneity (Agrawal, 2001). In recent years, Ostrom’s design has been critiqued by 
development practitioners and researchers on the basis that it employs “simplistic 
assumptions of single resource use, a static rationality model, the exclusive analysis of 
internal dynamics of the collective management system and the assumption that 
collective management outcomes are determined by predefined principles” (Steins et 
al., 2000). Moreover, design principles have neglected the role of contextual and 
external factors such as market demands, technology and population pressures, and 
how state policies interact with local institutions and natural resource systems in 
shaping collective action (Agrawal, 2001). Design principles have been criticised as 
being too limited for analysing dynamic resource management institutions (Steins, 
1999). While some studies have critiqued them for romanticising indigenous 
knowledge systems, whereas in reality these knowledge systems have been 
comprehensively interfered with and often exist as a shadow of their original form 
(Balland and Platteau, 1996; Ribot, 1995, 1999). 
Taking this homogenous view of ‘community’ given by property theorists, academic 
works on institutions have neglected questions concerning the differences and sundry 
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conflicting interests of resource users (Mehta et al., 1999). Works on collective action 
theory have neglected the fact that institutions, apart from enhancing co-operation, 
can also overwhelm conflict, factional divisions and power politics (Ibid). Moreover, 
common property theorists have focused on local groups, institutions and resource 
system-related factors, and have ignored the riddle of the local –in conjunction with 
external and non-local – environment. 
3.3.2.1 Local Communities: Caste, Class and Gender Dynamics in CBNRM 
Social science debates and empirical works have questioned the stand of common 
theorists and many of their assumptions on communities, especially rural ones, as 
homogenous units living and working in harmony with shared knowledge and 
purpose, and consisting of people sharing common views and agendas. Furthermore, 
so-called traditional communities may not be in as harmonious a relationship with the 
environment as often believed, and could be heterogeneous socially, culturally and 
economically (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). In addition, if in the past they were 
harmonious, they might not have the potential nowadays in a vastly changed context 
(Baviskar, 1996). Often, local politics, local hierarchies and the frailty of human 
behaviour are ignored (Agarwal, 1994), so the community tends to be glorified. And 
institutions are seen ahistorically, not taking into account the dynamic interaction 
between formal and informal networks entrenched in the community’s social and 
power relations (Leach et al., 1997b, 1999; Mehta, 1997, 2005) under its arrangement. 
Furthermore, social actors in the community have different sets of endowments and 
interests in natural resource management (Ahluwalia, 1997). 
The concept of gender is convolutedly mixed with the concept of community 
(Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen, 2001), both of which are broad analytical categories 
which incorporate dissimilar groups with differing or conflicting interests. The work 
of Kabeer and Subrahmanian (1996) highlights that often institutions which seem to 
be serving a collective good might in fact be shaping and reproducing unequal power 
and authority relations, and marginalising the concerns of women and poorer people, 
in the community. Gender cuts across households and other dimensions of intra-
community differentiation and hierarchy such as caste, class and ethnicity (Meinzen-
Dick and Zwarteveen, 2001:66). Overlooking these socio-cultural issues could 
jeopardise CBNRM interventions (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999, 2001; Guijt and Shah, 
1998). Despite the efforts that have been made to improve women’s positions through 
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processes of empowerment, their participation in formal decision making structures 
remains highly constrained (Agarwal, 1997; Cleaver and Elson, 1995; Mosse, 1994).  
Furthermore, conventional approaches to community-based natural resource 
management are centered around community organisation as the main vehicle for 
their activities, and are expected to fulfill and represent the collective interest of ‘the 
community’ (Leach et al., 1997b). The social organisation shaped around the project 
by development agencies is believed to replicate traditional organisations and 
reproduce the assumed effectiveness of a traditional past (ibid). It is necessary 
consider carefully the facts before assuming that new formal organisations will 
reproduce the assumed successes of traditional systems or enhance community 
involvement effectively (Mosse, 1997a). Many misconceptions about the actual 
functioning and capabilities of resource management institutions and organisations 
take place when the traditional past is idealised.  
Nonetheless, the images of consensual, ecologically harmonious communities are also 
invented by the local actors themselves, temporarily, in order to secure benefits from 
development implementing agencies (Ahluwalia, 1997; Leach et al., 1997b). Thus, 
the images of consensual communities should be judged more in relation to the policy 
discourses which produce them, and which they serve, than against empirical reality 
(Leach et al., 1997a: 5; Li, 1996). New works on CPRs have acknowledged that the 
early work on ‘collective action’ assumed the presence of homogenous actors, in 
order to make analyses more tractable (Keohane and Ostrom, 1995).  
Therefore, having an assumption that resource use could be regulated 
unproblematically by community structures reflects an outdated social theory, 
contradicted by more recent perspectives and empirical evidence, of people action 
theory and agency in monitoring and shaping the world around them (Giddens, 1984; 
Leach et al., 1997a; Long and Long, 1992). In taking this perspective, communities 
cannot be seen as static and rule-bound, as they are composed of people who interpret 
and shape the world around them (Long and Long, 1992; Long and van der Ploeg, 
1989). Furthermore, linking agency and structure underlines how structures, rules and 
norms emerge as products of people in the form of intended and unintended actions 
and practices (Leach et al., 1999). Consequently, routinised action serves to replicate 
structures, rules and institutions; other actions have agency, which serves to change 
the system and in the meantime make new rules (Bebbington, 1994; Bryant and Jary, 
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1991; Giddens, 1984; Leach et al., 1999). On the whole, this perspective sees social 
change in society differently from CBNRM narratives, which instead talk about 
external disruption to a community.    
The various images and assumptions around communities are basically reducing the 
notion of community, as generalised, on which policymaking could be based (Brosius, 
Tsing and Zerner, 1998; Pigg, 1992). In CBNRM, two problems of aggregation are 
found. Firstly, communities are not actually visibly bounded social or geographic 
units; secondly, they are not likely to be homogenous entities with single or agreed 
interests (Uphoff, 1998). There is a certain level of inadequacy in the 
conceptualisation of communities spatial units, homogenous structures and sets of 
shared understanding, as commonly put forward by advocates of the ‘community’-
based conservation (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). They argue on the one hand that, at a 
representational level, existing communities rarely correspond to the idea of small, 
harmonious, cooperative entities with shared understandings (Ibid). On the contrary, 
at the conceptual level, a direct relationship between ‘community’-as-shared 
understanding and ‘community’-as-social organisation is not easy to establish (Ibid).  
Another important factor which is often overlooked is that natural resources are also 
heterogeneous; for example, the conceptualisation of ‘community’ for the 
management of harvested resources such as timber, pastures and fisheries will be 
different from that addressing conservation of wildlife (Kumar, 2005). In the same 
way, ‘community’ in the management of the watershed poses challenges to upstream 
and downstream communities’ diverse interests (Ibid). Hence, the way in which a 
community is conceptualised and interpreted for implementation in CBNRM has a 
major drawback.  
Recent CBNRM studies have begun to examine the heterogeneity of communities and 
how resource management decentralisation has affected different community groups 
such as castes (Sangameswaran, 2008) and women (Mainzen-Dick and Zwarteveen, 
2001). These studies have shown that decentralising resource management to local 
communities, which consist of multiple actors who have numerous, and often 
competing, interests goes beyond the mere targeting of appropriate ‘communities’. As 
communities are highly differentiated along several lines that include gender 
(Mainzen-Dick and Zwarteveen, 2001), caste and class (Mehta, 2005), these studies 
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highlight the importance of social differentiation within local communities, and 
thereby challenge the notion of ‘community’ as a homogenous entity.   
Moreover, the questions of inequality, repressive social hierarchies and discrimination 
are overlooked in CBNRM (Guijt and Shah, 1998). As such, I would like to conclude 
that considering community as one composite whole is problematic, as it is not a 
single homogenous entity because it involves various actors with diverse interests and 
background. Therefore, diverse social groups74 exist to make a community, where 
different groups participate in various capacities to achieve their respective goals. It is 
now a recognised fact that communities are hubs of multiple interests and capacities, 
establishing heterogeneity across and within various sections (Agrawal and Gibson, 
2001). This leads to newer insights and an understanding of the nuances communities 
composition, and the relative implications for the intervention processes aimed at their 
development. 
In development theory and practice, the concept of decentralisation coincides with the 
mainstreaming of participatory approaches and advocates that local communities 
should play an active role in the conservation and management of natural resources 
(Chambers, 1995, 1996). For CBNRM proponents, community participation in 
resource management has been considered attractive because of its apparent 
democratising tendencies, which enable local actors to take charge of the natural 
resources with which they have day-to-day contact. As a result, and in the light of the 
above discussion on various contextual and contested issues characterising the 
concept of ‘local community’ in CBNRM interventions, I now proceed to investigate 
specific issues arising through community participation. 
3.3.2.2 Community Participation in CBNRM 
It is now an accepted argument that the concept of participation has increasingly 
gained importance over the last two decades in the form of collective action, 
community-driven development, decentralised governance, etc. in developmental 
practice, as well as in the CPR research and literature. The need for the participation 
of local communities and decentralised governance comes from perspectives such as 
a) critique of the centralisation of power in bureaucracy and the alienation of local 
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 Social groups are collectivities of individuals who interact and form social relationship (Abercrombie 
et al., 2000). 
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communities, b) disenchantment with the top-down approach and c) demands from 
the subalterns for their share in political space and in the development process (Joy et 
al., 2004). The CPR research community has been made to think about the concept of 
local community and the question of local community’s control, as well as 
institutional issues about the development of Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
thesis (1968, 1977), which has generated huge amounts of literature highlighting 
different stands, trends and nuances. 
Community participation has been perceived as an answer for improving the 
effectiveness of various state development projects. It is felt that the involvement of 
communities, which have been traditionally associated with resource management, is 
required for the success of state initiated local resource management projects (Puri, 
2004). Participation is defined as “the ability of people to share, influence or control 
design, decision-making and authority in development projects and programmes that 
affect their lives and resources” (Peters, 2000:6). 
Hence, there is growing consensus about the desirability of a participatory model for 
natural resource management through community involvement, as it aims to empower 
local people by increasing their direct access to and control over resources. The 
fulcrum logic behind participatory approaches to natural resource management is the 
ostensible reasoning for addressing inequalities, by distributing the benefits of local 
management initiatives within the community, which will lead to community 
development through new opportunities (Ribot, 1999). Participation itself is a socially 
entrenched phenomenon and cannot be elicited at will (Nemarundwe, 1995), which 
means that the people are not free to participate in created or invited arenas of 
participation without first entering into the realm of local power dynamics. The 
success of CBNRM is not possible by taking into account the few certain actors who 
are involved in resource management, while participatory approaches to natural 
resource management cannot bypass structural and institutional constraints arising 
from power relations and interactions in a given community (Admassie, 1995). 
Therefore, unequal relations need to be assessed in relation to the power that each 
actor commands on the bases of caste, class and gender, and which actor influences 
the outcome of CBRNM. One has to be vigilant while using the concept of 
participation as a means of ensuring better community involvement in the CBNRM, 
as it has many forms and magnitudes. 
63 
 
Seen from the context of CBNRM, the concept of participation is problematic, as it is 
variously defined in different contexts. There is a debate among writers who have 
theorised on the concept of participation regarding the nature and range or the means 
and ends of the participation. Participation takes many forms such as Agarwal’s 
(2001) drawing from Arnstein participation developed a typology for measuring 
participation in table II, it occurs along a continuum from nominal to interactive 
participation. 
Table II: Participation Typology and its Characteristic 
 
 
Source: Agarwal, 2001:1624 
 
In this typology of participation, the least desirable form of participation is nominal 
participation and the highest is interactive. Typology helps us to distinguish between 
people who were involved just for the sake of it, and those people or groups who had 
all the powers to make a difference and take decisive and influential courses of action. 
Thus, it is necessary to study how participation is apparent within the various water-
related community groups. Uphoff’s (1991) analysis on participation, also reflected in 
this typology in terms of objectives, is judged almost entirely by its potential 
efficiency effects and its ability to enhance equity, efficiency, empowerment and 
environmental sustainability. Besides this, there are different perspectives on who is 
expected to participate, what exactly is to be achieved and how it should be done 
(Pretty, 1995).  
Form/Level of Participation Characteristic Features 
Nominal Participation Membership in the Group. 
Passive Participation Being informed of decisions ex post 
facto; or attending meetings and 
listening in on decision-making without 
speaking. 
Consultative Participation Being asked for an opinion on specific 
matters without the guarantee of 
influencing the decisions. 
Activity-Specific 
Participation 
Being asked to (volunteering to) 
undertake specific tasks. 
Active Participation Expressing opinions whether or not 
solicited, or taking initiatives of other 
kinds. 
Interactive (Empowering) 
Participation 
Having say and influence in the group’s 
decision 
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Agarwal’s typology helps to evaluate the quality of participation of actors in a given 
participatory development intervention, as achieving effective participation would 
involve a shift from lower (nominal participation) to higher levels (interactive 
participation). Given the pre-existing socio-economic inequalities and power relations 
in a given community, there are limits as to what participation alone (interactive 
participation) can achieve in terms of equity and efficiency (Nemarundwe, 1995), 
even in community participation in the CBNRM. According to Agarwal (2001), 
participation in the context of CBNRM depends on the following factors:  
i) Rules of entry – the criteria defining membership in the community 
and institutional structures. 
ii) Social norms defining – who should speak and attend the meetings 
(code of conduct for men and women in public). 
iii) Social perceptions regarding disadvantaged groups and women’s 
ability to contribute to CBNRM activities. 
iv) Well-established territorial claims. 
v) Personal endowments and attributes such as wealth and caste 
status, educational levels, age, etc. 
vi) Household endowments and attributes, which identify where 
women fall in traditionally structured hierarchies.  
In regards to group participation, there are three important dimensions of 
participation, according to Kolavalli and Kerr (2002), namely a) facilitating collective 
action, b) transferring meaningful decision making powers and c) making 
communities share development costs and benefits. As a consequence, the 
implementing agency needs to play a crucial role in promoting the overall level of 
community participation in the planning and development of a watershed project 
(Ibid). Advocates of the participatory model belong to two groups: the first views 
participation as a means to achieve institutional efficiency, while the other considers 
participation as a way to achieve empowerment, equity and democratic governance 
(Puri, 2004). Over a period of time the term ‘participation’ has acquired various 
meanings and still continues to be a fuzzy concept, as at one end of the spectrum it 
could mean nominal membership in a group and at the other end it could imply 
having an effective voice in the decision-making process (Ibid). 
Often, the participation of local communities or resource users is seen as a means of 
achieving equitable goals. However, the question arises as to what constitutes ‘a 
community’ and who participates in community formation for resource management. 
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In India, rural communities are highly differentiated and stratified hierarchically; thus, 
at times, the transfer of decision making power to “the local community” leads to 
handing over decision making authority for the development process to dominant 
factions (Agrawal, 1997; Li, 1996; Menon, 1999; Mosse, 1997a; Shah, 2003). The 
quality and form of community participation in democratic local governance depends 
to a large extent on the characteristics of the local community itself. According to 
Platteau (2003), community-based development is often open to monopolisation by 
the elite, especially in localities with high inequalities. 
The concept of participation from equity- or agency-based perspectives ends up 
looking at a community as an undifferentiated, cohesive whole (Puri, 2004). Both 
views tend to ignore that a community has a space of internal differentiation, 
contestation and power differentials. Moreover, social capital theorists seem to ignore 
the existence of ‘bad social capital’ (Foley and Edwards, 1996), as norms of trust, 
reciprocity and cooperation also exist in the very coercive, hierarchical and exclusive 
communal formations. Furthermore, most collective action that takes place at the 
community and local levels is based on ascriptive affiliations such as caste, religion 
and tribe (Puri, 2004). This is apparent in the formation and functioning of various 
water-related community groups such as user groups, collective bore wells and water 
sellers.   
Hence, if advocates of community participation do not capture the dynamics of 
community participation, they are ignoring the fact that a community could constitute 
bad social capital and is a space occupied by hierarchies, power differentials and 
social-economic disparities. Privileging locals in policymaking, without taking into 
account the important characteristic of community, could mean sanctioning 
differences between money and social power, which in turn means excluding those 
who do not have such power (Puri, 2004). As a result, this study uses Agarwal’s 
typology to examine how different sections of the community participate, and throws 
light on the power relations within the Mathnaa community and their influence on 
participatory processes within the intervention context. The thesis uses an actor-
oriented approach in order to assess the ways and forms that actors seek to exert 
control over natural resources (like water in the case study) in relation to other actors, 
including the how weaker actors resist their powerful counterparts in the village. This 
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helps in understanding the working of different actors in a heterogeneous community 
in order to achieve their desired and vested interests.  
3.4 Actor-Oriented Approach  
The focus of the actor-oriented approach is explaining different responses to similar 
structural circumstances, even if the conditions appear relatively homogenous (Long, 
2001). The approach is useful for this study, as it places actors at the centre of the 
natural resource management discourse, with the recognition that there are diverse 
actors. As far as the approach is concerned, the persistence of local institutions is not 
explained through the rational calculations of individuals, but through structures of 
power in which natural resources are managed and where institutions tend to produce 
relations of dominance and dependence, and provide the context for political strategy 
and competition (Mosse, 1997b).  
A social actor in the actor-oriented approach is depicted as an active participant who 
possesses information and strategies in their dealings with various local actors and 
outside institutions and personnel (Long, 2001). According to this approach, different 
social organisations emerge from the interactions, negotiations and social struggles 
that take place between various factions. People involved vary from those who are 
present in direct encounters and those who influence the situation from ‘behind closed 
doors’, thus affecting the actions and outcomes in a given situation (Ibid). This was 
apparent in the selection of watershed committee members, the watershed secretary 
and user groups in Mathnaa’s watershed development project, which is explained 
further in Chapter 6.  
The advantage of an actor-oriented approach is that it aims to grasp precisely these 
issues through a systematic ethnographic understanding of the ‘social life’ of 
development projects –from conception to realisation – as well as the responses and 
lived experiences of the variously located and affected social actors (Long, 2001: 14-
15). Hence, the approach establishes why people in a community have multiple 
rationalities, desires, capacities and practices. The approach stresses the dynamic 
interaction between social agents and institutions. Social actors possess knowledge 
and capability, solve problems, learn to intervene in the flow of social events and, 
moreover, monitor their own actions by taking into account how others react towards 
their behaviour and take into consideration the various contingent circumstances 
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(Gidden, 1984). Actors always have some alternative ways of formulating their 
actions, objectives and reasoning for their behaviour, however restricted their choice 
may appear (Long, 2001). Thus, the significant point to note here is that an alternative 
discourse used by actors defies the notion that rationality is an inherent property of the 
individual actor on the one hand, whereas it also reflects the actor’s structural location 
in society on the other hand (Long, 2001). For this reason, the strategies used by 
individuals depend on verbal and non-verbal discourses, which are shared with other 
individuals, thus, in this context, understanding the concept of agency as a useful tool. 
A key concept of the approach’s relevance to this study includes the concepts of 
agency and power as they relate to the framework of resource use and management. 
3.4.1 Concept of Agency 
Agency theory is based upon the capacity of actors to process their own and others’ 
experiences, and then act upon them (Long, 2001). Agency is based on 
knowledgeability, where experiences and desires are automatically interpreted and 
internalised, along with the capability to command relevant skills, have access to 
material and non-material resources and to engage in particular organising practices 
(Ibid). Thus, agency is evident when a particular action makes a difference to a pre-
existing state of affairs or series of events. As such, agency depends upon the network 
of actors who are partially, but not completely, involved in the projects of others 
(Ibid).  
More so, agency entails the manipulation of networks of social relations, thus making 
it necessary to take into account the ways in which social actors engage in or are 
locked into struggles over the attribution of social meanings to particular events, 
actions and ideas (Long, 2001). Conversely, the notion of agency is attributed to 
individual actors who have the capacity to process social experiences and formulate 
ways of coping with life, even in severe forms of coercion (Long, 1992). 
Nevertheless, all actors vary in the extent of their control of social relations and in the 
scope of their transformative powers, but all members of society exercise some degree 
of agency in the conduct of their daily lives (Sewell, 1992). Therefore, agency 
involves the ability to organise one’s action75 with others and against others, to form 
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 Social action is not an individual ego-centered pursuit as it involves a network of relations having 
both human and non-human components, and is bounded by social conventions, values and power 
relations (Long, 2001). 
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collective projects, to influence, to intimidate and to monitor the simultaneous effects 
of one’s own and others’ activities (Ibid). As such, actors perceive others’ actions, and 
the agency of others shapes the actors’ own behaviour. Hence, actors try to give 
meaning to their experiences through representations, images, cognitive 
understanding and emotional responses.  
3.4.2 Concept of Power 
The concept of agency is inexorably associated with power. In order to understand the 
social interactions in relation to natural resource management, one needs to examine 
how power is conceptualised. In a social context, power is not just possessed, 
accumulated and unproblematically implemented (Foucault cited in Gordon, 1980). 
Indeed, it is not how hierarchies and hegemonic control distinguish social positions 
and prospects and hamper access to resources (Long, 2001). Power is the outcome of 
multifarious struggles and negotiations over authority, status, reputation and resources 
and requires networks of actors and community (Callon and Law, 1995; Latour, 
1994). Manoeuvring requires consent and negotiations with power and is manifested 
in the form of exerting some control, prerogative, authority and the capacity to take 
direct or indirect action (Villarreal, 1992). Consequently, power unavoidably 
engenders resistance, accommodation and strategic conformity in the politics of 
everyday life (Scott, 1985). Therefore, “all forms of dependence offer some resources 
whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors” 
(Giddens, 1984:16). All actors exercise some kind of ‘power’ and influence and 
manipulate strategies, while those who are in a subordinate position are also key 
players in the game (Long, 2001). Power is a relational concept which is shaped by 
different types of relationships that actors engage in and negotiate; moreover, power 
is viewed as a resource that can easily change hands. As no one particular actor has 
power at a particular time to the extent that others with whom he/she relates are 
lacking, the concept of power is a very useful analytical tool for understanding 
leadership and other struggles among community members in natural resource 
management.   
Therefore, in a social structure,76 power is the deciding factor which actor will play a 
decisive role. Structures shape people’s practices, but also people’s practices 
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(Giddens, 1981:27). 
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constitute and reproduce structures (Sewell, 1992). Therefore, structures are 
performed by “knowledgeable” human agents. According to Giddens, “they are the 
people who know what they are doing and how to do it” (Ibid). Thus, “structures must 
not be conceptualised as simply placing constraints on human agency, but as 
enabling” (Giddens, 1976: 161). Consequently, human agents are knowledgeable, and 
enabling implies that they are capable of putting their structurally formed capacities to 
work in creative ways. In addition, they are powerful enough, as their actions may 
have the consequence of transforming the very structures that gave them the capacity 
to act (Sewell, 1992). Agents are capable of exerting control over social relations and 
transforming them to some degree, as they have knowledge of the schemas that 
inform social life and have access to non-human and human resources77 (Ibid). Hence, 
the ability to influence others rests on the actions of a chain of agents who translate 
influence in accordance with their projects (Latour, 1986). This is illustrated through 
the case study of Mathnaa.  
3.5 Conclusion 
Community-based natural resource management assumes that communities can be 
treated as static, relatively homogeneous entities. This assumption traces its roots 
back to early social theory in sociology and anthropology (Leach et al., 1999). 
Common property resource management in the development discourse is overridden 
by concerns about making sustainable institutions which are influenced substantially 
by the consensus approach. Consensus ensures common good, which advocates that 
consensus leads to the fulfillment of the common interests of all (Kapoor, 2002). 
Thus, state agencies, development agencies and the literature tend to portray 
communities as unified. And if the project is small, it will be successful and 
egalitarian, often overlooking the complex social differentiations existing in a given 
society. The ethea of democracy, equity and participation are promoted by not taking 
into account existing power and social relations, based on different axioms within a 
community (Mosse 1997b, 1998). 
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 Non-Human resources are objects, animate or inanimate, naturally occurring or manufactured, that 
can be used to enhance or maintain power; whereas human resources are physical strength, dexterity, 
knowledge and emotional commitments which can be used to enhance or maintain power, including 
knowledge of the means of gaining, retaining, controlling and propagating either human or non-human 
resources (Sewell, 1992:9).    
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Consequently, I do not dismiss and negate the notion of community totally, but rather 
try to conceptualise it in terms of small groups with diverse interests. Hence, 
community is divided along the lines of caste, tribe, gender, economy class and 
resource priorities, and portrays itself in terms of the temporary unity of situations, 
interests and purposes. As such, seeing a community as a whole is problematic, as it 
consists of various diverse small groups with diverse interests. Therefore, a 
community exists but not in totality as a uniformly homogeneous entity, but rather as 
an amalgam of small groups which make up a community. 
In this study the actor-oriented approach is used, because it provides a set of 
analytical tools useful for describing and analysing changes in patterns of social 
action and interaction, as well as institutional arrangements, where such changes are a 
function of human agents, the social and material conditions under which they act and 
interact and agency-structure dynamics (Admassie, 1995:13). This approach is useful 
in this study because it addresses the question of social differences and provides 
specific concepts and analytical tools for the study of participation and the role of 
human agency in the processes involved in social interaction, both of which shape 
access to natural resources. Finally, the actor-oriented approach complements my 
study, which is ethnographic in nature, by investigating places and the roles actors (as 
groups or individuals in interaction processes) play and orchestrate to the best of their 
ability in certain circumstances. In addition, I investigate how communities were 
conceived and formed for intervention in order to achieve success in its functionality.  
This has to be corroborated in the larger picture of water policy mechanism as the 
water policy is witnessing varying reactions and efforts. The state of Gujarat claims to 
be attracting large amounts of foreign direct investment, backed by development and 
urban progress trumpet, but is still contemplating and vaguely trying to make the 
rural-urban divide minimal is far from coherent. It should be interesting to explore 
and demystify lacunae and other pitfalls that have afflicted water policy and its 
decentralisation in Gujarat and are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Water Resource Management in Gujarat: An Overview  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the water management scenario in the state of Gujarat and 
elaborates on the government’s efforts to promote community-based water 
management to combat water scarcity and manage water resources in the western 
state. This chapter also elaborates on Gujarat’s groundwater hydrology, the reason for 
the popularity of groundwater exploitation in the state and the development of private 
tubewells and groundwater markets. It then goes on to discuss the governance crisis in 
Gujarat by throwing light on government policies, measures and projects initiated to 
tackle irrigation and drinking water problems, and how far they are effective and 
ineffective in managing water resources. Finally, the chapter discusses factors such as 
Gujarat’s political, caste, class and power relations, which affect water governance, 
and argues that water management in the state is influenced by socio-political, 
institutional and ecological factors, rather than just being a policy matter. 
4.2 Gujarat State 
The state of Gujarat, situated on the western side of India and covering an area of 
196,024 km², accounts for about 6 per cent of the total geographical area of India and 
came into existence as a separate state on 1st May 1960. It was carved out of the 
bilingual state of Bombay (Government of Gujarat, 2009a). Gujarat is situated 
between 20°10´ to 24°50´ N latitude and 68°40' E to 74°40' E longitude and is 
bounded by the Arabian Sea in the west by the states of Rajasthan in the north and 
northeast, by Madhya Pradesh in the east and by Maharashtra in the south and 
southeast (Patel, 1997). It shares a common international border with Pakistan at the 
north-western fringe and has two deserts, one in the north of Kutch and the other 
between Kutch and mainland Gujarat. Gujarat has a long coastline of about 1600 km 
(Ibid), which is almost one- third of the total coastline of the Indian sub-continent. For 
administrative purposes, Gujarat at present comprises 26 districts, subdivided into 231 
talukas78 with 18,618 villages and 242 towns (Government of Gujarat, 2009a). A map 
of India shows the location of Gujarat, while the administrative map shows the study 
site.  
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 Taluka is also known as block, it is the political administrative unit between village and the district 
level. 
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Map I: Map of India 
 
Source:Government of India, 2011 (Map not to scale) 
 
 
Map II: Adimistrative Map of Gujarat, Showing the Study Site (Mathnaa) 
 
                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Government of India, 2011 (Map not to scale) 
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Gujarat’s weather has certain characteristics that make it special in the western region 
of India, namely an arid and dry climate with an irregular and fluctuating monsoon 
season. The northern part of the state is dry and arid whereas in the southern region, it 
has moist weather owing to its proximity to the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Cambay. 
Tropical monsoons dominate provide violent but erratic amounts of rainfall from 
June/July to September/October. Total levels vary from a meager 340 mm in west 
Kutch to 1,800 mm in the southern hills of Dangs. Nevertheless, on average, most 
parts of the state receive about 800 mm per annum. The average number of days of 
rain varies, from 20 in Kutch to 40-45 in south Gujarat (Hirway, 2000). In spite of 
having good water potential the state is facing a serious water problem. The 
exploitation of water resources has been far from judicious and the irrigation 
infrastructure has not promoted the sustained use of water resources (Ibid). Around 61 
per cent of the geographical area of Gujarat is under cultivation (Government of 
Gujarat, 2010a). Figure IV gives the statistical picture of the total cultivable area of 
Gujarat, of which 64 per cent is not irrigated. 
 
Figure IV: Total Irrigated and Unirrigated Area of Gujarat 
 
Source: Government of Gujarat, 2010a 
 
4.2.1 Gujarat Water Resources 
The state has a very poor provision of water resources and suffers from permanent 
water scarcity due to uncertain rainfall patterns (Rani, 2004). Gujarat receives very 
little rain except during the annual monsoon period between June to September and 
rainfall is less than 1000 mm each year in most areas (Hardiman, 2007). About 78 per 
cent of the area in Gujarat is subject to erratic monsoons and suffers from large-scale 
soil erosion of various degrees of intensity, which has reduced land productivity over 
the years (Rani, 2004). Around 66 per cent of the area is under semi-arid climatic 
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conditions (Shah, 2000). In addition, twice every five years the state experiences 
drought conditions (Ibid). Except for Narmada, Tapi, Mahi and Purna in south 
Gujarat, all other rivers of the state are seasonal, meaning they are dry apart from 
during the monsoon season (Rani, 2004). The ecological condition of major and 
minor rivers’ estuaries has changed due to the construction of a series of irrigation 
dams across the rivers (Singh, 2000). In most of northern Gujarat, the hills to the east 
and the state’s peninsular (Saurashtra and Kutch) there are no perennial rivers of 
much importance, and irrigation has either depended on wells or channels taken from 
the reservoirs formed by small-scale dams or embankments (ibid). The agriculture of 
the region has been dependent on the ability to harvest water during the dry months of 
the year, and over the last thirty years this ability has come under increasing threat. 
The main source of irrigation in Gujarat (71 per cent) comes from open wells and 
borewells, with a 14 per cent contribution from canals and 15 per cent from other 
sources (see Figure V). 
 
Figure V: Source of Irrigation in Gujarat 
 
Source: Government of Gujarat, 2010a 
 
The extraction of groundwater from wells in many areas of Gujarat has surpassed 
natural replenishment in the subsoil, leading to a fall in the water table at an alarming 
rate. Due to hard rock conditions, the recharge rate is only 5 per cent to 10 per cent in 
56 per cent of the total geographical area (Rani, 2004). 
Wells are the most important sources of irrigation. Even during colonial times there 
were no major canal projects. In the 1930s, about 78 per cent of the irrigated area of 
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British Gujarat was irrigated by wells and only 10 per cent by canals (Desai, 1948). 
The colonial government found the cost of building irrigation infrastructure 
prohibitively high, so left state agriculture at the mercy of the rain and groundwater 
irrigation. In Gujarat, water was lifted from the wells, which were not very deep, in a 
large leather bag known as a ‘kos’, which was raised by bullocks pulling a rope 
attached to the bag over a pulley erected above the well (Hardiman, 1998). 
Construction and maintenance of the masonry or stone-lined well with elaborate 
water-lifting apparatus was an expensive affair, so peasants had to take loans from 
wealthy professional usurers (sahukar).79 This in turn led to a vicious circle of debt, 
which continued for generations, and usurers in this arrangement would take cash 
crops as repayment and market them for profit (Hardiman, 1998, 2007).  
In poorer agricultural areas, although usurers provided the finance to construct wells, 
local chiefs took the bulk of the produce – leaving only subsistence crops for the 
villagers (Hardiman, 1998, 2007). In regions like central and southern Gujarat, which 
were more prosperous, village elites from leading castes had complete ownership of 
the wells. This is termed ‘community control’, but benefitted only a small number of 
elite villagers (Ibid). Due to technical limits caused by the depth of the wells, water 
had to be raised laboriously through bullock power, which did not lead to any 
substantial depletion of groundwater resources, and so they never dried up entirely 
(Hardiman, 2007), even in the years of severe famine (Bhatia, 1992).  
With the advent of new pumping technology in the twentieth century, it became 
possible to bore deep wells and extract water in huge quantities, which caused 
seasonal drying of the wells. High yielding hybrid crop varieties introduced by the 
Green Revolution, which demanded water in large quantities, led to the construction 
of deep tubewells with submersible pumps by those who had the resources. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, diesel engines were used by the farmers to pump groundwater, 
but with the spread of rural electrification they began to use submersible electric 
pumps, as diesel pumps were unable to chase declining water levels. Between 1971 
and 2001, the use of diesel pumps in irrigation increased by up to 56 per cent and the 
use of electric pumps by 585 per cent (Shah et al., 2008). Figure VI illustrates this 
change. 
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Figure VI: The Trends in the Number of Diesel and Electric Pumps Use for 
Irrigation in Gujarat 1970-2003 
Source: Adapted from Statistical Abstract of Gujarat State, (Government of Gujarat, 2006) 
 
Figure VII, below, depicts over a period of time the amount of privately owned 
tubewells in Gujarat, which have outnumbered the total publicly owned, thus 
demonstrating private involvement in the extraction of groundwater. 
Figure VII: Changing Trends of Public and Private Tubewells in Gujarat from 
1960-2003 
 
Source: Adapted from Statistical Abstract of Gujarat State, (Government of Gujarat, 2006) 
 
With India’s independence, Gujarat invested heavily in its canal irrigation projects, 
but agriculture still continued to be deeply dependent on irrigation through wells and 
tubewells (Shah et al., 2008). In recent times, alternatives to well irrigation have come 
in the form of canal irrigation, which is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Since 
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India’s independence in 1947, two major rivers, the Mahi and the Tapi, have been 
dammed to provide water for canals. The Narmada River, the largest of all rivers in 
Gujarat, is also in the process of being dammed. The Sardar Sarovar Project80 on the 
Narmada, which started in the 1980s, has been surrounded by controversy, as it is 
believed that the massive reservoirs created by the project will displace thousands of 
tribal and peasant cultivators.  
It has been widely publicised through the state publicity and propaganda that the 
Narmada project will solve all the water problems of the state. It is anticipated that 
water in the huge canals, covering hundreds of kilometres, will be diverted to remote 
arid zones of the state. Critics of the Narmada project argue that there will be massive 
demand and supply monopolisation due to the political clout held by industry and the 
farmers who are located close to the dam. Thus, the vision of the project to supply 
water to remote arid zones is doubtful at best. As a consequence, there will be no 
other major river with such a large perennial flow in Gujarat, after Narmada, if it is 
dammed in this way. Therefore, wells will continue to dominate the irrigation 
scenario for the vast majority of peasant farmers. Groundwater development in 
Gujarat has taken off with such speed that it has left behind state intervention. 
Groundwater is the most important means of irrigation, exemplified by figure VIII, 
which states the increase in net area irrigated by the tubewells has outnumbered that 
of canals. 
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 Popularly referred as Narmada Dam Project. 
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Figure VIII: Net Area Irrigated by Canals and Tubewells in Gujarat from 1970-
2003 
 
Source: Adapted from Statistical Abstract of Gujarat State, (Government of Gujarat, 2006) 
 
These developments have significantly affected groundwater resources in the state. In 
2009, 31 blocks (talukas) in the state were declared as ‘over-exploited’, 12 as ‘dark’ 
(critical) and 69 as ‘grey’ (semi-critical) (Government of India, 2009). Table III 
presents a list of the districts and their classifications. 
Table III: Decline in Water Level and the Stage of Groundwater use of Various 
Districts of Gujarat 
Districts Level of Ground Water 
Development in % 
Category 
Ahmedabad 92.63 Dark 
Amreli 71.03 Grey 
Banaskantha 111.49 OE 
Gandhinagar 146.04 OE 
Junagadh 77.59 Grey 
Kheda 72.8 Grey 
Kutch 85.96 Grey 
Sabarkantha 88.75 Grey 
Surendranagar 70.54 Grey 
Mehsana 164.65 OE 
Source: Central Ground Water Board, West Region Ahmedabad, Government of India 1997a 
Due to a failure in managing groundwater, Gujarat is one of the weaker groundwater-
governed states of India. Groundwater over-exploitation from coastal Saurashtra, 
which used to enjoy a successful (ground) water regime, has been pushed into saline 
water, resulting in salinity ingress and deterioration in the quality of water supply. In 
northern Gujarat, Kutch and northern Saurashtra the arbitrary withdrawal of 
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groundwater has depleted water resources due to water mining on a large-scale. At the 
same time, in the case of southern Gujarat where the rainfall is high, canal irrigation 
and the subsequent overuse of water has raised waterlogging and salinity. Hence, the 
immediate fallout of increasing water scarcity and groundwater level decline has 
decelerated agricultural growth and productivity, which is seriously affecting the 
livelihoods of millions of people in the Gujarat hinterland (Prakash, 2008). The next 
task that arises out of this situation is to examine the measures taken by the Gujarat 
government to check this process.   
4.3 Water Governance Crisis in the State 
Since colonial times, groundwater has held an important place in Gujarat agriculture 
in the form of well irrigation. The state has been at the forefront of debates concerning 
water scarcity and the level of decline in the groundwater table. In order to develop 
water resources and solve the problem of water scarcity, the state government81 has 
implemented various policies and schemes. Water scarcity has distributional and 
relational aspects, as it does not have a universal impact on all social groups. Hence, 
water resources management in the state aims to provide water efficiently, equitably 
and in a sustainable manner. In order to achieve its goal of increasing the net 
availability of water, the Gujarat government has been implementing various projects 
to improve water use efficiency, bridge the gap between the potential created and its 
utilisation, and to restore and modernise the old irrigation system.  
The situation is in fact a crisis of governance (Prakash, 2008) because the state 
encouraged groundwater exploitation by promoting groundwater-based agriculture. In 
1975, the government established the Gujarat Water Resources Development 
Corporation (GWRDC) to develop groundwater through tubewells. Nine hundred 
tubewells were transferred to the Gujarat Water Resources Development Corporation 
in 1978 and placed under the control of Panchayat district (Directorate of Economics 
and Statistics, 2008). The main aim of the public tubewells programme was to 
increase the area under irrigation by exploiting groundwater and thus accessing 
farming communities (Prakash, 2008). It was a bureaucratically managed subsidy-
based programme which later led to losses, as many of the tubewells became 
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 The ruling political party presently in Gujarat is BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party). 
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redundant due to lack of repair and maintenance. Following on from this debacle, 
many of the tubewells were transferred to farm cooperatives.  
Moreover, encouragement of the Gujarat government, indirectly of the exploitation of 
the groundwater through promoting groundwater-based agriculture, and turning a 
blind eye to the expanding private groundwater markets in the early 1980s and late 
1990s by providing subsidized electricity structures contributed to the mess of water 
governance crisis. In present day Gujarat, groundwater use is governed by the 
Bombay Irrigation Act of 1879, amended in 1950 in order to extend ‘notification’ to 
wells and tubewells as ‘second class irrigation works’, thereby specifying the use of 
wells82 (Dubash, 2007). Again, the Act was amended in Gujarat in 1976. The Bombay 
Irrigation (Gujarat Amendment) Act was passed by emergency ordinance, which 
stated that a licence should be acquired for the construction of a tubewell and the 
depth of the bore should not exceed more than 45 metres (Bhatia, 1992; Singh, 1998). 
Tubewell owners were also made responsible for checking for water leakages and 
wastage. Moreover, restrictions were also placed on water consumption, but being an 
emergency ordinance it was not passed by vote in the Gujarat Legislative Assembly 
and lapsed, as the legislature failed to ratify it within six months (Ibid).  
Many attempts were made in the subsequent years to revive and implement the law, 
especially by Amarsinh Chaudhury83 of the Congress Ministry in 1988-9, but due to 
vested interests his efforts were met with strong opposition and the law could not be 
passed (Hardiman, 2007). The measure of 1976 has not been made into a law, and 
even after three decades84 there has been little real impact on the private rights of 
unchecked access to groundwater, which were established in the colonial era. In 2001, 
the Gujarat government created the Gujarat Groundwater Authority to monitor and 
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 This process entails a preparation of a ‘record of rights’ based on current use patterns, but allows 
these rights to be consequently commuted by the state based on payment of money, land or alternative 
compensation as the officiating officer ‘may think fit’ (Government of Gujarat, 1963). 
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 Amarsinh Chaudhury was the first scheduled tribe member to become Chief Minister of Gujarat and 
being a tribal he depended less on the support of the dominant Patidar caste and other wealthy caste 
peasant groups. Thus he was in a stronger position to carry forward the measure to pass the Bombay 
Irrigation 1976 Act (Gujarat Amendment) (Hardiman, 2007). 
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 Some argue that amendment was passed in 1998 (Moench, 1998; Sharma, 1998; Singh, 1998). 
Others argue that the amendment was notified in 1988, but was not published in the gazette and 
therefore may not be in force (World Bank, 1998). Hence this confusion elaborates the sorry affair of 
groundwater regulation in Gujarat. 
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control the extraction of groundwater use in the state, and produced a Bill to regulate 
and control the development of groundwater, which is still under preparation.   
The Groundwater Model Bill was a legislation-based approach used to control the 
usage of groundwater and was introduced by the Government of India in 1970. With 
‘water’ being a state subject, the Bill was to be endorsed by the state, and in 1992 it 
again was revised and implemented. It applied to a limited number of districts that 
were overexploited, but even in these areas the Act was never fully implemented due 
to the powerful farmers’ lobby opposing such regulatory measures (Prakash, 2008). 
Neither the Gujarat Acts nor the Central Model Bill deal directly with the issue of 
groundwater rights, as the purpose of redefining them is in the context of groundwater 
management. The laws are aimed at well regulation through licensing. In fact, the 
success of restrictions over private rights depends entirely to the extent to which the 
inventory, registration and licensing of wells are carried out, which is quite 
questionable (Vani, 2009b).  
Thus, state laws have never been properly implemented; moreover, the issue is 
politically sensitive and the ruling government is not prepared to alienate the farming 
community, which forms the core of their vote bank, particularly the wealthier 
segments which are the main users of groundwater. Therefore, groundwater-related 
polices of Gujarat have very little to do with scarcity, depletion or quality of 
groundwater but more to do with rural politics manifested in terms of the presence of 
farmer lobbies. Hence, in Gujarat, where there is a real and grave groundwater crisis, 
the state government has been able to neither implement strict groundwater 
regulations nor increase electricity tariffs significantly. This has been due to “vote-
bank-politics”, as over the years groundwater irrigators in Gujarat have formed a 
powerful pressure group, which mobilises large numbers of votes in the state’s 
general elections on the issue of irrigation.  
One of the major water resources development project in India is the Sardar Sarovar 
Project (SSP), which is an inter-state, multipurpose joint venture between Gujarat, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan, with a major terminal dam on the 
Narmada River, in Gujarat. In order to make this a success, a separate division within 
Narmada Water Resources, Water Supply and Kalpsar Department has been created 
under the heading Narmada Division. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited 
(SSNNL) was set up to implement the Sardar Sarovar (Narmada) Project in 1988. 
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About 75 per cent of the command area in Gujarat is drought prone, as defined by the 
Irrigation Commission, and it is estimated that the project will provide about 179.2 
million hectares of land via irrigation facilities covering around 75 talukas of 15 
districts (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2008).  
The basin of the Narmada River is 9,7410 km² and a total of 30 major, 135 medium 
and 3,000 minor dams are to be built in the river valley (Government of Gujarat, 
2002). The Sardar Sarovar Canal-based drinking water supply project, covering 8,215 
villages and 135 urban centres from Saurashtra, Kutch, North Gujarat and 
Panchmahals has also been formulated (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
2008). Hence, 104 towns are to be covered under the Sardar Sarovar Canal-based 
water supply scheme at a cost of Rs. 54,385.3 million. In addition, the Narmada 
tribunal has reserved 1.06 million acres (3528 MLD) of water in the Sardar Sarovar 
for drinking and industrial purposes (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2008). 
There has been debate about raising the height of the Sardar Sarovar Project dam for 
optimum water utilisation; however, the plan for harnessing the river for irrigation 
and power generation was initiated in 1946, and the late prime minister, Pundit 
Jawaharlal Nehru, laid its foundation stone on 5th April 1961. The Indian government 
constituted the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal (NWDT) in 1969 under the Inter 
State River Water Disputes Act 1956. The height of dam over the river Narmada 
under construction will be 163 metres (Government of Gujarat, 2002).  
Controversy has surrounded the SSP (Sardar Sarovar Project) since it began. Various 
organisations and individuals including Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA),85 meaning 
‘Save the Narmada,’ led by Medha Patkar have criticised the construction of the dam 
and even led a movement against its construction. The extent of irrigation possible 
under the Narmada command, and the cost involved in bringing water to far-off 
regions, is questionable, as the data provided by the government are viewed with 
grave suspicion by activists and scholars. The original river water flow study was 
calculated in 1979, at which time there was not enough historical rainfall and river 
flow data available to produce accurate figures (Ibid). Officials have historically 
underestimated the affected area and grossly overestimated the benefits of dams. 
Moreover, the efficiency of the canal system assumed by the government also seems 
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 Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) was set up in 1986 under the leadership of Medha Patkar. The 
movement of NBA attempts to publicize the ecological disaster and the plight of the poor in the region.    
83 
 
unrealistic (Roy, 1999) and its efficiency is likely to be around 45 per cent rather than 
60 per cent as argued, which will further reduce the water available for irrigation 
(Ram, 1993). 
Moreover, the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River, and the entire hydraulic 
infrastructure below it, are designed based on the annual allocation of 11 km³ of water 
to Gujarat by the Narmada tribunal in 1978 (Shah, 2009). Studies by Kumar et al. 
(2005) and Ranade (2005) show that pump irrigation development, upstream of the 
dam, has increased annual consumption by about 5 km³ during this period. This has 
happened because of the unauthorised lifting of water by non-command farmers, who 
use pumps to lift water meant for downstream needs from canals or rivers (Singh et 
al., 2005). Consequently, pump irrigation development upstream can render dams 
useless in most seasons, and since the tribunal board is silent on the issue of 
groundwater sharing among states, the hydraulic infrastructure below the Sardar 
Sarovar Dam has to be satisfied with far less water than it was originally designed to 
receive (Shah, 2009). Furthermore, it is propagated that central and northern Gujarat, 
Saurashtra and Kutch will benefit from the SSP, and apart from bringing irrigation the 
canal network is expected to alter the groundwater ecology in the canal command 
areas (Prakash, 2008).  
In reality though, Narmada water will reach only 2 per cent of drought prone areas in 
Kutch, 22 per cent in Saurashtra and 17 per cent in northern Gujarat, while other areas 
like Sabarkantha, Banaskantha and many villages of Saurashtra, which need water, 
are not under the command area of the SSP at all (Prakash, 2008). Hence, in Gujarat, 
the state has ‘manufactured’ one perception for water, namely the Narmada project as 
the single solution, whereas in doing so, political and business interests across the 
state are being served (Mehta, 2007:657).  
Since 1995, the Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) programme has been 
undertaken by the Government of Gujarat, which aims to transfer the management of 
irrigation to newly formed users’ organisations. In the first phase, 13 pilot projects 
were identified in different parts of Gujarat, out of which five pilot projects were 
undertaken by NGOs, who were involved in planning and implementing the 
programme. In the PIM, participating farmers were expected to operate and manage 
water user associations; in addition, they had to make a fixed contribution towards the 
initial expenses of repairing and rehabilitating the system. The WUAs were also 
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responsible for the allocation of water and collection of demand forms and water 
charges from their members. In addition, the Gujarat government passed the Gujarat 
Water Users Participatory Irrigation Management Bill in 2007, authorising farmers to 
create WUAs to manage the canals. 
However, in the new Sardar Sarovar Irrigation project, five years after the water 
began flowing down the system, not even one of the 1,100 service areas in the 
command had watercourses or field channels constructed by WUAs (Shah, 2009). On 
the contrary, pump irrigation emerged in each area where private farmers lifted water 
from the tributary to irrigate their own fields and engage in selling water (pump 
irrigation services) to other farmers (Talati and Shah, 2004). Hence, the Narmada 
irrigation experience suggests that the PIM has not reduced total transaction costs; it 
merely transfers bits of anarchy from the system to the water users’ associations, 
which are reluctant to absorb the transaction costs of controlling the scheme (Shah, 
2009:75). Though Gujarat adopted the motivation strategy (i.e., a bottom-up 
approach) but did not achieve its wide spread implementation across the state (Swain 
and Das, 2008). 
An ambitious and innovative Sujalam-Sufalam project was introduced in 2004 by the 
government of Gujarat, which involved building a 337 km-long elevated earthen canal 
from the Kadana reservoir in the Mahi basin to recharge the parched alluvial aquifers 
of northern Gujarat by filling up 21 dry riverbeds (Shah, 2009). The Yojana86 aims to 
bring about a perennial solution to the ten districts of northern Gujarat, namely 
Ahmedabad, Patan, Banaskantha Gandhinagar, Mehsana, Sabarkantha, Dahod, 
Panchmahals, Surendranagar and Kutch (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
2008). By utilising the flood water of Narmada, lift irrigation schemes, deepening of 
tanks, increasing the storage capacity of reservoirs, making check dams, farm tanks 
and drinking water facilities are included in the project (Ibid). Nonetheless, as of now, 
with the project half completed, it appears that water may flow into the canal only 
once every seven to ten years, and that will happen only when the Kadana reservoir is 
filled to the level of 419 feet, at which point water will then tip into the canal because 
of overspill (Shah, 2009). Groundwater development and decentralised recharge 
structures take water upstream of the Kadan reservoir, which happens because water 
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harvesting and groundwater recharge on a large-scale reduce surface water flows all 
along the basin, and upstream harvesting and groundwater recharge efforts threaten 
large reservoirs (Ibid).   
Due to the scant, uneven depletion of underground water, recharging work has been 
given a lot of importance. The Gujarat government introduced a water conservation 
scheme called Sardar Patel Participatory Water Conservation Scheme (SPWCS) 
through partnership between people and the government in January 2000. The pattern 
of sharing is 80:20 for the entire state, where the government contribution is 80 per 
cent and 20 per cent is borne by the beneficiary. It involves the construction of check 
dams87 and recharge wells, as well as the renovation of village tanks and ponds 
(Government of Gujarat, 2009c). In Saurashtra, dug well irrigation is supported by 
hundreds of thousands of check dams and percolation tanks, which communities have 
constructed with government support for over a decade under this scheme (Shah, 
2009; Shah, 2009 et al.,). Scientific testimony, however, has proved that these 
interventions are creating negative ecological effects rather producing positive 
impacts (Kumar et al., 2009). The reasons for this are i) surface water resources in the 
region’s basins are over-appropriated through a large number of medium (around 100) 
and minor irrigation schemes in years of normal and deficit rainfall and ii) in very wet 
years, hard rock aquifers provide no space to store additional runoff underground. As 
wells in the region overflow during high rainfall years, in normal and drought years 
they only reduce the flow into d/s reservoirs, while in wet years the water remains on 
the surface, eventually evaporating during the monsoon season itself due to high 
evaporation conditions (Kimar et al., 2009:72).  
Up to 1988, farmers were charged based on metered use of electricity, but the 
introduction of a new flat tariff system in 1988 by the Gujarat Electricity Board 
(GEB) changed the whole scenario of groundwater extraction and led to 
overexploitation. During the 1980s, farmers got 18-20 hours of three-phase electricity 
per day, and to control the farm power subsidies, the Gujarati government began to 
reduce three-phase rural power supply until, at the turn of the millennium, farmers 
only received about 10-12 hours of power. Furthermore, the power supply was often 
at low voltages and frequently damaged motors through tripping. In addition, the 
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farmers started using phase-splitting capacitors (locally called tota) to covert two or 
single phase power supply lines into three phase powers to run their tubewells, which 
resulted in tubewells running for 18-20 hours/day.  
By using tota the farmers were able to beat power rationing, but the voltages for all 
the rural power users was reduced to a great extent. Moreover, electricity board 
officials began treating agriculture as a loss leader and farmers as residual customers 
(Shah, 2009). Paradoxically the poorer farmers of Gujarat, especially landless 
sharecroppers and marginal farmers, benefited from the capacitors as the tubewell 
owners with the help of ‘stolen power’ sold them water at a very low price. Therefore, 
electricity subsidies began the widespread groundwater depletion. Moreover, the 
large-scale farmers’ political mobilisation and the powerful vote bank politics which 
aim at preserving at all cost the farm-power subsidy are indicators of the governance 
crisis in the energy-irrigation nexus.   
A noteworthy improvement to groundwater management in Gujarat was initiated by 
the Jyotirgram (Lighted Village) Scheme (JGS), under which a separate electricity 
supply is provided to domestic and agriculture-related activities in villages. The 
scheme was initially launched as a pilot project in eight districts of Gujarat, but by 
November 2004 it was extended to the entire state, assuring 24-hour supply for 
domestic use and 8 hours for agriculture. This has helped in curtailing the 
overexploitation of groundwater pumping through illegal means and is described by 
the government of Gujarat as a win-win solution. Under this scheme, by 2006, 18,000 
villages of Gujarat had been covered (Shah and Verma, 2008).  
JGS has negatively impacted on farmers, tenants and landless farm labourers, as they 
bought water from the tubewell owners at an affordable price before JGS; ironically, 
these poor farmers also benefited from the illegal use of electricity before this time 
(Shah et al., 2008). Hence, the groundwater markets have shrunk, as pump irrigation 
prices have increased by 40-60 per cent. Landless labourers cultivating leased land 
face reduced levels of irrigation as well as low returns on lease farming, while 
marginal farmers and landless labourers also face reduced opportunities for farm work 
(Shah et al., 2008; Shah and Verma, 2008), which has affected the livelihood of poor 
farmers. 
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Gujarat has many soil and water-related problems and the majority of the population 
survives on rainfed agriculture. As such, the watershed development approach is of 
key importance for the state of Gujarat. Although way back in 1978, watershed 
programmes were initiated through the establishment of the Gujarat State Land 
Development Corporation (GSLDC) to carry out all activities related to soil and water 
conservation, it was only in 1994-95 that the central government-funded programme 
started. Gujarat was amongst 11 states88 in which the first watershed guidelines of 
1995-96 were implemented. The main programmes introduced have been the 
Integrated Wastelands Development Programme (IWDP), Drought Prone Area 
Programme (DPAP), Desert Development Programme (DDP) and the Employment 
Assurance Scheme (EAS) by the Department of Rural Development and National 
Watershed Development Projects for Rainfed Areas (NWDPRA) by the Department 
of Agriculture. In the watershed development, the Department of Forest has also been 
involved with the Joint Forest Management Programme (JFMP).  
At present, the GSLDC is also carrying out a number of major and minor watershed 
development programmes such as the National Watershed Development Projects for 
Rainfed Areas (NWDPRA), River Valley Projects (RVP), Reclamation of Alkali Soils 
(RAS), etc. Hence, WDPs started as a policy measure to combat the increasing 
environmental crisis and non sustainability of agriculture in dry land and semi-arid 
regions, and became a key strategy for economic development in Gujarat due to 
frequent instances of droughts, dwindling groundwater resources, increasingly salinity 
and loss of vegetation.  
The approach of watershed development is holistic, while institutional arrangements 
are unmanageable and compartmentalised. Unfortunately, water resource ministries 
are not concerned with this matter. As water conservation and development are a 
prime agenda points within watershed development projects, it is necessary that they 
should be tackled by water resources ministries and irrigation departments, and there 
should be more inter-agency cooperation. Moreover, watershed development has not 
been taken up as a political issue because watersheds do not serve the interests of 
powerful business lobbies. Special importance is instead given in watershed 
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development projects to water harvesting structures such as check dams, which 
benefit only small amounts of farmland by recharging wells, and ignore the 
implications for water resource management in the wider context of the river basin 
(Shah, 2001). This has led to distorted water use planning and interpersonal, as well 
as inter-regional, inequality in access to water resources (Ibid). At the community 
level, with social differences in rural hierarchical society in terms of caste, class, 
gender and inequity in access to resources, the changes brought about by the 
watershed programme are not evenly spread, as those with the land benefit more from 
the recharged structures than the landless, as water rights are inextricably linked with 
land rights.  
Nonetheless, in order to curtail water scarcity, the government has introduced 
programmes to increase supply and provided efficient management in the form of the 
PIM. Among other programmes, watershed management has shown some initial 
success in Gujarat, with an increase in agricultural yield which has been attributed to 
a substantial increase in the water table (Shah, 2000). Among all the initiatives, 
however, construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam has been the most visibly 
controversial. Therefore, I would conclude that water management in Gujarat is 
influenced by socio-political, institutional and ecological factors. 
4.4 Conclusion and Discussion 
Since the 1980s, Gujarat’s energy-irrigation nexus has degenerated into a prolonged 
war of words between the government and the increasingly organised farmers’ 
lobbies. Inequity and overexploitation are the two ugly heads of groundwater 
mismanagement and its unscrupulous usage (Bhatia, 1992). Gujarat is governed by 
the rightist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is referred to as the ‘Hindu 
Nationalist’ party by the western press and media. Moreover, Gujarat has not 
undertaken any formidable land reforms and panchayat exists only on paper. 
However, agrarian politics in the form of strong farmer lobbies has been the foremost 
factor in the state’s power struggles (Mukherji, 2006). Predominantly, ‘Patel 
farmers’89 and farmers’ voices have provided leadership to the Bharatiya Kisan Sangh 
(BKS), which is the radical peasant wing of the BJP and plays a decisive role in 
Gujarat politics. In spite of a severe groundwater crisis, the state of Gujarat is opposed 
                                                           
89
 Patel farmers are the dominant farming caste in Gujarat. 
 
89 
 
to the CGWB (Central Groundwater Board) suggestions that groundwater extraction 
should be banned in blocks facing over-exploitation (Mukherji, 2006). 
Secondly, the state government has not been overly successful against the farmers’ 
movement against the proposal to raise the electricity tariff for groundwater irrigation. 
The state government has given up the plan of rising electricity fair due to the 
wielding influence of farmers lobby under the leadership of Bharatiya Kisan Sangh 
(BKS).90 Consequently, even in view of really unstable groundwater conditions, the 
GOG has maintained a pro-farmer stand. Due to its vested interest of staying in 
power, many of its politicians and government officials have strong rural roots and 
have sympathy for farmers within their own caste (Mukherji, 2006, 2007). Therefore, 
a strong farmers’ lobby supported by politicians and bureaucrats has successfully 
resisted any measures to curb their access to groundwater. 
Moreover, Gujarat groundwater markets are insensitive to the natural, social and 
historical factors (Dubash, 2000). Physical characteristics of groundwater in context 
to depth and conditions of access have a strong connotation for patterns of agrarian 
differentiations. Private ownership and unchecked extractions in northern Gujarat 
have led to competitive well deepening. Access to groundwater has given rise to new 
forms of social organisation, which are in turn shaped through social and economic 
aspects within the agrarian set up. The question of inequity in accessing groundwater 
is very important, as investments in groundwater pumping equipment are often 
lopsided and disparate, which often results in the ownership of groundwater assets 
lying in the hands of wealthy farmers and leads to the creation of ‘water lords’. 
The advantage of unrestricted access to pump groundwater is inexplicably 
appropriated the large-scale landholding farmers who have the capital to invest, 
whereas poorer famers come to depend on these wealthy tubewell owners for their 
livelihoods, which has been well documented in the work of Bhatia (1992), Dubash 
(2002), Prakash (2005) and Mukerji (2006). The concept of community-based 
groundwater management is difficult to establish due to the issue of inequity in access 
to groundwater, as farmers with adequate resources construct deep tubewells with 
submersible pumps, and in the process are more interested with private gain and 
ignore the social cost of over-exploitation. This in turn leads to gross over-
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exploitation, as justified through  Garett Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ whereby 
access to CPR leads inevitably to degradation (Hardin, 1968, 1977). However, there is 
no ‘tragedy’ for the time being for those who have the resources to drill the wells and 
purchase water, as it puts them in an excellent position to benefit from wider scarcity 
(Hardiman, 2007:41). 
The wealth generated from the groundwater irrigation has led to the social transition 
of large- and medium-scale landholding farmers. Thus it is necessary to give 
importance to the implications of groundwater dependence and the struggle to 
maintain access to it. This is pertinent in understanding the social-cultural-economic 
and political change in rural society. Prakash’s (2005) study explains how the inequity 
in access to groundwater has also led to poor and marginal farmers becoming 
sharecroppers, which favours landlords who also happen to be the owners of water. 
Moreover, the farmers’ lobby comprises mostly large landholding farmers, (also 
called ‘bullock capitalists’ by Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987) who are organised on a 
caste basis to safeguard their interests. They do not necessarily voice the concerns of 
small and marginal farmers or agricultural labourers. 
Tubewell partnerships are formed around caste affiliations, and often “caste is the 
glue that binds the partners together”, leaving lower castes disadvantaged. Their 
inability to form tubewell partnerships on a large-scale removes them from the 
groundwater market (Dubash, 2002). Hardiman’s (2007) study on water scarcity in 
Gujarat illustrates how Patidars (the well owners) operate on capitalist principles 
when they sell water to their subordinates, and in the process reinforce caste 
domination and social inequality. Consequently, the domination by the resource rich 
in an opportunistic race to the bottom of the aquifer has marginalized the poor and the 
unorganized in the local groundwater economies (Joshi and Acharya, 2005). In 
managing water, indirect approaches like limiting institutional credit, electricity 
pricing mechanisms and electricity connection have made little impact and have 
proven impossible to implement, so far. Wealthy farmers are generally able to bypass 
such regulations, obtain credit from their social networks and private credit 
cooperatives and get access to electricity.  
The government policy of subsiding electricity for the farming community has 
promoted extensive groundwater exploitation. The creation and functioning of the 
groundwater market, and its advantages for certain sections, has produced an 
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inequitable society. These markets have also helped in strengthening the position of 
upper caste/class farmers who have a strong political lobby and work against any 
move to control groundwater overexploitation. In the case of SSP, state resources 
continue to be invested in legitimising the project as Gujarat‘s lifeline, but it is the 
larger farmers, agro-industrial lobbies and the state’s big cities that stand to gain the 
most from this project (Levin, 2004: Mehta, 2005). Therefore, due to poor 
management, the great potential of water is being lost, creating a further divide 
between rich and poor farmers and rural and urban settings.  
Hence, Mehta (2003) analyses the context and construction of water scarcity through 
its linkages with ecological, socio-political, temporal and anthropogenic dimensions 
and stresses not to visualize it in absolute terms. Consequently, caste, politics, power, 
gender, institutional governance and inequalities of wealth have a strong effect on 
water management in Gujarat, determine access to water and do not easily facilitate 
community-based management due to power relations which are linked to social and 
economic hierarchy and the issue of resource inequity. Therefore, social differences 
have affected both macro and micro level water schemes in the state.  
Taking that as my reference point, I intend to discuss the issues concerning my work. 
A case study of one particular village in the subsequent chapters, would try to open up 
and problematize the entry point and would further tether the already accepted 
arguments by collating it with newer and fresher perspective of looking at the 
negotiation of rural Gujarat, amid, welfare measures aimed at reducing wide gaps and 
filling cleavages permeating the system and political economy of this village called 
Mathnaa. 
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Chapter 5 The World of Water in Mathnaa 
 
 “Water is sanctified for everyone when it is underground, but it 
takes a different meaning when it enters our courtyard, it’s our 
caste which defines water’s sacredness and profanity”. 
  (Somabhai,91 Thakore by caste, Mathnaa)  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter empirically introduces the region and the case study village, its social 
fabric, caste arrangement and the role that caste hierarchies play in water 
arrangements. Moreover, it outlines the village’s social structure and how this centres 
on water. The preciousness of water is explained through various socio-cultural 
practices and their locus around water. The domains contextualising water and land 
arrangements in the village, government water supply schemes and the institutions 
governing them are dwelt upon historically in this chapter. Tracing the sacred of 
nature and employment of water is argued through different positions and anomalies. 
The ownership of water in the caste hierarchy, how it regulates social relations and 
the negotiation of gender politics amid a patriarchal society are also explained in this 
chapter. The socio-cultural matrix centered on water arrangements in the context of 
religion is also typified, and power dynamics in terms of wealth, land ownership and 
access to water are elucidated. Finally, the chapter explains the power dynamics and 
its equation with water in the socio-cultural matrix of Mathnaa. 
5.2 Study Area: Sabarkantha 
Before I navigate to the exact site where I conducted my fieldwork from May 2008 to 
February 2009, I would like to throw some light on the district where the village is 
located. The village of my study is located in Sabarkantha district, which is in the 
northern part of the State of Gujarat. The total area of Sabarkantha is 7,390 km² of 
which 1,270 km² is covered by forest (Director of Census Operation, 2001).  
The economy of the district is dominated by agriculture, as 62.8 per cent of its 
workers are engaged in the sector (Director of Census Operation, 2001). Rainfed 
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agriculture and animal husbandry are the chief occupations. The important crops of 
the district are wheat, cotton, pulses and groundnut. Figure IX clearly illustrates that 
74 per cent of the cultivable area of Sabarkantha is unknot irrigated. 
Figure IX: Total Irrigated and Unirrigated Area of Sabarkantha 
 
Source: Government of Gujarat, 2010b 
 
Sabarkantha has 13 talukas92 (Khedbhrambha, Vijaynagar, Bhiloda, Mehraj, Modasa, 
Idar, Vadali, Talod, Himatnagar, Pranjit, Dhansura, Malpur and Bayad) and 1,372 
inhabited villages. As per the 2001 census, the total population of Sabarkantha is 
2,082,531, and 10.8 per cent of its total population lives in urban areas. It is one of the 
districts in Gujarat with a sizeable tribal population. The total percentage of scheduled 
caste population in Sabarkantha is 8.3 per cent, and of scheduled tribes is 20 per cent. 
The population density of this district is 282 persons per km² and is the thirteenth 
densest district of the state. Table IV, below, illustrates the talukas as the largest tribal 
population in Sabarkantha. 
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Table IV: Distribution of Tribal Population and Main Tribes in Sabarkantha 
District  
Taluka Tribal Population 
(%) 
Main Tribes 
Khedbrahma   62.73 Dungri Garasia, Bhil Garasia, Bhil 
Vijaynagar 73.40 Sokla, Garasia, Dungri Garasia 
Bhiloda 53.51 Sokla, Garasia, Dungri Garasia 
Meghraj 37.94 Sokla, Garasia, Dungri Garasia 
Source: Adapted from Lal, 1998 
 
The average annual rainfall varies from 372.46 mm,93 in 2002, to 1721.15 in 2006 and 
651.23 mm in 2008 (Sabarkantha District Collecterate Office, 2008). Figure X, below, 
illustrates the trend of average rainfall of Sabarkantha from 1992-2008. 
Figure X: The Average Annual Rainfall of Sabarkantha (in millimeters) 
 
Source: Sabarkantha District Collecterate Office, Himatnagar 
 
5.2.1 Water Schemes in Sabarkantha                                  
Topographically, Sabarkantha is highly eclectic. The northeastern and eastern parts 
are hilly, the central part represents is rugged and undulating and the southwest is a 
gently sloping alluvium plain. Rocky areas cover two-thirds of the district, and there 
is no well-defined aquifer system. Groundwater is available from the weathered zone, 
cracks, fractures and joint planes in limited quantity through wells, hand pumps and 
single-phase borewells.  
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There are about 93 small irrigation schemes (Government of Gujarat, 2009f), under 
which water is available for crops in the kharif94 and rabi95 agricultural seasons. To 
ensure the continuity of irrigation, dams and canals are repaired once a year. 
Moreover, eight major and medium-sized irrigation facilities have been developed in 
Sabarkantha by the state government (Ibid). More than 17 small irrigation schemes 
were approved by the central government for renovation, restoration and repair in 
2007-08. Schemes like Sardar Patel Participatory Water Conservation, which was 
introduced in 2000 have been implemented, and 19 check dams on big rivers and 
6,253 check dams on small rivers/Kotar constructed (Government of Gujarat, 2009g). 
Sujalam-Sufalam Yojana was introduced in 2004 for the ten most water-scarce 
districts achieved the following target. Under this scheme, 17 check dams on big 
rivers and 156 check dams on small rivers were constructed (Government of Gujarat, 
2009g). Furthermore, participatory irrigation management, Jyotrigram Yojana and 
various watershed programmes have also been implemented in Sabarkantha.  
Privately owned wells are the main source of irrigation in the district, followed by 
government canals. This is indicated in Table V, below which exemplifies the area 
irrigated by different sources during 1993-94 and 1997-98. Out of the 13 talukas, one 
(Idar taluka) falls in an overexploited category and two (Meghraj and Modasa talukas) 
are in the dark/critical category (Government of India, 1997b), pointing towards the 
overexploitation of groundwater. 
Table V: Area Irrigated Under Various Sources in Sabarkantha (‘00’ hectares) 
Source of 
Irrigation 
Area Sown with Different Irrigation Sources 
1993-94 1997-98 
Net                Gross Net                 Gross 
Government 
Canals 
347                  431 245                   283 
Tanks 1                      1 7                       7 
Wells 1,268             1,499 1,538               1,956 
Total 1,616             1,931 1,790               2,246 
Source: Adapted from Director of Census, Sabarkantha District 2001 
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Figure XI, below, illustrates the various sources of irrigation in Sabarkantha and 
clearly proves that groundwater is the main source of irrigation, accounting for 76.45 
per cent of total output.  
Figure XI: Source of Irrigation in Sabarkantha 
 
Source: Government of Gujarat, 2010b 
5.3 Mathnaa: Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Water Management 
The caste system is a product of ‘post-Vedic philosophy’96 and attributes the stages of 
ritual purity- pollution to human beings on account of their position in the caste 
hierarchy. Water has since been acknowledged as an instrument for establishing the 
observance of socio-ritual purity and pollution. Thus, the basis of the caste system is 
determined by notions of purity and pollution, which are central to Hindi culture 
(Dumont, 1970). Since the Vedic period, water has been acknowledged as a 
primordial spiritual symbol. According to the Vedic philosophy, which forms the 
structural basis of presently practiced Hinduism, water and the human bodies are not 
simply physical entities (Baartmans, 1990). Thus, the caste-based social hierarchy is 
determined locally through notions of purity and pollution, which are used in local 
culture to determine and reinforce inequitable access to, control over and distribution 
of water and its usage rights. At the top of the caste hierarchy are the pure, high caste 
Brahmins and at its base are the impure, low status untouchables, who protect the high 
caste by dealing with pollution, for example removing dead animals. This implies that 
there are complementary hierarchal relationships in the caste system, where upper 
caste purity depends on the untouchables’ impurity. Between the Brahmins and the 
untouchables are all the other castes. The whole system is constituted by a complete 
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set of complementary relationships, where, in consequence, each caste is mutually 
ranked by its relative purity. 
In Hinduism and village cosmology, water is considered pure and consecrated 
because of its cause and effect attributed to sacredness. All the residents of Mathnaa,97 
irrespective of their caste and tribal affiliations, endorse this view. Caste-based 
traditions clearly lay down the rules and regulations of purity and pollution regarding 
‘whose’ water can be drunk, ‘whose’ should be avoided and who should fetch the 
water from the common source of water: for example, hand pumps or a sarkari 
(government) well. However, water takes a different meaning all together, when it 
comes to using it for irrigation. Thus, water, which is a natural resource, has 
symbolic, cultural, religious and economic meanings attached to it, and is highly 
differentiated in its use in the local context (Mehta, 2007). Water, unlike earth, is a 
standard by which we can measure how deeply the essence of caste has penetrated 
and perverted social relations (Guru, 2009). 
Mathnaa is a small village, in the east of the Sabarkantha district. A bumpy 10-
kilometre ride on a narrow road leads to the village from the main highway. Mathnaa 
is surrounded by the high hills of the Aravalli ranges, and the above-mentioned 
narrow road off the main highway leads to the ‘chopaal’, which is the main square of 
the village and a common meeting place for the settlement’s men. The chopaal has 
one tea stall, a small grocery shop, a panchayat office, a village dairy, a village hall 
and a bus stand as well as a through road to other settlements. The main temple of the 
village’s local deity (Kanku Mata) is located here. (See map III below of Mathnaa). 
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Mathnaa is connected to the outside world by government bus, jeep or carrier 
rickshaws, which are referred to as “tempu” by the villagers. Often, local 
transportation is overloaded, so frequently one can see people sitting on the roof of 
bus or a jeep. Only a handful of people in the village have motorcycles. The villagers 
need to go to the main town for most of their daily needs, as there is no village 
market. Mathnaa has one primary school with three male teachers, where children 
from the lower caste stratum study. There is also a school, exclusively for the tribals, 
which was built by the Government of India to promote education among scheduled 
tribes residing on the periphery of the village. After primary education at school, for 
further education the next destination is the main town, situated at a distance of more 
than 15 kilometres from the host village. On the health front, Mathnaa is bereft of any 
medical facility, and the nearest health centre is approximately 15 kilometres away. 
There is, however, one traditional healer known as a “tantrik baba” or shaman in the 
village, who is more popular among the Adivasis in the village and also acts as the 
priest attached to the temple of Bhathi Dada, which is popular amongst the villagers. 
He is consulted about family- and marriage-related problems and is believed to have 
supernatural powers that can cure many illnesses. 
The village has several clusters of settlements along the lines of caste, called “was” 
locally in the Gujarati language. From the main square of the village, near the bus 
station, one can see the narrow mud lanes leading to the caste-based (jati)98 residential 
abodes or “was”. There is a clear-cut demarcation between each caste, whereby upper 
caste houses are identified with a tulsi99 (holy basil) plant in their main courtyard, 
complemented with a lamp lit daily in the evening in their concrete houses. The 
distinct feature of Adivasi houses is their walls, painted with traditional tribal folk art. 
Their floor is made up of mud and cow dung paste. The usual structure, based on mud 
and a thatched roof, is easily identifiable in agricultural fields where it is ritually 
located. 
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The climate of Mathnaa is semi-arid and the topography is mountainous and rough; 
the soil is sandy in character. Average temperatures rise to 45.5 ºC in summer and fall 
to 7.7 º C in winter. Rainfall is erratic and varies from 700-1000 millimetres.100 The 
year I conducted the field research, the average rainfall was 462 millimetres in 
Mathnaa. Figure XII, below, illustrates rainfall trend, which is erratic in nature. 
Figure XII: Average Rainfall in Mathnaa from 1992-2008  
Mathnaa Rainfall 
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Source: Sabarkantha District Collecterate Office, Himatnagar 
The total population of Mathnaa stood at 1,150101 in during 2008-09, when the study 
was conducted, and the total number of households was 200. Mathnaa’s total area is 
503 hectares. Table VI gives an overview of the statistical picture of Mathnaa.  
 
Table VI: Distribution of Land Use of Mathnaa (in Hectare) 
Distribution of Land Area of Mathnaa in Hectare 
Total Area of the Mathnaa 503 
Total Cultivable Area 449 
Total Irrigated Area 220 
Total Non-Irrigated Area 229 
Wasteland 46 
Source: Village Talati (village revenue officer) 
 
The chief source of livelihood in Mathnaa is agriculture, which is mainly rainfed. 
Two main crops are sown throughout the year – kharif and rabi; due to erratic rainfall 
patterns and the scarcity of water, it is not possible to plant major crops during the 
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 Data collected from the Sabarkantha District Collecterate Office, Himatnagar. 
101
 Data collected from the study census conducted in the village, in order to recognize households’ 
heads and categories of people based on caste and wealth. 
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summer months, except fodder or seasonal vegetables mainly for subsistence needs. 
Cultivators keep bullocks for their plough and buffaloes, cows and goats for milk. 
Small and marginal farmers go to town, which is about 15 km away, to work as daily 
labourers or casual labour on construction sites, and return to the village in the 
evening. No official records indicate any form of seasonal migration in Mathnaa by 
any caste group. Table VII below illustrates the village’s crop calendar. 
Table VII: Seasonal Crop Calendar of Mathnaa 
Crop Calendar of Mathnaa 
Kharif Crops Rabi Crops Seasonal Vegetables 
Maize Wheat Brinjal (ringna) 
Millet (bajra) Mustard Gourd (dudhi) 
Pulses (mug, tur, 
urad) 
Gram Ginger (adu) 
Castor Potatoes (batata) spinach (palak) 
Cotton (kapas) Turmeric (haldar) Tomatoes (tameta) 
  Coriander Leaves (dhania) 
  garlic (lesan) 
  Fenugreek leaves (methi) 
  Cabbage (kobi) 
  Lemon (limbo) 
  Lady Finger (bhinda) 
  Onion (dungari) 
  Chilli (mircha) 
  Pods (guwar fali) 
  Pumpkin (kaddu) 
Source: Field Notes 
 
Mathnaa, to a large extent, depicts most of the characteristics of Sabarkantha, the 
main district, in the form of its economy, cropping pattern, rainfall pattern, 
topography, source of irrigation and population. In Mathnaa, the agriculture is both 
irrigated and non-irrigated, and wells are the main source of irrigation. Sabarkantha, 
as one of the districts of Gujarat, is numerically superior to Adivasis, and in Mathnaa 
a significant proportion of tribes along with a few other caste groups form its 
demography. The rainfall is erratic, uncertain and varies with frequent droughts, while 
the topographically is undulating. Hence, Mathnaa, is a close prototype of the main 
district.  
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5.3.1 The Social Fabric 
Mathnaa is characterised by strong social differentiations along the lines of caste, 
tribe, gender and wealth. Mathnaa is a multi-caste village along with tribes, which 
also constitute a significant proportion of the population. Caste determines living 
space and is the basis for social interaction in terms of water. Figure XIII, below, 
gives caste numbers for household representations according to the census study 
conducted. 
    Figure XIII: Caste-wise Distribution of Households in Mathnaa 
 
 
• Eight Jadeja (Rajputs) households: They consider themselves superior 
to all other castes, as they trace their origin back to Sambha, son of 
Lord Krishna, and believe to have ruled Sabarkantha and driven away 
tribes to the forest (Mukherjee, 2003). Rajput clans include the Jadeja, 
Solanki, Parmar Chauhan, etc., but it is claimed that in the local 
Rajput caste hierarchy, Jadeja Rajputs occupies the highest position. 
They come under the category of Kshatriyas under the ‘varna 
system’.102 In Mathnaa, these eight Jadeja households own around 113 
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 The social hierarchy of the caste system in Hindu society is said to have originated from the four-
fold class system (Das, 1982; Fuller, 2003; Murray, 1994) and the word caste is sometime used to 
translate varna; a term denoting the four ‘classes’ of the Hindu society with the Brahmins, the priestly 
class; Kshatriyas, the warrior class; Vaishya, the trader or business class;  Sudras, the service class 
which served the other three classes and whereas the untouchables (also known as Harijans, Dalits or 
the Scheduled Caste, their official designation) are the bottom and are outside the four-class system and 
object of extreme stigmatization. The Rig-Veda hymn ‘the Purusha Sukta’ describes how from the 
Purusha, or the primeval man body the four varnas originated, i.e from his mouth came the Brahmins, 
his arms the Kshatriyas, his thighs the Vaishya  and from his feet the Sudras (Fuller, 2003). The first 
three varnas are called twice-born because their male members undergo an initiatory rebirth; the 
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hectares of land legally, apart from encroachments on village Gauchar 
land (pasture land), for their own cultivation. Jadejas’ social standing 
is also visible through their big houses of concrete, ownership of 
tractors and motorcycles and the use of big brass utensils (because 
brass is a symbol of social status) in comparison to many others in the 
village who use earthen pots for storing water.  
• One hundred Thakore households: They are BakshiPanch and claim 
their descendants come from the Rajputs. They also claim to be 
Kshatriyas and are traditionally associated with agriculture. In 
Mathnaa, around 137 hectares of land is owned by these 100 
households.  
• Fifty-six Dungri Garasia households: They are the Adivasi103 (first 
people), meaning indigenous people. Dungri Garasia, literally 
meaning, is jagirdars or inamdars of the hilly areas (Gazetteer of 
India, 1974). Dungri means hills and Garasia mean grass. People who 
have cleared the forests and prepared it for cultivation are the Dungri 
Garasia. They migrated from the Mewar region of Rajasthan three 
centuries ago. They live on their fields/farms with agriculture and land 
their main sources of livelihood. In total 122 hectares of land is owned 
by these 56 households. The Dungri Garasia tribe is patrilineal in 
character.  
• Thirty-six Harijan104 households: They are at the bottom of the caste 
system. Formerly known as untouchables, even though untouchability 
has formally been abolished in India, they are still discriminated 
against in the village. There is also intra-hierarchy among the Harijans, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Sudras remains ‘once-born’. Thus for understanding the caste (jati), the varna system is important 
mainly because it serves as an ideal religious model for the former. 
103
 Adivasi literally means ‘original/earliest settler’. This term is used to designate the indigenous 
people of India who are officially known as ‘Scheduled Tribes’(ST) and who make around 8 percent of 
the Indian population. Scheduled Tribes are list of marginalized indigenous (tribal) people, comprising 
of different ethnic sub-groups. In the dissertation I would be using the word Adivasi instead of their 
tribe name, as the term Adivasi is widely used in the village to address them. 
104
 Harijans means ‘Children of God’ and this term was given by Mahatma Gandhi to the untouchable’s 
caste, placed in the lowest level in the traditional caste hierarchy. The group rejects this terminology 
and prefers to call themselves ‘Dalits’ meaning ‘the oppressed’. Their official designation is Scheduled 
Caste (SC). But in the dissertation I will be using the word Harijan, instead of the more politically 
correct designation Dalit (oppressed). This is because as they are address in the village by the term 
Harijans (alongside more derogatory term such as chamar). 
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and in Mathnaa they are from the group of chamars. Their original 
occupations were skinning the hides of dead animals. In Mathnaa they 
practice agriculture. 
Caste not only determines the living space in Mathnaa but also landholdings and 
access to water. The following sections discuss the wealth, landholdings and water 
ownership-cum-access on caste lines. 
5.4 Land and Wealth in Mathnaa 
In Mathnaa no one is landless; people of every caste in some form or the other own 
some land, although access is based on inheritance, caste and claims grounded in local 
history. According to the village elders, the Jadejas and the Thakore community 
owned large chunks of land. Reforms introduced in 1960 and The Gujarat 
Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, enforced in 1961, provided ceilings for existing 
landholding and for the future acquisition of land. As a result, it afforded some relief 
to marginalised communities like the Harijans and the Adivasis in the form of land 
redistribution. Realistically though, the two major groups of Jadejas and Thakores 
own more than 250 hectares of land in Mathnaa. Moreover, 69 per cent of the large 
farmers come from the Jadejas and Thakores factions. No one in the village owns a 
tractor for ploughing the fields apart from the Jadeja family; the rest of the cultivators 
in the village use traditional oxen and bullocks. Table VIII gives a detailed description 
of landholding in Mathnaa according to farmer categories and caste identity, 
respectively.105             
      Table VIII: Caste-wise Mathnaa Landholding under the Different Categories 
of Farmers (in hectares) 
Caste Larger 
Farmers106 
Small 
Farmers107 
Marginal 
Farmers108 
Total 
Land 
Jadejas 101.2427 7.3521 4.2715 112.8706 
Thakore 95.0166 28.1101 14.0918 137.2185 
Adivasi (ST) 64.0044 45.5983 12.7503 122.353 
Harijan (SC) 32.1133 10.5983 5.4279 48.1395 
Total 292.3770 91.9465 36.5415 420.865 
Source: Data calculated from the land records available from the Tehsildar office 
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 Please note there exist a discrepancy in landholding records given to me by Talati (village revenue 
officer) and the records available at the local revenue office of Tehsildar at the Taluka level. 
106
 Larger farmers are those whose landholdings is 2 hectares and above. 
107
 Small farmers are those whose landholding is between 1 to 2 hectares. 
108
 Marginal farmers are those who own land less than 1 hectare. 
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During pre-independence times, Sabarkantha was politically and administratively 
divided into two broad categories: a) the Princely States and Estates and b) the British 
areas of old Prantij talukas and Modasa Mahal. The State of Idar was the largest of all 
the princely states and estates, and the system of revenue collection was not uniform. 
Due to geographical difficulties caused by the distance of the villages to be 
administered by the Idar State, the Ankada system was implemented in the 40 
settlements. In this system, local elders were allotted certain villages on lease, which 
were in hilly and far flung areas of the Bhiloda and Meghraj talukas (Gazetteer of 
India, 1974). The Ankadedars were in charge of leasing out lands for agriculture in 
the villages and for collecting fixed sums called ‘Ankada’ and passing these on to the 
Idar Darbar.109  
Villages participating in the Ankada system were in hilly and largely inaccessible 
areas and usually populated by the tribals. Leading Adivasis (tribal) were made 
Ankadedars of the villages, and it was their responsibility to populate the hilly 
regions, serve the border land of the state and collect revenues for the state. Mathnaa 
is a good example of how the land in the villages was controlled by the Ankadia 
during pre-independence, but after independence this system was discontinued. 
Encroachment is a common phenomenon in Mathnaa, whether it is the main Gauchar 
land, i.e. land for the grazing cattle or a small piece of land between private fields, or 
the village pond. The village pond (Talab) is often dry in summer. Villagers farming 
adjacent to the pond convert pond land into a private farm during dry periods. 
Manikbhai, an Adivasi, has occupied the pond for his own cultivation and the logic he 
states for encroaching on the pond is illustrated below: 
“The village pond is good for nothing, it’s dried for most part of 
the year and everyone has encroached common land in the village. 
If I have also done, what’s the big deal about it?! At least I am 
making use of this pond for good; it’s only in monsoon season that 
there is some water in the pond, it’s not very deep, and I do 
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 Idar Darbar is the term used to refer the court of the ‘Princely State of Idar’ 
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cultivation in the upper side of the pond which is adjacent to my 
field, so it’s all right” (Personal Interview, 3-9-2008).  
In Mathnaa, small patches of wasteland sit in-between private fields. In order to 
derive benefit from these common lands, farmers with land adjacent to common land 
use it for growing fodder or grass for cattle. This was explained by Kantibhai, who 
shares a small piece of common land (plot) situated between his field and his cousin’s 
field. 
“Instead of fighting over who uses this small piece of common land 
and reporting the matter to the panchayat, we use the plot for our 
own personal use. Turn by turn in each season, though the plot is 
not big, fodder can be grown, so we use the land for fodder 
cultivation and share the produce. It’s good this way. We both 
benefit from this process of sharing the common land between our 
respective fields. Many people in the village have done this kind of 
negotiation, as both parties benefit from the small piece of common 
land, so it’s a good deal” (Personal Interview, 1-9-2008). 
Certain people in Mathnaa have been able to use their social, political and economic 
status to influence and make tacit agreements with the talati (village revenue officer), 
thus enabling them to encroach on common land. The main common land (Gauchar 
land) allocated for cattle grazing in Mathnaa has been encroached on by the Jadeja 
families, and there is no common land left for other villagers to graze their cattle. 
Maniyabhai justifies the reason for not complaining to the government authority: 
“There is no use reporting the matter to the higher authority, as a 
few years back someone reported the matter and the Jadejas came 
out with knifes and swords in public. Police will come for their 
routine call and will not remain here permanently. We have to live 
here, what is the use of having enmity with the powerful families? 
They have police connections and relations in taluka panchayat. 
Furthermore, during the scarcity of water, they might provide water 
for free drinking purposes if one is in their good books, so why 
have enmity with them?” (Personal Interview, 10-9-2008).  
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Hence, in Mathnaa, people carry out negotiations and harmonise with their co-
villagers to access and manage water. 
5.5 Ownership of Water  
Mathnaa has only one village pond, which is often dried up in the summer. The 
village used to have one sarkari (government) open dug well with a depth of 60-75 
feet, but it has been dry for almost a decade now. The main source of irrigation in 
Mathnaa was open dug wells, which ran on diesel and electric motor. There were 
around 50 open dug wells with a depth of 60-75 feet before 1999, but all of them are 
now dried up.110 The agent of change in Mathnaa was the Jadejas. It was in late 1980s 
that the Jadeja farmers sourced a diesel engine and installed it next to the well, and 
were able to irrigate, whereas others were dependent only on rain. With the 
introduction of motor technology, others also made an effort to have electric/diesel 
engine motors in the open dug well. In the words of Jethusingh Jadeja, whose father 
was the first person in Mathnaa to use a motor for an open dug well:  
“My father introduced the engines to everyone in Mathnaa in the 
late 1980s. Many in Mathnaa had open dug wells but were not 
using any motor on it, due to a lack of information about such 
motors and also because diesel was expensive. The majority of 
people in Mathnaa practiced only rainfed agriculture. Later with 
rural electrification, which was at a subsidised rate, people got 
motors, electricity was cheap and people could afford it, although 
the electricity supply was not regular” (Personal Interview, 7-1-
2009).  
Many farmers embraced inexpensive pump technology in the late 1980s. Water was 
found easily and not at great depths below ground. In Mathnaa, again, it was one of 
the members of the Jadeja family who introduced borewell111 technology to the 
village in 2000. In the words of Daljeetsingh Jadeja and Gambhirsingh Jadeja:  
 “It was me who introduced this borewell technology in Mathnaa. It 
is an expensive technology but it bears fruit as it goes deep, up to 
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 Information collected from the household survey. 
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 Borewell is a well consisting of pipe placed in hole bored into the ground to tap groundwater 
supplies from one or more aquifers. 
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200-250 feet, to fetch water for longer periods, even in the summer. 
I had gone to Himatnagar to buy spare parts for my dug well 
electric motor, and then the agent of the local borewell company 
told me about this amazing borewell technology and how it was far 
better than the normal motor used in the dug well. I immediately 
decided to have this on my field” (Personal Interview, 8-1-2009, 
Daljeetsingh Jadeja). 
“My family brought this technology to Mathnaa, similarly, as my 
uncle Jethusingh had introduced the electric/motor, for the open 
dug well in the late ‘80s. Once we got the borewells installed, 
others also slowly started getting the borewells on their fields. 
When they saw the borewell water pumping capacity, many others 
were inspired to have one of their own” (Personal Interview, 8-1-
2009, Gambhirsingh Jadeja). 
Borewells started to increase in Mathnaa after 2000.112 As a consequence, dug wells 
in the village started drying up. By 2009, there were about 24 borewells as deep as 
200-250 feet in Mathnaa.113 Caste-wise distribution of the borewells is given below in 
Table IX. 
Table IX: Caste-wise Ownership of Borewells 
Caste Number of Borewells 
Jadeja 4 
Thakore 11 
Harijan (SC) 2 
Adivasi (ST) 7 
Total 24 
Source: From Field Survey 
 
In Mathnaa, borewells are collectively owned by a group of relatives. These people 
cannot be classified as ‘tubewell companies,’ which exist in the Mehsana and 
Banaskantha districts of northern Gujarat and consist of rich farmers.114  
                                                           
112
 In the year 2000 there were 4 borewells and which increased to 24 by the year 2005. But from the 
period of 2006 to 2008 there have been no new installation of borewells. Hence there has been 6 fold 
increases in the installation of borewells in Mathnaa. 
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 Data collected from the field survey. 
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 From personal communication with Prof. Amita Shah (Economist GIDR, Gujarat) 26th November, 
2008. 
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When I conducted my field research, all the dug wells of Mathnaa had dried and were 
no longer in use. The reasons given by the villagers who earlier owned dug wells are 
as follows: 
“Dug wells are not deep. When our neighbour got a borewell 
installed on their fields, the water from our open dug well dried up 
completely, as the borewell went very deep – as much as 200-250 
feet. Subsequently, the rainfall has also failed in the last few years 
and from the proud owner of a dug well I became a water buyer” 
(Personal Interview, Beerabhai, a Thakore, 3-1-2009). 
“I did not want to have a borewell, but due to my economic 
conditions there was no other option because my well went dry due 
to the borewell in the nearby field. I was forced to think about 
having a borewell” (Personal Interview, Kirtibhai, a Harijan, 6-1-
2009). 
“The rate at which water was sold has changed. Now the majority 
of the people’s wells have dried up. Few people in Mathnaa have 
borewells and water buying is turning out to be expensive due to 
the new electricity scheme. Moreover, the rains have not been very 
good for the past few years, so the viable option is to own a 
borewell collectively” (Personal Interview, Shanthaben, a Adivasi, 
29-12-2008). 
“With the water level going down, due to borewells on nearby 
farms, my well is becoming dry with each passing year. Deepening 
of the well costs more and is not very fruitful. Therefore, making 
borewell is considered wise. Although it involves huge 
expenditure, it is deeper and does not go dry in the summer” 
(Personal Interview, Praveenbhai, Thakore, 7-1-2009).  
Well ownership goes hand in hand with land ownership, so no one can stop the 
construction of private wells or borewells. Regulations set minimum distances 
110 
 
between borewells, but unfortunately these are not followed.115 A survey carried out 
with 25 borewell-owning farmers116 (and participants in the groundwater market as 
water sellers) gave a striking result, in that 56 per cent had got borewells because of 
poor rainfall, and these were mostly from upper castes. On the contrary, lower castes 
(Harijans) and Adivasi felt that borewell installation was not solely down to less 
rainfall alone; a combination of less rainfall and drying up of their open dug wells due 
to the coming of the borewells in adjacent fields forced them to have a borewell.  
In terms of drinking water, Mathnaa has a total of twenty-two government hand 
pumps,117 which are under village panchayat118 supervision, located in each caste 
quarter in the village. Out of these, only ten are in good working order and in the 
summer very little water availability makes life tougher for the villagers.119 In 
Mathnaa, water tankers are brought into the village during weddings and death 
ceremonies.  
There is clear inequality around landholdings (see table VIII) and those having access 
to irrigation facilities and wells (see table IX). Irrigation is a resource of ‘unusual 
social power’, as stated by Hunt and Hunt (1976), and contributes to better harvests 
and poverty reduction, but it can also increase social inequality (Epstein, 1973). This 
can be observed in the context of irrigation facilities and the ownership patterns of 
borewells, which ostensibly strengthen if not promote social inequality. Those having 
access to irrigation through ownership of a borewell are assured of water and 
therefore in a better position to enjoy an assured harvest. People who have access to 
water – those who own the borewells – are indeed the wealthiest and most powerful 
actors in Mathnaa. This group comprises people from several castes, mainly Jadejas, 
Thakores and a cross-section of other groups.  
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 Although Gujarat was the first Indian state to pass groundwater legislation in the year 1976 to deal 
with the regulation and licensing of tubewell construction and to control the use of groundwater but its 
implementation prove to be very difficult as the regulation was usually by-passed. 
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 The 25 farmers on whom sample survey was carried out consist of the following caste background: 
5 Harijans, 5 Adivasis, 8 Thakores and 7 Jadejas. 
117
 Data collected through field survey. 
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 Panchayat is the village elected council. 
119
 Data collected through field survey. 
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5.6 Gender Dimensions 
Other than caste, gender is a key aspect of difference and hierarchy. The commonality 
running across all the women in every caste and tribe in Mathnaa is their subordinate 
position to men in all affairs, whether religious or economic. This is apparent from the 
following statement of a Thakore woman:  
“Having no son means no salvation from the cycle of birth and 
death, because a son is needed to light the funeral pyre. Her in-laws 
and her husband consider a woman bearing a girl child good for 
nothing. A son is the lamp of the family as he can carry forward the 
name and honour of the family” (Field Notes, August, 2008). 
This is the general view of all women in the village. They cannot perform any 
religious sacrifices or ceremonies, and they do not own any land either. All women in 
Mathnaa share a common gender-based restriction of veiling (ghunghat) in front of 
strangers such as outside men and elders, but married women have coped up with the 
veiling tradition by deciding the length of the veil depending on their relationship and 
interaction with the male space, even, in the agricultural fields. Jadeja women do not 
work in the fields, whereas women from the Thakore, Harijan and Adivasi 
communities do carry out this sort of manual labour. Although, they work in the field, 
they have no decision-making power or bargaining capacity when it comes to the 
pricing of water for selling in Mathnaa’s informal groundwater market. This is 
apparent from the statement of an Adivasi woman: 
“Water is a male-centric arena, as the price of water for irrigation 
in each season is decided by men. Water is an important 
commodity and only men have the decision-making power, as they 
have more knowledge about how things work in the market. Men 
are more knowledgeable about money matters relating to water. 
We stay at home. We do not know how things work in the outside 
world. Our intelligence is doubted and is not considered wise 
enough to make a decision about a commodity like water, which is 
so scarce in the village and has a tremendous economic value 
attached to it. Moreover, having a borewell is a status symbol” 
(Field Notes, August, 2008). 
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Harijan (lower caste) and Adivasi women interact in public, unlike upper caste 
women. It is the lower caste women and Adivasi women who go door-to-door to sell 
seasonal fruits, like custard apples, or berries and seasonal vegetables to the nearby 
town. Even the institution of marriage in Mathnaa is not free from the influence of 
water scarcity, and casts its shadow on women in their groom selection. ‘Village 
exogamy’120 and ‘caste and tribe endogamy’121 for marriage are practiced in Mathnaa. 
Dowry systems exist in all the caste groups in the village, except among the Adivasis. 
It is the custom of the village that after marriage the bride and her groom, irrespective 
of their caste affiliations, have to pay obeisance to the village deity, Kanku Mata, and 
seek blessings before the marriage is solemnised. According to Malibhai, the priest of 
village deity’s temple: 
“The new bride should seek the blessing of the Kanku Mata, in 
order to pray that Mata removes any water shortage in the 
bridegroom’s home and saves the woman from the agony of 
bringing the water long distances during drought years. Mata is a 
female deity and she blesses the women by removing the water 
scarcity. This is our belief” (Personal Interview, 17-10-2008). 
The main responsibility for managing household water rests with the women. There is 
preference and a prevalent norm among mothers to give their daughters to those men 
who own borewells or wells, in order to spare their offspring the agony of walking 
miles to fetch water. Women of all the groups in Mathnaa shared this view. Sakaben, 
a Thakore by caste, states: 
“If a girl is really lucky and is born with good destiny she gets to 
marry a man who owns a borewell. But everyone is not so lucky. A 
man who owns a borewell demands more dowry” (Personal 
Interview, 7-9-2008).  
Although this view was shared by women from all the groups in Mathnaa, it is mostly 
the lower caste (Harijans) and Adivasis who face the brunt of water scarcity because 
of the low social and economic standing of their families. For them, possessing a 
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 Village exogamy means preferred or prescribed practice of marriage outside the village boundaries. 
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 The preferred or prescribed practice of marrying within the defined kin-group, be it caste, linage or 
ethnic group. 
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borewell is a huge status symbol and luxury. In India, arranged marriages take place 
mostly between families of the same caste and social status, and in rural areas this is 
no different.  
Gender differences are used to emphasise social and caste differences in the village 
and are linked with water arrangements in the village. In any water-related 
management practice, for example, becoming a member of watershed committees at 
village level, Harijan and Adivasi women tend to participate for the sake of it, 
although women from upper castes are highly unlikely to participate in public events 
dominated by males. According to Meenaben, a Thakore: 
“It’s a matter of shame and dishonour for women from good 
families to participate and sit with strange men in these 
committees. It is disgraceful for her family and for her husband. If 
he allows his wife to sit with other strange men in the meetings of 
watershed committees or any public events like these, then it 
seriously affects the caste honour and family’s prestige. Harijan 
and Adivasi women participate in these ‘all-men’ gatherings, as 
they are of lower caste and status and they do not have any legacy 
of family izzat [honour] which they need to maintain or protect” 
(Personal Interview, 5-10-2008).  
Married Jadeja and Thakore women do not go out to fetch water from the common 
hand pumps; it’s the small children who do it for them, when needed. Women from 
the other groups are seen actively participating in getting water from the common 
hand pumps or grazing their animals in the common land. Small girls and boys have 
to work in the fields after school, especially girls from the Harijan, Thakore and 
Adivasi groups. In Sabarkantha, the literacy rate for females is quite low compared 
with that of males. In 2001, 52.3 per cent of females were literate as opposed to 80.4 
per cent of males (Director of Census Operation, 2001). Thus, in social relations and 
social positions, the caste system prevails, which is further articulated by gender in 
terms of hierarchies and boundaries (Dube, 1996). 
In Mathnaa, 12 self-help groups (SHGs) were formed in 2000, but now only three are 
left functioning, namely Jai Laxmi, Jai Shreeji and Jai Dashama, after the watershed 
project got finished in 2007. Membership of SHGs is caste-based to ensure smooth 
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running through kinship ties. All the original SHGs were named after gods and 
goddesses in order to seek the blessing of God on the group and their money. Mostly, 
saving and lending activities were carried out within the SHGs, and its members made 
up their own rules, which included a Rs 2 per month levy as interest on borrowing 
Rs.100, and an increased rate of Rs.5 per month if the loan was not repaid on time. 
Despite their apparent benefits, many of the groups dissolved due to internal conflicts 
such as low attendance, poor repayment of loans, etc. The reasons illustrated by the 
women who dropped out of the SHGs are as follows: 
 “Meeting coordination took a lot of our time and we have to 
manage cooking, washing, working in the fields along with 
fetching water, which is all very time-consuming” (Kaniben, 
Personal Interview, 12-2-2009). 
“It was difficult to have a fixed, coordinated time for the meetings 
for every member. Many of us have to do agricultural work as well 
as other household chores” (Kokilaben Personal Interview, 28-11-
2008). 
“Sometimes, favouritism was apparent in giving loans to a close 
relative, leading to conflict of interests between two people who 
required loans simultaneously” (Kantaben, Personal Interview, 3-
11-2008). 
Women’s social identities are multiple and overlapping, as they can be treated as a 
single social group in certain contexts. Cutting across differences like caste status 
shapes their position and options in critical ways. In addition, they do not formally 
own any land or enjoy water rights. For example, the watershed project, which was 
implemented in Mathnaa in 1999, had nine user groups, which were constituted 
around the nine water harvesting structures (check dams) and consisted only of male 
members. Even in the village panchayat or watershed committees of Mathnaa, women 
were just present to fulfill the criteria of various government guidelines. The real 
decision-making power and authority rests with the male members.  
Over and over again, gender is used as a symbol to make the social distance between 
social groups more visible and apparent (Mehta, 2005; Unnithan, 1994). Furthermore, 
class, caste, religion, wealth and other symbolic and structural systems have it’s a 
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strong binding force on gender (Harding, 1996; Mehta, 2005; Mohanty, 1991). Thus, 
hierarchy is prevalent among women. For example, a Harijan woman is considered 
inferior to all the women – even to an Adivasi woman. Thus, in Mathnaa, gender is 
sharply shaped and governed by caste relations, which in turn have a strong influence 
on water arrangements and management. Its impact can be seen in all the aspects of 
life, including local politics, which is discussed in the next section.  
5.7 The Political Struggle 
Mathnaa politics is centered on caste and tribal affiliations. It shares a common 
village panchayat with two other villages. Various caste panchayats in traditional 
form still exist in Mathnaa and are known as ‘jati samaj’ for each caste (which 
consists of senior male members of that particular caste) and ‘Adivasi samaj’, i.e. the 
local village-level tribal council (consisting of senior male members of the tribe). 
Members are not elected but are chosen unanimously from older people who tend to 
command traditional authority.122 In Weberian sense, this also holds true for the tribe, 
as it is inter-village and intra-village rivalry which plays a key role in panchayat 
elections. In 2008, when I conducted my field research, a panchayat election was held 
in Mathnaa, in September 2008, and the outgoing sarpanch (village headman and 
leader of the elected panchayat), Kachadabhai, an Adivasi, won the election for the 
second consecutive term. Although an Adivasi (tribal), he enjoys support from other 
community members like the Jadejas and the Thakores. He is nouveau-riche among 
the Adivasis, as two of his sons have jobs in the Indian Army and he owns a 
substantial amount of land. Kachadabhai is also known to give tremendous respect to 
the legacy of the Jadejas and Thakores communities. The Sarpanch seat in 2008 was a 
reserved seat (due to the Indian government’s affirmative action policy) for scheduled 
tribes.123 The whole village was united in voting for him, despite internal differences, 
so that development work, especially related to water could take place. Hence, in this 
case, voting transcended caste and class divides to promote a collective ‘public good’.  
                                                           
122
 Traditional authority is based on a claim by the leaders and a belief by the followers in the virtue in 
the sanctity of age-old rules, customs and power (Ritzer, 2004). 
123
 Due to oppressed caste system, SCs and STs they were historically oppressed, denied respect and 
equal opportunity in Indian society and were thus under-represented in the nation building activities. 
Hence in order to bring them at par with the rest of the society and to mend the injustice done to them 
for centuries, constitution of India has given reservation to them in the field of education, government 
jobs and in contesting elections. 
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Furthermore, in pursuing the case for a water storage structure, which was constructed 
in the year 2006 in the Harijan “was”, which was not functional due to lack of some 
paper work relating to the installation of an electric motor. Finally, became a rallying 
point for bringing unity. It was a general belief in the village that if a sarpanch got 
elected from the other village, Mathnaa’s development would be neglected, so the 
villagers put aside their personal rivalry and mobilised the whole village to vote for 
Kachadabhai. Bemabhai (who was an ex-watershed secretary of Mathnaa) was also 
encouraged to stand, but he refused. 
Bemabhai declined the offer, stating: 
“Let Kachadabhai stand and we will make him win the election. I 
am the most educated man among the Adivasis in Mathnaa, and I 
know I will be the real sarpanch, even if I do not run for elections. 
Kachadabhai is just IV class pass, he cannot work without my help, 
he is elder to me and I respect him. It does not matter, if he 
becomes the Sarpanch or me. We are from the same clan. I prefer 
to work from behind the doors rather being at the forefront” 
(Personal Interview, 19-9-2008). 
Mathnaa’s social fabric is shaped by caste, tribe, gender and wealth. The community 
is heterogeneous and village life is sharply governed by local politics. The local 
traditional caste hierarchies are still very much prevalent and determine the 
individual’s position in the village social structure.  
5.8 Socio-cultural Matrix of Water 
Water is used as a metaphor to assert the social differences and distance between 
various groups in the village. Water symbolises the difference between communities, 
and the social distance to be maintained by dictating whether the other’s water can be 
drunk or not. There are clear-cut rules; for example, the higher caste abstains from 
drinking water supplied by the lower caste. Thus the Jadejas, Thakores do not drink 
Harijan and Adivasi water. Ironically, an Adivasi, who is also marginalised in the 
village and under the scheduled tribe category, refrains from drinking  Harijan water, 
even though Jadejas and Thakores consider Adivasis at the same level of impurity as 
the Harijans. This was apparent from the statement of an Adivasi woman, Sakantaben: 
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“We are at a higher level in the hierarchy than Harijans; if we drink 
their water we will get paap (sin). Harijans have come from the feet 
of the Purusha, the primeval man” (Personal Interview, 2-10-2008). 
Furthermore, water, unlike earth, is available to every caste and determines the scale 
of untouchability (Guru, 2009). Even during times of water scarcity, which is most 
acute in summer months, people of the higher groups are still not willing to fetch 
water from the government-sponsored hand pumps located in Harijan “was” or 
Adivasi “was”. This amply demonstrates the concepts of pollution and purity in 
village life. It is widely believed in the village that Harijans are impure because they 
eat carrion and that they also come from the feet of the Purusha, the primeval man, 
mentioned in the Rig Veda hymn ‘The Purusha Sukta’. Although no one in Mathnaa 
performs the traditional task of carrying away animal carcasses, many of the Harijans 
feel that they are merely waiting for the day to come when the upper caste, which 
discriminates against Harijans in spite of government prohibition of such 
discriminatory practices, will be forced to undertake menial work. Maltiben, an old 
Harijan woman, states: 
“I am too old to live to see the change when these upper castes will 
do menial jobs, but one day will come when there will be Harijan 
rule in the village, in a true sense. During the scarcity of water in 
the summer, as the water level goes down in many of the hand 
pumps located in Harijan “was”, we are not allowed to take water 
from the hand pumps which are located in the “was” of the upper 
caste. They believe their water will become impure. For us, 
everyone is equal, and we take everyone’s water. But we are 
discriminated against by the upper caste as well as by the Adivasi ” 
(Personal Interview, 22-11-2008). 
Hence, the upper caste take their cue from the manu code124 and use water for creating 
a perpetual division, thus rendering some bodies ritually ‘pure’ and others as 
everlastingly ‘impure’ (Guru, 2009). Purity is amplified by connecting the link 
between water and actors assigned with pure status, and by reducing involvement 
with things and actors of impure status. Nevertheless, the condition of purity is 
                                                           
124
 Manusmriti (The Laws of Manu) is the foundation of Hindu religious law and social conduct written 
by Manu, and is popularly known as Manu code. 
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maintained either by distancing oneself from objects symptomatic of impurity or 
purifying oneself in the form of things recognised to have a capacity to absorb and 
remove impurity. Water is considered to have intrinsic purity and is the most common 
medium of purification (Babb, 1975).  
Water, being a scarce and precious commodity, has led to the cultural practice of 
drinking by pouring it straight into the throat with specially designed vessels called 
“lotas” to prevent water from spilling. Water for domestic needs, such as washing 
clothes and utensils and for animals to drink, is stored in a concrete structure called a 
“kothi” (See photograph: I), which prevents waste and evaporation. The villagers 
make every possible effort to preserve and make use of water, as it does not come for 
free for many families. 
Photograph I: Kothi 
 
 
Moreover, because of its value, the majority of Mathnaa residents, irrespective of 
their caste, do not feel the need to have concrete flush latrines, instead preferring open 
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defecation, as less water is used. Some also see the advantage of using human excreta 
as manure. Bathing is also a luxury in general, and especially during summer. With no 
separate bathing place for women, they usually bathe with their clothes on. In 
Mathnaa, the Jadejas, sarpanch and the ex-watershed committee secretary have 
latrines, making a total of four latrines in the whole village.  
The only school in Mathnaa also has no separate toilet facilities for boys and girls. To 
make matters worse, there is no drinking water facility for the students, so they have 
to get drinking water from home. The toilet structure of the primary school stands 
without any door or roof and is in a dilapidated condition. The boys urinate in fields 
adjacent to the school, whereas the girls control their urine until they return home 
after school. The reason given by girl students for controlling their urine is explained 
below. 
“Our parents tell us not to urinate in the school’s fields, as there are 
boys also, so we should control ourselves and drink less water to 
avoid toilet. A mundane activity, only to be done at home, can’t be 
done otherwise during the school hours” (Field Notes, Female 
Students, October, 2008).  
Photograph II: Primary School of Mathnaa without Proper Toilet for Students 
 
Arrow indicate the toilet for boys and girls in the school having no roof, door and water 
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Due to water scarcity, the villagers prefer to use ash for washing their utensils. The 
reason for not using soap or washing detergent is that it requires more water to rinse 
the utensils properly. Conversely, ash uses less water and is easy to clean off, thus 
saving a lot of water. Apart from water being a precious commodity, and due to its 
scarcity, it has been given immense religious importance. This deification stretches to 
any structure related to water including the digging of an open well or a borewell. The 
“tantrik baba”, an Adivasi, conducts elaborate rituals to accompanying any water-
related construction process. Ancestors are worshipped as well as the village deity, 
Kanku Mata. Moreover, the religious ceremony includes the feeding of seven “kumari 
kanyas” (virgin girls). The reason for feeding food to the virgin girls is as follows: 
“A virgin symbolises pavitra [pure] and untouched, thus the water 
which will come from the borewell should be pure and flowing 
forever. Just like the virgin sanctity, the borewell will maintain its 
sanctity by flowing for years with water being uninterrupted” 
(Personal Interview, Jethabhai, 18-12-2008). 
When the nine check dams125 were constructed as part of the watershed project 
implemented in Mathnaa in 1998, each of the nine check dam user group members 
insisted on the implementing NGO official performing a puja126 to combat water 
scarcity. When there is less rainfall in Mathnaa, the village deity Kanku Mata is 
prayed to and offered earthen pots as a symbol that they should not become dry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
125
 Check dams are low cemented or earthen barriers made to capture monsoon run-off in empty 
streambeds, creating a series of small reservoirs which percolates to nearby wells and recharge the 
groundwater aquifers (Wood, 2007). 
126
 Puja is a form of Hindu worship in which chosen deities are honored. 
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Photograph III: Temple of Kanku Mata, Village Local Deity 
 
There is a belief in the village that whenever there is no rain in Mathnaa, the idol of 
Lord Hannuman should be bathed in milk in order to invoke the rain god. It is 
believed that whenever this ritual has been carried out, it has rained:  
According to the villagers, the moment they bathed the idol of Lord 
Hannuman and had left the temple for their way back home it had 
rained, so this legend has continued in the oral tradition of Mathnaa 
for years (Field Notes, October 2008).  
In both the ceremonies, a caste-based difference is visible. The Jadejas and the 
Thakores, to assert their authority and status in Mathnaa, supply the milk, and the 
main ceremony performed for the village deity is presided over by the Thakore Priest. 
Hence, supplying milk is considered a way of generating an important form of 
cultural capital (cf. Bourdieu, 1977). The gains arising out of providing milk for the 
ceremony every year are not only material but also symbolic in the form of punya 
(rewards) in the afterlife and attaining moksha (salavation) from the ‘rites of passage’ 
(the cycle of life and death) and blessings from God.   
Water is a matter of survival which has been given a sacred touch by the people of 
Mathnaa, by keeping the drinking water pots next to idols of gods and goddesses. This 
act of ritual can be accorded an intrinsic and extrinsic relationship when seen through 
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the perspective of Durkheim’s sacred and profane for darshan (act of viewing the 
deity) and material gains. Water which is an everyday, commonplace, utilitarian and 
mundane aspect of life in its profane sense acquires a sacred meaning when kept next 
to gods’ and goddesses’ idols and pictures in the household, thus bringing out the 
attitudes of reverence, respect, mystery, awe and honour in the pure Durkehiem sense 
(cf. Durkehiem, 1965). The reason explained by Shantiben, an Adivasi, is as follows: 
“Water is a scarce commodity in Mathnaa. We keep the drinking 
water next to God so that ‘His’ blessings are always in our house 
and we do not face the crisis of drinking water and ‘He’ blesses our 
home by removing the scarcity of water. Water is a precious 
commodity and keeping next to the god shows we place 
tremendous importance on it. God blesses our home and we have 
water throughout the year, and we should be able to have the 
honour of offering drinking water if someone asks for it” (Personal 
Interview, 9-9-2008). 
Accordingly, water that is needed for survival has been given a religious touch by the 
villagers and is directly linked to social status when it comes to possession and 
ownership. 
5.8.1 Government Water Supply 
In Mathnaa, water is available through open dug wells, hand pumps, borewells and 
the village pond. The government has also made various efforts in providing drinking 
water and combating water scarcity by providing open dug wells, borewells, hand 
pumps, piped water supply and the watershed project. However, water supply systems 
provided by government departments are poorly maintained or are often a source of 
conflict in the village, due to various vested interests. This conflict is laden with the 
resonating claims of upper castes and their purported control. The village had one 
sarkari (government) open dug well, but the higher caste asserted their authority over 
its management and access and the distribution of water. As Raniben, a Harijan, 
states: 
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 “We were at the mercy of the upper caste groups to give us water 
from the well; it was believed if we fetched on our own we would 
pollute the well and the water for everyone” (Personal Interview, 
11-10-2008). 
Furthermore, she recounted an incident which happened few years back, when a 
young Adivasi boy was caught stealing water from this common well. He was beaten 
up, his head was shaved and he was ridiculed for stealing water by making him sit on 
a donkey. In addition to this, the concrete structure floor of the well was washed and 
‘puja’ (prayer) was organised to do away with the impurity caused by the boy’s touch. 
In 2005, Mathnaa was blessed with the Schedule Caste Sub Plan (SCSP). Under this 
scheme, water supply facilities were to be provided in the form of hand pumps and 
piped water supply at stand posts in the schedule caste localities in the rural areas. For 
this purpose, a huge concrete water storage structure was constructed in the Harijan 
“was”. There was dissent in the village on the location of the water structure, as some 
social groups felt that, as Thakores were in the majority, this water storage structure 
should have been built in the Thakore “was”, and not in the Harijan “was”. The group 
felt that favouritism happened in order to please the Harijans, as one of the family 
members of the Harijans was employed in the taluka panchayat office. The electric 
pumping motor was installed in the structure but it was stolen after a few days. As a 
consequence, due to an ongoing fight, the structure stands without any water supply to 
the present day. Kaniyaben, a Harijan, states: 
 “These upper caste people do not want us to see having water taps 
in our homes and having a regular supply of water by tap. As 
having water taps will reduce our water scarcity and would 
increase our self esteem; which upper castes do not want, as they 
want us to be at their mercy always”. (Personal Interview, 2-12-
2008) 
When the Harijans reported the matter of the stolen motor to the taluka panchayat 
office, government officials blamed them for mismanagement. The Block 
Development Officer, who himself was an Adivasi, advised the Harijans to maintain 
peace and not to get agitated in this matter. He said: 
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“Funds have finished, you all know. Already, there has been so 
much dispute on this site for this tanki and you should have taken 
care of its safety. It’s your mistake, how can you people be so 
careless? That electric motor in your ‘was’ got stolen right under 
your nose. Now, no use of blaming the upper caste for this theft, 
this blame game will not do any good to you, so learn to make 
peace with the upper caste. And remember, without good relations 
with the upper caste, you will find it difficult to get water. So go 
back and do not trouble me with these kinds of issues again” (Field 
Notes, January 2009 based on reports of Harijans who were present 
at this meeting with the officer).  
Harijans saw this water storage structure with a tap as a source of empowerment and 
self esteem. This water structure installed under the government scheme took caste 
colors right from the beginning of its installation, and even today the structure stands 
without water supply and electric equipments.  
Although, there are state sponsored hand pumps in each “was” of Mathnaa and were 
installed in the year 1995. They are maintained by the village panchayat. Water 
problem is most severe during the months of March to June. In summers, most of the 
hand pumps go dry as they are not very deep and water level is very low during the 
summer season. Women have to walk to the nearby villages to fetch water for free. 
Different caste members do not fetch water from the handpumps installed in the other 
caste “was”, due to the stigma, attached to purity and pollution of water in the caste 
context. This has led to informal water market for drinking water in Mathnaa. 
Drinking water is sold during the severe water crisis period of the year, especially in 
summers. Caste inequality has also not spared the handpumps either and the access to 
water in handpumps is clearly marked by the caste dynamics: involving the pollution 
and purity concept of caste hierarchies.  
There are also three sarkari (government) borewells, one located in the Adivasi “was” 
near the sarpanch house, one in a Harijan “was” and the other in the Jadejas “was”, 
each installed for public use. Instead, a few people monopolised and used them for 
personal needs by taking water through their pipes to irrigate their fields, even selling 
some to others for irrigation. This resulted in conflict and the matter was brought to 
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the attention of government officials at the taluka level; it was ignored and swept 
under the carpet. When asked, Sanjabhai illustrated the situation as follows:  
“No one dares to complain as these people have connections with 
the officials, so no use of feuding having an enmity with the 
powerful people. And if we are in the good books of these people, 
we might get water for free, so it’s a trade off” (Personal Interview, 
3-2-2009). 
Moreover, in Mathnaa, a watershed development project was started in 1999 under 
the Integrated Wasteland Development Programme (IWDP) by a local NGO. It was 
done with the aim of reducing water scarcity by constructing nine check dams in order 
to improve groundwater levels. From the very beginning, the upper caste hijacked the 
project and their dominance was present in every form, from the selection of the 
watershed committee members to the formation and functioning of the user groups.127 
They were all pervasive. The working of the watershed project was influenced by 
caste politics, gender disparity on the lines of caste inequality and inequity in access 
to resources due to the inability to invest in technology for the extraction of 
groundwater. The user groups formed were male-centric in nature, but management 
was in the hands of women, who, in spite of doing all the work, had no decision-
making power. Hence, the government-sponsored and NGO-run water-related 
programmes in Mathnaa are influenced by caste, class, ethnicity, gender, local politics 
and inequity. This occurs because of the uneven spread of technology. This issue will 
be discussed in detail in the following chapter.  
5.9 Discussion and Conclusion 
It can be summarised that Mathnaa’s world is deeply rooted in the religious artefacts 
of water-related practices. Water occupies a central place in the life of the people of 
Mathnaa, as various water sources in the village have social, ecological and 
institutional principles governing their use. Furthermore, social relations and 
differences are centered on water arrangements. In addition to this, water issues in the 
village are in juxtaposition with caste, gender, wealth, politics and power. Social 
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 This issue is explained in detail in chapter 6: Social Organisation in Watershed Development Project 
of Mathnaa. 
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fabric, caste arrangements and caste hierarchies symbolise heterogeneity within the 
village. 
The village community cannot be seen a ‘whole unified community’, as it has many 
layers around it in the form of caste, class, gender, ethnicity and wealth. Local 
traditional caste hierarchies are still very much prevalent and determine the 
individual’s position in the village’s social structure, water management, access and 
distribution. They are also being altered and challenged through gender, politics and 
wealth. The material fact of wealth can be seen when people become members of the 
watershed committee, or in other various water groups, by participating in the 
groundwater market. Caste as an identity, a form of social organisation and the basis 
for staking claims in resource build up and authority remains significant in rural India. 
Gender hierarchies conditioned by caste lead to disparity in terms of water access and 
management in Mathnaa. Even at community level, the gendered relationship between 
men and women across castes and in tribes (Adivasi) tends to be subtle and biased. 
For example, Harijan and Adivasi women face more gender bias compared to upper 
caste women (Jadeja and Thakore) in terms of water management. Carrying out 
maintenance work on the check dams for their user groups, and for the upper caste as 
well, along with fetching water from the hand pumps, are examples of biases. 
However, lower caste women (Harijans) and Adivasi enjoy the freedom of 
participation at public occasions like watershed committee meetings, the village 
panchayat, election meetings, self-help groups etc., whereas women from the upper 
caste are not expected to take part in public occasions involving any form of 
interaction with men from other castes. Evidence shown in the discussion 
demonstrates that decisions pertaining to water-related management in the guise of 
the watershed committee, the price of water, maintenance of the check dams bear 
witnesses to the submission of women across all castes. 
Access to and control over water influences participation and decision-making 
processes as well as the institutional structure that regulates access to the same. 
Lastly, water management in Mathnaa is dominated by caste in terms of access, 
distribution, ownership and participation in water-related arrangements. Whether it is 
the government- or NGO-operated water-related programmes like hand pumps, 
borewells, dug wells, watersheds or the piped water supply scheme, all follow the 
same claims of ownership. Inequality in landholding leads to inequity in access to 
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groundwater, as poor farmers are unable to invest in technology and as a consequence 
remain excluded from beneficial groundwater extraction. Hence, the resource is used 
largely by a few well-to-do households, which are often the upper caste. In the case of 
Mathnaa it is demonstrated that inequality in landholding and caste are directly related 
to each other. The higher the caste status, the higher will be the landholding. Finally, 
the government institutions add indirectly to the inequity by ignoring the social 
undercurrents of power relations linked to social and economic hierarchies. Therefore, 
caste plays a dominant role in influencing every other aspect such as gender, 
landholding, ownership of borewells, access to technology, the groundwater market, 
the watershed project, user groups, etc. In a better way, this also provides an 
oxymoronic entry point to contestations, cooperation and negotiations in water 
management, taking its cue from ascriptive and normative mores at work. The issue 
of caste provides a further set of contradictions waiting to be questioned within the 
domain of social organisation around check dams, borewells and diverse property 
rights. The coming chapter will deal with such issues. 
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Chapter 6 Social Organisation in Watershed Development Project of  
Mathnaa 
6.1 Introduction 
Often, the participation of local communities is seen as a means of achieving 
equitable goals, but the question arises as to what constitutes ‘a community’ and what  
factors facilitate their participation in watershed development. This chapter 
empirically depicts how the quality and form of community participation within the 
watershed community depends to a large extent on the characteristics of the local 
community itself. The chapter demonstrates that the village community is influenced 
by caste, class, gender, ethnicity and wealth and comprises actors with varied 
interests, who are involved in shaping the outcome of any development interventions, 
such as the watershed project in the case of Mathnaa. Moreover, the chapters explain 
how gender relations are characterised and socially constructed through gendered 
norms, meanings and practices in the context of participation in the water 
development project. The chapter further explains how formal participatory arenas 
created for participation fall short of achieving the desired result of equitable 
participation.  
This chapter elaborates on how groundwater development has been an important 
recent phenomenon of irrigation through the introduction of the borewells, which 
have been as a rule achieved through individual or cooperative efforts of farmers in 
Mathnaa. Moreover the strategies farmers adopt in order to extract groundwater, using 
kinship and caste ties, offer an interesting subject for study. We further illustrate how 
the exchange of groundwater is embedded and governed by local institutions which 
are deeply embedded in the caste system, along with a series of other social factors. 
Finally, we shall explain the social, hydrological and policy factors which influence 
the development and management of the groundwater through borewells, electricity 
schemes (pre- and post- Jyotirgram Yojana) and check dams. Moreover, the chapter 
shows how the community intelligently combines various pre-existing property rights 
to gain access of water.  
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6.2 Setting the Scene for the Watershed Development Project in Mathnaa 
When the watershed project was initiated in Mathnaa, drought-like conditions 
prevailed, with annual rainfall of less than 440mm in the whole Sabarkantha district. 
Mathnaa is a rainfed area and has no irrigation facility supplied by the government, 
although groundwater irrigation does take place in the larger realm of informal water 
markets. Mathnaa has uneven terrain and is surrounded by hills. The seasonal Watrak 
River flows in the taluka where Mathnaa is located, but the village is outside the 
river’s irrigation command area. 
The watershed development project was started under the Integrated Wastelands 
Development Programme (IWDP)128 in 1999 by a local NGO, under the Common 
Guidelines of 1994.129 A ridge-to-valley approach was adopted, as it is in the 
upstream, and soil conservation was considered necessary to retain water and soil 
moisture.130 Before the intervention, 95 per cent of the rainwater used to run off.131 
The watershed project was seen as a viable option for reducing water scarcity, which 
was apparent from the statements of the one of the government officials at taluka 
level:  
“Mathnaa is totally dependent on rainfed agriculture, although 
groundwater irrigation does take place and there is the prevalence 
of an informal groundwater market. Not everyone can afford a 
borewell and canal irrigation is not possible in Mathnaa. Thus, 
watershed development was considered a viable option for 
Mathnaa in order to recharge its groundwater through constructing 
check dams and checking the rainwater runoff” (A.R. 
Kalasavabhai,132 Deputy Tehsildar Officer, Meghraj, Personal 
Interview, 20-8-2008). 
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 Predominant activity of Integrated Wastelands Development Programme (IWDP) is soil and 
moisture conservation on wastelands under government or community or private control. 
129
 Common Guidelines are discussed in detail in chapter 2: Water Management across Space and Time 
in India. 
130
 In personal communication with the Mr. B.K. Darzi, assistance irrigation engineer in taluka (block) 
panchayat on 20-09-08. (See the Watershed Map of Mathnaa in the annexure- III). 
131
 In personal communication with the implementing NGO, team leader for Mathnaa Mr. Gor on 1-07-
08. 
132
 Please note that in Gujarati, the male members suffix the word ‘bhai’ meaning brother with their 
first name and woman put ‘ben’ meaning sister as a suffix in their first name, and this is officially 
acknowledge and is used in government records as well. 
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Groundwater is the only source of drinking water for the Mathnaa people, as no piped 
water supply has been issued by the government.133 Secondly, it is also use for 
irrigation purposes, so the watershed project was considered the key solution to 
Mathnaa’s water problem:  
“The authorities decided the best option for Mathnaa was to have a 
watershed project, keeping in mind its topographical features, soil 
condition, rainfall scenario and population structure. Rainwater 
conservation is necessary, as groundwater is used for all major 
purposes such as drinking and for irrigation, through open and 
borewells, although rainfed agriculture is practiced” (Ramehbhai 
Patel, Block Development Officer, Personal Interview, 18-8-2008).  
“Canal irrigation is not possible in Mathnaa and in its surrounding 
villages, due to its uneven and hilly terrain, and the seasonal 
Watrak River flows and Mathnaa is outside its command area, so 
the watershed scheme is a viable option for Mathnaa-kinds of 
villages, as their main source of irrigation is groundwater, although 
a large and substantial area is under cultivation through rainfed 
agriculture. Watershed techniques have served as quite good 
alternatives in many villages with terrains like Mathnaa, thus it was 
a wise decision by the government and the implementing NGO to 
have a watershed project in this village” (Deepakbhai Kaushik, 
Deputy Block Development Officer, Personal Interview, 18-8-
2008). 
The first time the NGO officially visited Mathnaa in 1998 to inform the villagers 
about the implementation of the watershed project, a rumour was spread regarding 
government steps to confiscate farmers’ land for the project. The people who were 
against the project were the Jadejas and Thakores, who believed that if government 
development intervention took place in the village, outsiders would frequently visit 
Mathnaa, and as a result their encroachment on Gauchar land and their use of 
coercion and pressure would be highlighted in the eyes of local government 
authorities. This was apparent from the following statements of the villagers:  
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“The first time the NGO officials visited Mathnaa in December 
1998, we came out with knifes, swords and sticks, and threatened 
them with dire consequences, as we were told that they had come 
to monitor our meters used in groundwater extraction and would 
take our land for this project” (Field Notes, December 2008 based 
on reports of Harijans and Adivasis who participated in this act).   
The initial reactions and resistance of villagers against the watershed project led the 
implementing NGO official to hold a meeting with local caste leaders, along with the 
village panchayat, explaining the whole concept and the project’s aims, objectives and 
benefits.134 Gradually, people started to cooperate with the NGO official, which led to 
the establishment of community-based organisations like a user group, watershed 
committee and so on, related to the functioning of the watershed project. 
6.3 Politics of Participation in Mathnaa’s Watershed Project 
The formation of community-based organisations such as self-help groups, user 
groups and a watershed committee acted as a confidence building exercise with regard 
to certain norms, procedures and arrangements. The most important questions arising 
here are does real participation take place, who participates actively in this consensus 
building and how is consensus achieved?  
As part of the watershed guidelines, a watershed association135 was formed in 
Mathnaa, as the watershed area (503 hectare) covered was in co-terminus with the 
village panchayat. The functions of the watershed association, according to a specific 
bye-law, are as follows: 
a. The Watershed Association (WA) should be registered as a society 
under the Registration of Societies Act. 
b. The Watershed Association should meet, at least, twice a year to 
evolve/improve the watershed development plan, monitor and 
review its progress, approve the statement of accounts, formation 
of user groups/self- help groups, and resolve differences or disputes 
between different user groups and self-help groups.  
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c. The WA should look into the arrangements for the collection of 
public/voluntary donations and contributions from the community 
and individual members; lay down procedures for the operation 
and maintenance of assets created, and approve the activities that 
can be taken up with money available in the Watershed 
Development Fund.  
d. The WA should nominate members of the Watershed Committee 
from amongst the user groups/self–help groups by a system of 
rotation, and take disciplinary action of removal of membership 
from the Watershed Committee or user groups and whatever other 
disciplinary action it deems fit. 
e. The WA will elect its own President, who shall be different from 
the office bearers and members of the Watershed Committee. The 
Watershed Secretary shall assist the President of the WA in the 
discharge of responsibilities entrusted to the WA. 
Mathnaa Watershed Association had a total of 97 members, consisting of 81 male 
members and 16 female members,136 but when inquiring about the actual numbers in 
the watershed association, no one in the village was able to inform the researcher of 
the exact number. On repeated questioning on this topic, the people unanimously 
indicated that all information was held by the ex-watershed committee secretary, as he 
managed all the affairs of the watershed.  
Contrary to the guidelines, the functioning of the WA in reality was quite different, as 
the members only met once when the association was being formed and rarely met 
after that. As a result, villagers complained that they were never informed about any 
meetings related to WA- or watershed-related activity. The villagers were legally 
members in the WA, but in practice they had no opinions, views or representation in 
the true sense, in order to fulfill the formal criteria set out when the WA was formed. 
In practice, the traditional existing structure of power in terms of caste and wealth 
hierarchy was used to run the WA, which was controlled by a few powerful rural elite 
to maintain their control in the village. Initially, when the project was started and the 
WA was formed, there was some enthusiasm amongst the people, but with passage of 
time they lost interest, as they found no transparency in the working of the WA or 
watershed activities. The WA and various guidelines existed only on paper.137 The 
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WA in Mathnaa consisted of 11 members, shown by a breakdown of the members’ 
caste status in Table X, below. 
Table X: Caste and Gender Breakup of the Watershed Committee Members of 
Mathnaa 
Total 
Number of 
Members 
No. of Male 
Members 
No of Female 
Members 
Caste -Wise 
Representation 
11 9 2 
 
Harijan (SC): 3 
Jadeja: 1 
Thakore: 3 
Adivasi (ST): 4 
 
 
For the participation and representation of villagers in the watershed project, and to 
make the watershed committee a success, various rules were made by the members, 
such as:  
i) All castes should be represented in the watershed committee, as 
Mathnaa has a diverse caste composition and in order to ensure that 
benefits reach all castes. 
ii) The committee should be gender-sensitive by including female 
members.  
iii) Watershed committee members will meet regularly every month to 
discuss the progress of the work and chalk out future lines of 
action. 
iv) If a member misses a meeting three times, without prior 
notification, they will be asked to leave the committee. 
v) In selecting beneficiaries, the committee members have to ensure 
the principles of the watershed and equity so that no caste is 
neglected or left out of the project-related benefits.  
vi) The watershed committee will solve and look into any dispute 
arising between the villagers over watershed-related work. 
vii) There will be a 10% contribution by users in the case of (check 
dams) structures built on common property and a 15-20% 
contribution in the case of private property.  
viii) The beneficiary from the watershed-related work have to give 
labour for the work done near their field, if they cannot contribute 
through cash. 
 ix) For those households where even labour contribution is difficult, 
they have to provide water to build the structures. 
x) User groups for the check dams’ structures have to monitor the 
structures during construction and should, from time to time, 
134 
 
inform the watershed committee about work progress and any 
problems related to it. 
6.3.1 The Politics of Participation and Functioning in the Watershed Committee 
In the watershed guidelines the rule for the formation of the watershed committee was 
that the majority of members had to come from the marginalised section of the 
village. In land-based technology the landed are primary beneficiaries, as benefits will 
mostly follow the contours of existing inequalities and property rights. The Jadejas 
and Thakores, who were opposed to the project initially, on realising that the check 
dams were to be constructed as part of the watershed project actively lobbied for the 
nomination of these types of candidate,138 as illustrated by the various statements of 
the villagers. 
“As the user groups were to be formed around the check dams and 
in the formation and selection of the site for check dams, watershed 
committee members played a key role. The upper castes had the 
maximum landholding and were to be benefit most, along with 
those lower castes and Adivasis who had land, too. Thus, those 
people were favoured, who traditionally have good relations with 
the upper caste, and therefore it was all about the vested interest of 
each being fulfilled and being opportunist to cash in on the 
watershed project for their respective benefits” (Amritbhai, 
Harijan, Personal Interview, 11-10-2008). 
“No doubt there was representation of marginalised people in the 
committee, but the real power rested with someone else, in the 
hands of Jethusingh Jadeja and Daljeetsingh Thakore and his close 
associates in their respective caste panchayat. Their favourites were 
nominated in the watershed committee and they tried to hijack all 
the work related to water-retaining structures, and their people got 
check dams constructed near their fields” (Motibhai, Thakore, 
Personal Interview, 20-9-2008). 
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members in the committee. 
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In Mathnaa, the resource-rich, i.e. those who own water in terms of borewells and 
maximum landholding, are the upper caste – around 69 per cent of the large farmer 
group is comprised of the Jadejas and Thakores caste groups. The agents of change in 
Mathnaa were also the upper castes, who were the first to introduce motor technology 
to the dug wells, and out of 24 borewells own 15 of them.  
Bemabhai was chosen unanimously to become the watershed committee secretary, as 
he was considered the most educated amongst the Adivasis. He had a diploma in 
agriculture, could take care of the financial accounts, was smart and presentable and 
could speak confidently in meetings with the government and NGO officials. These 
views were expressed by the ex-watershed committee’s members, as well as by ‘user 
groups’ members. However, when I asked villagers who were not in the committee or 
in any user group, they gave me a different story about the selection of Bemabhai:  
“In order to show to the NGO official that the villagers are united 
and the marginalised voices will be expressed, represented in the 
project activities, the rich and the powerful people in Mathnaa 
favoured an Adivasi to become the watershed secretary” 
(Mayaben, Personal interview, 6-1-2009). 
“Bemabhai has good terms with the Jadejas and Thakores, and he 
also has the maximum land amongst the Adivasis, so the powerful 
people in Mathnaa wanted a man to hold the post of watershed 
committee secretary who could work in close confidence with the 
people who still hold traditional authority in the village” 
(Mevabhai, Personal Interview, 13-9-2008). 
“He is outspoken and is known to get the work done quickly, so 
there was no other choice better than him, so whether we like or 
not he was thought to be suitable to take care of the work and 
furthermore he enjoyed the backing of his tribe samaj139 as well” 
(Dengarbhai, Personal Interview, 19-10-2008). 
 “Common land in Mathnaa exists only in papers with the talati 
[village revenue officer], but in reality at the ground level, large 
areas of the common land [Gauchar land] have been encroached by 
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the Jadeja families, and thus the question of common land being 
treated does not arise. Thus, Bemabhai’s selection served a lot of 
purposes for many people” (Durgabhai, Personal Interview, 27-1-
2009).  
Thus, his election was a combination of various aspects like being the most educated 
amongst the marginalised section of Mathnaa, as well as in his tribe, his dynamic 
personality, his ability to handle accounts and speak confidently with outside agencies 
and having the backing of his own samaj as well as the support of the upper castes.  
Monthly meetings by the watershed committee members were held in the first six 
months of the watershed project in order to discuss watershed-related work, as the 
NGO personally initiated these meetings. Later, with the passage of time, the 
meetings were held annually, and at times decision were taken by the few members 
who happened to control the working of the watershed committee. As such, their 
messages would be conveyed to the other members. Typically, meetings became 
regular on monthly a basis when the money was released and the work progressed. In 
these meetings, apart from the watershed committee members, the caste leaders of 
each caste were present, although the lower echelons were there purely to make up the 
numbers. The meetings were dominated by upper caste members and caste leaders, 
who played an active role in its functioning. The reason for their interference was that 
they knew about their caste interests and wanted to ensure that these were not ignored 
(Field Notes, November, 2008). Laxmiben and Praveenbhai, Harijans who were 
watershed committee members, were replaced by Savitriben and Kishanbhai, other 
Harijans, as both of them had questioned the authority and functioning of the 
watershed committee, which they believed lacked transparency. 
“They talk about collective participation and equity, but it was only 
a few people, especially the secretary and the upper caste leaders, 
who were the real players in the whole project. Decisions were 
already pre-decided and we were just informed and our views and 
opinions had no value. When we questioned the financial details, 
cement bags used for the construction in the check dams, and 
advocated that all the members should meet the sarkari motobahi 
(government officials) and the villagers should be informed about 
all the decisions pertaining to the watershed, we were asked not to 
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speak. Being in our caste limits, we were told that we should be 
indebted that we were in the committee, in spite of being 
untouchables. Later on we were asked to leave by citing the 
watershed committee rules that we did not attend the meeting 
without giving prior notification” (Personal Interview with 
Laxmiben and Praveenbhai, 16-11-2008). 
Mathnaa has a slope, varying from 2-6 per cent, and the velocity of water and run-off 
is quite high. Consequently, reducing land degradation, retaining soil moisture, 
storing and recharging water and increasing the water table level in the wells were the 
prime objectives of the watershed project.  
Activities such as constructing farm bund were done, and two types of farm bunds 
were constructed: a contour bund with stone and one with earthwork to retain 
rainwater and moisture in the soil and reduce the slope of land, thus increasing the 
chances of rainwater retention in the soil. Additionally, there were many small 
streams (gullies) in Mathnaa on higher slopes, which led to soil degradation. Gully 
plugs with loose stones were constructed to reduce the intensity of the flow of the 
stream, leading to reduced land degradation. Nalla plugs were also constructed on the 
streams to reduce the intensity of their water flow, thus reducing land degradation and 
increasing water percolation in the soil. Check dams were made constructed on 
rivulets in Mathnaa to check the flow of water, reduce land degradation and increase 
the percolation rate in upstream areas for wells recharging the borewells and 
ultimately increasing water for irrigation. Gabions are structures consisting of a 
rectangular or cylindrical wire mesh cage filled with rock and are constructed on 
small rivulets to check soil erosion and increase soil fertility through silt deposition. 
Table XI illustrates the various activities carried out in Mathnaa under the watershed 
project. 
Table XI: Area Treated Under Watershed Activity in Mathnaa 
Activity Number Area treated in 
Hectares 
Area treated in 
Percentage 
Contour Bunding, 
running in meters 
16303 meters 138 29 
Gully Plugs Nos. 4 0.84 ---- 
Nala Plugs Nos. 15 98.90 21 
Check Dams Nos. 9 157 33 
Gabion Nos. 2 17.86 4 
Source: Data available from the ex-watershed committee secretary 
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According to the villagers, the locations of the abovementioned structures were 
chosen by the watershed committee members, who were also members of the user 
groups due to the pattern of landholding, as the agricultural land of each caste is 
adjacent to their residential caste quarters. These structures were meant to be built on 
government land, but most of this had been appropriated by the upper castes, 
especially the Jadejas and Thakores. As a result, most of the structures were built near 
upper caste private land. Moreover, the Jadejas and Thakores had their representatives 
in the watershed committee, who worked for their particular interests. Some of 
villagers complained that when government officials visited the construction site for 
inspections, they were not allowed to meet them and were not informed when they 
attending. Villagers also highlighted the misuse of construction material such as 
cement bags for private use by some of the committee members. Shivabhai, 
Laxmanbhai and Praveenbhai had constructed their homes’ floors from concrete 
immediately after the project had finished, with the cement which was bought for the 
project work (Filed Notes, January, 2009). However, a civil engineer with the taluka 
panchayat and the NGO stated that check dams could not be built everywhere, as 
certain geographical and technical aspects, and the availability of land for deciding 
the location of the check dams, had to be followed, but the villagers failed to 
understand this point.  
As far as female representation was concerned in the watershed committee, there were 
just two women candidates – one from the Adivasis and the other from the Harijans 
(untouchables) caste in order to fulfill the criteria laid down by the common guideline 
of 1994. In reality though, the roles of these women were just to agree with whatever 
they were told to do, with no chance to stress their own opinion.140 This is 
exemplified by the statements given by ex-watershed committee women members:  
“I did not know how the committee worked, to be honest, as it 
involves lot of politics. It was my husband who told me what to say 
and do in the committee; it’s an all-men affair, so I did not ask 
unnecessary any questions. It’s only when the mottabhai [meaning 
‘big brother’ in Gujarati] from the sarkar [government] or NGO 
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officer used to come that I was told in advance what to say to them 
if they asked any questions regarding the watershed committee and 
the project” (Savitriben, Harijan, member of the ex-watershed 
committee, Personal Interview, 15-11-2008).  
“Occasionally, I attended the watershed committee meeting when 
my thumb impression [signature] was required, as I have to do a lot 
of household work like feeding the cattle, fetching the water, 
cooking and also to work in the agricultural field. It was my 
husband who used to represent me in the meetings when I could 
not go; in a way it was fine, as he was taking care of everything 
and knew what was good for us and for our village” (Malaben, 
Dungri Garasia, member of the ex-watershed committee, Personal 
Interview, 17-11-2008). 
Nevertheless, in spite of having just a puppet representation with no real authority or 
voice in the working of the watershed committee, both women felt proud that they 
were watershed committee members:   
“We are better than the upper caste women as we participated, even 
if it was for the sake of it. We felt empowered, as our thumb 
impression was required to facilitate the functioning of the 
committee. We know it’s a small beginning but imagine women of 
our status getting this honour and position to sit with men – it 
makes us feel good, at least for the time being. We were made to 
feel important, as our thumb impressions were required” (Personal 
Interview, 15-11-2008 and 17-11-2008). 
On the contrary, upper caste women feel that they have honour to preserve and 
maintain, so why would they want to sit with strange male members on a male-centric 
committee and interfere with male working?  
“These lower caste and Adivasi women feel that they have 
empowered themselves by being in the committee as members, but 
in reality when their male members have no decision-making 
authority in front of our male members in the committee, than what 
makes them feel that they are empowered and better than us. Our 
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ancestors have ruled Mathnaa; and women are the honour of the 
family and they should not be sitting with male members. They still 
work in our fields as agricultural labourers and in maintaining our 
check dams, so what have they gained by being members in the 
committee?” (Field Notes, January, 2009)  
The active participants in the meetings were male upper caste members and leaders, 
who were present in the meetings, in spite of not being the members. Hierarchies exist 
even amongst genders, between upper caste women and lower caste/Adivasi women. 
Hence, gender disparity exists in line with caste hierarchies in the representation of 
women from different sections of Mathnaa society. Historically they have been 
excluded from decision-making powers.  
6.4 Working and Participation in User Groups  
The size and shape of the check dams141 constructed to control water run-off were 
small (see the diagram in annexure III). One of the most important aspects of the 
watershed project in Mathnaa was the formation of ‘user groups’142 around the nine 
check dams (water retaining structure) for the smooth functioning of the check dam 
construction and its maintenance. The check dams in the case of Mathnaa were built 
on common property resources such as wasteland, unused pastureland and the traverse 
land of rivulets and drains. Consequently, no private land was submerged. The check 
dams worked on the lines of a common property regime.143 
Residential patterns in Mathnaa are demarcated by caste and tribe, so the agricultural 
land of each caste is adjacent to each residential caste quarters. Therefore, the users 
group’s members consisted of people from the same caste, related by kinship ties, and 
were from the same (kutumb) extended families. There were only a few exceptional 
cases where the members of the user group came from different castes. The 
composition of the nine ‘user groups’ along the nine check dams are as follows: 
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a) The first user group is named Jadejas eik144 (I), as all its four 
members are from the Jadejas clan. 
b) The second user group is named Jadejas bae145 (II), as two of its 
members are Jadeja and one is Thakore.  
c) The third user group is named Thakores eik (I), as all four members 
are from the Thakores clan. 
d) The fourth user group is named Thakores bae (II), as three 
members are Thakores and one is Jadeja.  
e) The fifth user group is named Chamar eik (I), as all three members 
are Harijans. 
f) The sixth user group is named Chamar bae (II), as all four 
members are Harijans. 
g) The seventh user group is named Chamar trind146 (III), as three 
members are Harijans and one is Adivasi.  
h) The eighth user group is named Tindoli eik (I), as all three 
members are Adivasi.  
i) The ninth user group is named Tindoli bae (II), as all four members 
are Adivasi.  
Each check dam user group had its own leader, which was appointed unanimously by 
its members; moreover, each user group consisted of four to five members. Out of the 
nine user groups, four had members of different caste backgrounds together, whereas 
in the remaining five user groups, members came from the same caste and were 
related to each other through kinship ties. Members in the user groups around the 
check dams had activity-specific participation. The user groups were organised on the 
basis of landholdings near the check dams. Focus group discussions (FGD1and 
FGD2)147 illustrate that members of the same caste in the user groups came from the 
same extended family and the borewell was also collectively owned by the family 
members, who also happened to be members in the user group due to landholding 
patterns. Moreover, being related through kinship ties, the degrees of conflict were 
less for the maintenance of check dams. This was elaborated by Jashubhai, a Harijan: 
“Our borewells are collectively owned, and we acknowledge that 
this structure will benefit our borewell, so there was no question of 
any doubt or conflict and we happily provided water from our own 
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borewell when the construction was taking place of the check 
dams, as it was for our own collective good and in the near future 
we would ripen the fruit of the check dam collectively” (Personal 
Interview, 4-8-2008). 
Furthermore, borewells in Mathnaa operates on the lines of common property regime 
as the ownership in the borewells are shared and they are operated jointly, which will 
be elaborated later in this chapter in detail.  
6.4.1 Participation in the Maintenance of the Check Dams through User Groups 
During my field visit to Mathnaa, over a period of one year I did not see a single 
structure which was in a dilapidated state; in fact, all of them were in good condition 
and fully operational. Below is a photograph (IV) of one of the check dams. 
Photograph IV: Check Dam 
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FGD1 and FGD2 revealed that check dams are quite new. Technical designs are 
provided by government engineers and there is no compromise in the quality of the 
materials used for their construction to ensure they can stand heavy rainfall. 
Moreover, maintenance work for the check dams is distributed amongst the user 
group families on a yearly rotation basis, and the structure is maintained by cutting 
the shrubs and de-silting the path through which the water flows. 
FGD1 and FGD2 revealed that if any damage was to occur to the check dams in the 
near future, the members would only carry out repairs if monetary expenditure was 
not involved. All of them asserted that they would complain to the panchayat if a 
hefty sum of money was required as the dams are sarkari (government) structures, so 
it is the government’s responsibility to take care of them. When asked what they 
would contribute in this situation, they were very clear that they would provide labour 
and, if needed, water from their borewells only. Check dams come under common 
property rights, but with a slight change in terms of ownership, which is restricted as 
no financial burden is required for its maintenance by users. 
6.4.2 Power Dynamics of Check Dam Maintenance and Participation: A Gender 
Perspective 
Women in Mathnaa have neither land rights nor water rights, even though they are 
largely responsible for water-related tasks. Further, their participation in decisions vis-
à-vis water is minimal. However, the role of women is very significant in maintaining 
the water-retaining structure (check dams). In the case of Mathnaa, one can see 
gender disparity, as Harijan and Adivasi women participate in the maintenance of the 
check dams. Institutions which seem to be serving a collective good might in fact be 
shaping and reproducing unequal power and authority relations and marginalising the 
concerns of women and poorer people. This issue has been highlighted by various 
feminist works (see Kabeer and Subrahmanian, 1996; Goetz, 1996). 
FGD5 explained why the upper castes refrain from doing menial work such as 
cleaning the check dams. The upper caste (Jadejas and Thakores) women do not 
participate in cleaning and in the maintenance of the check dam structures. It is a 
status symbol that (cultural capital) menial work for the upper caste landowners or 
landlords is done by the Harijans or Adivasis. The reasons for providing these kinds 
of services by the lower caste are many, as illustrated by Gauriben, a Adivasi: 
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“Our ancestors have been serving the Jadejas and Thakores for 
years and we are just carrying forward this legacy traditionally, as a 
mark of respect for them. Secondly, in summers most of the hand 
pumps go dry; it is these people who give us free drinking water, 
and we are saved from walking miles to other village to fetch water 
from the government hand pump made for our tribe people. Thus, 
we are saved from the agony and pain of walking and standing in 
the rows to fetch water and our time is also saved. Furthermore, 
they also make generous donations when any marriage takes place 
in our family, and also during festivals we are compensated with 
clothes and gifts” (Personal Interview, 16-11-2008) 
Kundiben, a Harijan states: 
 “The Jadejas and some Thakores are rich families and we have 
been working on their fields for years. We have also developed a 
good rapport with them, so as mark of respect we do their cleaning 
work on the check dams. In return, whenever there is a severe crisis 
of water, we can look up to them for help, at least the drinking 
water we will get free, and it is always nice to be in the good books 
of the powerful people; it also enhances one’s status and say in 
one’s own caste, as well. They are powerful people in the village 
and still hold considerable authority in village matters” (Personal 
Interview, 18-10-2008). 
Households that have membership in the user groups, and which participate in the 
cleaning process of the check dams, collectively decide on the work of each woman in 
the households and distribute this work load each year prior to the monsoon. This 
meeting is called by the most elderly woman of the household, who is usually the 
mother-in-law, and her decision is taken seriously by all the other young women in 
her stead. 
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Photograph V: Women Discussing and Allocating work for Check Dam 
Maintenance 
 
The reason for this meeting is explained by some women in the FGD3 and FGD4, as 
follows:  
“It is usually the elderly woman of the kutumb, which happens to 
be usually the mother-in-law, who allocates the work load between 
her daughters-in-law and other young girls or women in the 
household. In Mathnaa, there are mostly joint families having 
separate kitchens, but still the mother-in-law commands a great 
authority amongst the other young women in the household. There 
is less chance of conflict between the young women, if the mother-
in-law decides on and allocates the workload of the cleaning of the 
check dams” (Field Notes, from some of the meetings on the 
maintenance of the check dams attended by the researcher). 
In the cleaning of the check dams and of the path of the check dams from where the 
water flows, lower caste women clean the check dams belonging to the upper caste 
first. Hence, even in the process of cleaning and maintaining the structures, the caste 
dynamic within the gender hierarchy plays a significant role, as upper caste women do 
not participate in the maintenance process of the check dams belonging to their own 
user group. 
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6.5 Groundwater Development and Management 
Groundwater is an important source of water in Mathnaa, and its development is 
largely a private affair. The private property regime in groundwater has created a 
place for private exploitation of groundwater. With the absence of well-defined 
property rights to the groundwater and rapidly growing groundwater markets along 
with the widespread use of modern water extraction technologies, groundwater is 
being used as private property in Mathnaa. 
6.5.1 The Private Regime of Groundwater through the Lens of Check Dams 
Water-related activity is interlinked with land, so it is always bound to benefit those 
who own land, which applies in the case of check dams in Mathnaa. Plots closer and 
downstream to these structures get much more water compared to those that are 
placed further away and upstream from the structures, due to the physical attributes of 
water and its gravitational flow. 
From the point of view of property rights148 and collective action, treating the 
watershed as a collective resource unit is important, as water which is seen as open 
access in the form of rainfall becomes private the moment it is drawn from a borewell. 
Property rights are integral to how economic resources are governed. Four broad 
categories of management regimes are found in the common pool resource 
management literature: state, private, common property and open access, or non-
property. Table XII, below, explains these four categories in detail. 
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 Property rights regime constitute a terrain of struggle, which is not given surprising given that 
‘property’ is not an object, but it is rather a social relation that defined the property holder with respect 
to something of value (the benefit stream) against all others (Bromley, 1991). 
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Table XII: Property Right Regime and its Characteristic 
Property Right 
Regime 
Characteristics 
State Property The state has right to determine use and access rules; 
and individuals have to follow the rules of access and 
use stated by the state. 
Private Property Based on exclusive and permanent individual 
ownership. 
Common 
Property 
System of group ownership with bounded 
membership and internal allocative mechanisms for 
individual usufruct rights, while behavior of all group 
members is subjected to a set of accepted rules; both 
usufruct rights and management rules are embedded 
in the institutions. 
Open Access or 
Non-Property 
Individuals have both privilege and no right or duty 
with regard to use and maintenance of the resource, 
hence resulting in no rules or restrictions regarding 
access and resource use. 
Source: Cousins, 1992 
 
Groundwater is regarded to be in the open access regime, i.e. anybody can extract as 
much as water as he wants from the ground below because there is no social authority 
that defines and enforces the rights of individuals or a group to use open access 
resources, and thus each resource user ignores the consequences of his behaviour on 
others (Bromley, 1992). However, the open access nature of groundwater is restricted 
due to the fact that land owners are able to gain access only if they have the means to 
invest in the necessary infrastructure required for the extraction of water. 
Consequently, groundwater open access can be termed as a ‘restricted or skewed’ 
open access regime. 
Hence, the groundwater system, which is an open access resource, operates through 
the private property regime through borewells, which are privately owned by group 
members, as in the case of Mathnaa. The check dams built in Mathnaa operate in a 
common property regime, as user groups have been formed for the maintenance of the 
check dams’ structures. Nonetheless, these check dams operating on common 
property encourage the private property regime of extracting groundwater, as they 
increase the percolation of rainwater and its harvesting. Therefore, borewells have an 
advantage over structures built on common land, so the landed benefit more than the 
landless. Even the landed who are able to monopolise and use the opportunity can 
reap the benefit of having a borewell. As such, diverse individuals groups have 
interests in how the movement of water in different parts of the watershed is 
148 
 
managed, thus at time connecting people with conflict for the mutual benefits. This is 
apparent from the composition of the user groups and maintenance of the check dams, 
as some of the user groups have members from different caste backgrounds but have 
common interests of borewells within the command area of the check dams.  
Despite the drought-like conditions in Mathnaa during the year of my fieldwork, I 
spotted standing sugarcane crop, which is a water-hungry crop, in the field of 
Jetusingh Jadeja, who happened to be the member of two user groups due to the 
positioning of his land near to two check dams. When asked about the paucity of 
water and how he managed to irrigate sugarcane, he said:   
“I own borewells which have water and I am simply lucky that two 
check dams are near my fields. The water below my land is mine 
and no one can prevent me from growing whatever I like” 
(Personal Interview, 4-10-2008). 
Investment in water-related infrastructure comes from public funds, but it is 
ultimately used for private profit making by a few whose lands are strategically 
located near the water storage structure. Thus, the development of water resources 
through watershed development interventions has serious equity implications, as the 
nature of benefit is based on one’s spatial location within the watershed and on pre-
existing inequalities of class, caste, gender and wealth.  
During informal interviews and focus group discussions with the farmers who had 
borewells near check dam command areas, it was established that most were members 
of the user group. They agreed that groundwater levels had improved, as check dams 
increase the retention of rainwater in the soil, leading to rise in the water table. 
Borewell owners in the command area of check dams are able to participate more 
widely and actively in the groundwater market as water sellers, and even in summer 
they are able to sell water for drinking, if not for irrigation. The numbers of Harijans 
and Adivasi borewell owners, who are near the check dams and participate in the 
groundwater market, have increased, and they feel a sense of pride in participating in 
the groundwater market more actively and widely. 
In Mathnaa there are total of 24 borewells, the ownership of which is based on 
collective partnership between brothers and close kin. All of the members of the nine 
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user groups (33 members) also have a stake in the borewells.149 Through informal 
interviews with these 33 members it was disclosed that the cropping patterns amongst 
these households have changed significantly. The table below explains the kind and 
the number of crops they grow. Various advantages for these households are shown in 
Table XIII.  
Table XIII: Benefits to Households Having Membership in User Groups and 
Borewells 
No of crops 3 crops per year 
Vegetation in Summer seasonal vegetables, fodder for selling 
Change in Cropping Pattern Grow wheat, cotton, pulses, castor and 
mustard, (maize for self consumption) 
Engagements in Water Market actively engaged as water sellers in 
groundwater market 
Source: Author’s fieldwork data from Mathnaa (Gujarat, India) 
 
Even in the summer months they grow vegetables and fodder for their own use and 
for selling in the nearby town of Meghraj. Moreover, wasteland is fully cultivated 
with crops like wheat, cotton, pulses, castor and mustard, as well and sugarcane for 
market selling and maize for self-consumption. Conversely, households that have no 
borewells grow mostly maize for subsistence needs and have to buy water for 
irrigation and drinking. 
6.6 Social Organisation of the Borewells 
Borewell installation increased from 2000 to 2005 in Mathnaa, and in most cases 
families jointly own borewells, although some came from separate households. Thus, 
ownership of the borewells in Mathnaa started as a collective partnership in the form 
of finance partnerships, in order to cover expanding construction costs of borewells. 
Table XIV, below, shows year-on-year increases in the numbers of borewells in 
Mathnaa.  
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 Source: Interviews and Field Notes. 
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Table XIV: Trends of Borewells in Mathnaa from 2000-08 
Year and Caste Wise Increase in Number of Borewells in 
Mathnaa 
 
Year 
 
No. of Borewell Caste Ownership 
2000 4 Jadejas 
2001 6 Thakore and Adivasi 
2002 3 Harijan and Thakore 
2003 5 Harijan, Adivasi and 
Thakore 
2004 4 Thakore 
2005 2 Adivasi 
2006 0 Not Applicable 
2007 0 Not Applicable 
2008 0 Not Applicable 
Total=24 (Borewells in Mathnaa by 2008) 
Source: Author’s field data from Mathnaa 
 
The arrival of the borewells led to a decline in the use of open wells. The depths of 
the open dug wells were approximately 60-75 feet deep, which was nothing compared 
to borewells, which went as deep as 200 feet below the ground. As a result, open dug 
wells that were near borewells dried out. The individual solution was investment in 
borewells, which brought added costs and new forms of strategies for water sharing. 
With inadequate resources, forming partnerships with others, whether based on 
kinship or caste ties, provided protection against risk. Caste networks played a key 
role in forming partnerships regarding borewells and access to groundwater. Lower 
caste groups formed their own partnerships based on kinship. For example, in 2002 
Kacharabhai, a Harijan was the first person from the Harijan clan to form a borewell 
partnership with his five brothers, financed by the money his sons had earned working 
with Indian Army as soldiers. Together, they spent Rs. 60,000 on pipelines and 
buying a pump with a 5 horsepower engine:  
“We decided to have our own borewell, when we saw how this 
technology makes access to groundwater easier, as it goes deep 
compared to our open dug wells, which are only 60-70 feet deep. 
Moreover, in the due course of time we were told that through the 
watershed project check dams would be installed near our fields, 
and we would be part of the user group. So we decided that it was 
time that we should have our own borewell. Moreover, check dams 
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would indirectly benefit our borewell in the long run” (FGD7, 16-
12-2008). 
It was at the same time that Nanjibhai Thakore also decided to have a borewell 
with his brothers:  
“The reason which facilitated our common ownership of a 
borewell was that our lands were adjacent to each other, so there 
would be no interference with pipelines crossing other fields, and 
we are related to each other through blood ties. The best way to 
cope with a falling water table was to own borewell, as buying 
water from others would be expensive in the near future” 
(Nanjibhai, Personal interview, 28-12-2008). 
The institutional glue that held partners together was the social bond of kutumb, or 
extended family membership, as most of the borewells were collectively owned.150  
All expenses relating construction costs, electricity charges and any wear and tear are 
shared equally amongst the members of the borewell. Water allocation between 
members (brothers) is done in the following way. Days of the week are allocated in 
advance for each brother to irrigate his fields, and for drinking water a fixed time is 
decided on for all the members to take water for livestock and other domestic work 
(See photograph VI). Crop choice is also decided for each season amongst the 
partners, as they have to share the electricity charges together. In these private 
arrangements, women have little or no decision-making power and there are hardly 
any irrigator women, irrespective of caste in Mathnaa.  
Borewell ownership in Mathnaa cannot be classified in the same way as ‘tubewell 
companies’ found in the Mehsana and Banaskantha districts of Northern Gujarat. In 
the case of Mathnaa, membership numbers are small and the ownership of the 
borewell is family-based locally called kutumb.  
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 Total number of borewells owned by different caste groups collectively has been described in detail 
in the chapter 5: The World of Water in Mathnaa. 
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Photograph VI: Women Collecting Drinking Water from the Common Borewell 
 
Drilling machinery used in the construction of the borewell is hired from the nearby 
town of the bordering state of Rajasthan. Privately run drilling machine owners 
usually offer cheap prices if more than one borewell has to be installed and drilled. 
The price also varies according to the season; for instance, it is more expensive prior 
to the monsoon season due to the heavy demand for drilling in villages. In order to cut 
the cost of drilling, groups of farmers usually strike a deal with the drilling machine 
owners and get the work done simultaneously. Moreover, ownership of over 
groundwater rests particularly heavily on social and caste ties and networks.  
6.7 Groundwater Exchange and Electricity Nexus 
Groundwater development in Mathnaa is largely a private affair and the private 
property regime, which in turn encourages private exploitation. Prior to 2000, the 
majority of the farmers had their own open dug wells with electric motors, and the 
price of electricity was at a flat rate tariff according to the horsepower of individual 
pumps. For example, an electric motor with a 10 horsepower capacity cost Rs 100 per 
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month, whereas a 20 horsepower motor cost Rs 200. Thus, pricewise, it made no 
difference to the farmer if the motor ran for an hour a day or for 24 hours.  
In Mathnaa, electricity was available at a flat rate up to 2005, prior to the Jyotirgram 
Scheme.151 In pre-Jyotirgram Scheme (JGS) times, at the lowest level 11 KV (kilo-
volt) feeders served a group of 2-5 villages, whereby all connections in these villages 
(domestic, agricultural and commercial) were served through this feeder (Shah et al., 
2008; Shah and Verma, 2008) (see Fig. XIV). 
 
Figure XIV: Electricity Network Pre-JGS 
 
                                     
 
 
                                                                
 
A=WEM (Water Extraction Mechanism) Owners 
D=Domestic Power Consumers 
C= Commercial Power Consumers 
Source: Adapted from Shah et al., 2008 
 
 
Post-JGS, the feeders were bifurcated into agricultural and non-agricultural feeders 
(see Fig. XV below), which meant that certain feeders only served farm tubewell 
connections, whereas the rest served domestic and commercial customers. Meters 
were installed on agricultural feeders intended to identify the source of any 
significantly greater than expected demand (Shah et al., 2008; Shah and Verma, 
2008). In rural Gujarat, two major changes occurred in villages: i) they began to 
receive a 24-hour power supply for domestic use, in schools, hospitals and village 
industries; ii) farmers began to receive eight hours’ worth of daily three-phase power, 
but at full voltage and on a pre-announced scheduled, after which power supply was 
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 Jyotrigram mean ‘light of the village’, this scheme basic idea was to improve the quality of rural life 
through better power supply, was introduced in Gujarat in 2004. This scheme was initially launched in 
eight districts of Gujarat but by 2006 more than 95 % of Gujarat’s 18,000 villages were covered under 
JGS (Shah et al., 2008).  
 
All Uses-11 KV Feeder 
Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 
A2 A1 D1 C1 D2 C2 A3 D3 C3 
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disconnected to those feeders, making to impossible for tubewell owners to use any 
capacitors (Ibid). Hence, every village now receives agricultural power during the day 
and night and on pre-announced alternate weeks.   
Figure XV: Electricity Network Post-JGS 
  
  
  
  
 
                                                                 
  
 
A=WEM (Water Extraction mechanism) Owners 
D=Domestic Power Consumers 
C= Commercial Power Consumers 
Source: Adapted from Shah et al., 2008 
 
6.7.1 Groundwater Market  
Mathnaa did not have water market before 2000, as irrigation was done through open 
dug wells run on electric motors and rainfed agriculture was practice extensively. 
However, a combination of certain factors introduced and boosted the water market. 
First, borewell technology came to the village in 2000 and extracted more water, as it 
went very deep compared to open dug wells. Second, electricity was made available 
on a flat tariff. Third, check dams were constructed near the borewells as part of the 
watershed project. Together, these factors acted as incentives in the development of 
groundwater and the groundwater market in Mathnaa.  
There exists no uniform price in the village for selling and buying water; instead, this 
is determined by the caste affinity of each buyer and seller. The price of water ranged 
from anything between Rs.15-20-25 per hour, depending the kind of relationship the 
water buyers and sellers had with each other. This was the scenario in the village 
before the JGS.  
A11 KV Agricultural Feeder 11 KV Non-Agricultural 
Feeder 
Village 1 
Village 2 
Village 3 
Village 4 D4 
A2 
A1 
A4 
A3 C3 
C4 
C2
3 
D2 
D3 
D1 C1 
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The Jyotirgram Scheme imposed by the Gujarat government in 2005 led to an 
increase in water prices, as electricity was no longer available at a flat rate. Selling of 
water was most profitable in Mathnaa between 2000 and 2004, but now a uniform 
water price is prevalent in Mathnaa, due to the rise in electricity charges, which are 
applied to all borewell owners, irrespective of their caste affiliations.  
A sample survey of 25 water buyers152 and 25 water sellers153 was conducted in 
Mathnaa. In total, 80 per cent of the water buyers and 64 per cent of the water sellers 
stated that water prices had increased in the informal groundwater market due to the 
Jyotirgram Scheme, although all of them agreed that electricity supply had improved 
greatly. Figure XVI shows that water buyers and sellers, to a large extent, blamed JGS 
for the increase in water prices and the consequent shrinking of the water markets. 
Figure XVI: Reason for the Change in Water Price in the Groundwater Market 
in Mathnaa (in %) 
 
Source: Sample Survey of Water Buyers and Sellers Engaged in Groundwater Market in Mathnaa 
 
During 2008-09, when I carried out the research, the price at which water was being 
sold was Rs.65-75 per hour, which was exceptionally high, as this rate had never been 
charged in Mathnaa before. The reason for this hike was due to less rainfall and the 
scarcity of water, along with expensive electricity. Moreover, water was only being 
sold if the water sellers had surplus. In usual years, after the Jyotirgram Scheme, the 
price at which water was sold was Rs. 50 per hour. 
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 Sample of water buyers consisted of 8 Harijans, 9 Adivasis and 8 Thakores. 
153
 Sample of water sellers consisted of 5 Harijans, 5 Adivasis, 8 Thakores and 7 Jadejas and 92 percent 
of them have stake in collective borewell ownership. 
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“This year has not been good; not much rain, so we are not selling 
water at all. Only those borewells owners who have surplus are 
selling, but that’s only to their caste members who happen to be 
related to them through kinship ties. As a whole in the village this 
year, very less water is being sold” (FGD8). 
“Otherwise, when rainfall is ok, water is sold and the price is also 
less such as Rs. 50-55, but again it depends who is buying water, as 
most of the buyers are related through kinship and caste ties due to 
landholding patterns, which are adjacent to each caste living 
quarter” (FGD9). 
Hence, during periods of water scarcity, members first fulfill their crop water 
requirements and then decide collectively whether or not to sell to others. If they sell, 
it’s mostly to relatives who have land near to them. 
6.7.2 Terms of Exchange   
Water is sold on two bases: firstly for cash on an hourly provision of water, and 
secondly for a one-third share of the crop. Quite often farmers mentioned ‘trijo bhag 
panino’, meaning a third part of the crop is to be given away for water.154  Water 
delivery follows a set pattern of rotation among members who have a stake in the 
ownership of the borewell, including the water buyer, therefore facilitating the timely 
delivery of water.  
Competition existed between water sellers leading to vast differences in water price in 
the groundwater market prior to JGS, as electricity was available at a cheaper rate to 
all. But post-JGS, there is no such thing as competition in selling water. A uniform 
price exists in Mathnaa for water selling for irrigation. At the beginning of each 
season, leaders of different castes jointly decide the price; there is no formal meeting 
and sellers do not meet individually to discuss explicitly the price. These meetings are 
kept quiet and secret.  
Whilst the location of one field decides potential buyers and sellers for irrigation, as 
one is bound to buy from them, one has the choice of buying from anyone who is 
above his/her caste as far as drinking water is concerned. No uniform price for water 
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 Trijo bhag panino kind of deal is negotiated when more water is required for crop cultivation. 
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selling exists for drinking water, as price is determined by the individual group of 
water sellers of each caste. This is due to religious faith and sentiments attached to 
rewards in the after-life and attaining moksha (salvation) from the cycle of life and 
death after providing drinking water. Though many of the water sellers are of the 
opinion that they would like to provide free drinking water to their own people, 
money is needed to pump the borewell, which is why they are forced to charge for 
drinking water as well.  
6.7.2.1 Rules of the Game for Water Exchange 
Caste and religious-based traditions lay down clear rules and regulations about purity 
and pollution regarding ‘whose’ water can be drunk, and ‘whose’ should be avoided 
in groundwater market exchange. This view is endorsed by all the residents of 
Mathnaa, irrespective of caste and tribal affiliation, and is practiced when buying 
drinking water. 
There are clear cut rules regarding buying water under the rubric of pollution and 
purity of caste system. For example, the higher caste abstains from buying drinking 
water from the lower caste or Adivasi, thus Thakore do not buy drinking water from 
Harijan or Adivasi water sellers. The irony is that Adivasis, who are also 
marginalised, are considered at the same level of impurity as Harijans by the upper 
caste. Adivasi feel that they are superior to Harijans, because they are indigenous 
people.  
“We are the original settlers of this region and were outside of the 
Hindu hierarchy, but now, after entering the Hindu religion, we 
consider ourselves at a higher level in the Hindu hierarchy than 
Harijans. If we buy drinking water from them, we will get paap 
[sin], as Harijans have come from the feet of the Purusha, the 
primeval man” (Lataben, a Adivasi, Personal Interview, 17-8-
2008). 
As a result of these beliefs, Harijan water is considered polluted and deemed unfit to 
be placed in pots next to the idols of gods and goddesses, as practiced in other 
households (see Photograph VII, below). 
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Photograph VII: Drinking Water Kept next to the Idols of Hindu Gods and 
Goddesses in Mathnaa 
 
For irrigation purposes, farmers, irrespective of caste affiliation, buy water from the 
borewell owner adjacent to their field, as according to them water for irrigation does 
not have the concept of being pure or impure. Thus, water is sold and purchased 
freely. 
“There is no problem in taking water from the borewells which are 
owned by the Harijans or Adivasis, as water for irrigation is 
purified when it mixes with the soil, so the question of getting 
polluted or impure by taking water from the lower caste does not 
arise” (Kanthaben, Thakore by caste, Personal Interview, 10-11-
2008), 
For the drinking water, there are very strict rules. Hence, the concept of Durkheim 
sacred and profane is prevalent in water context.  
“Our samaj cannot buy drinking water from the Harijans, as it will 
put us in paap and we will get impure, so there’s no question of us 
buying [drinking] water from untouchable borewell owners. But 
we will certainly buy it for irrigation” (Meeraben, Adivasi, 
Personal Interview, 22-12-2008). 
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“Water has a very strong place in the village life, as Mathnaa has 
water scarcity, so earthen pots containing drinking water are kept 
near the idol of the local deity in each household. Thus, we cannot 
buy drinking water from everyone; we have to follow the religious 
and caste rules” (Shivabhai, Thakore, Personal Interview, 30-10-
2008). 
Water needed for human survival gains the importance of religious value, as well as 
the worldly value of social status attached to it, through access to and possession of 
water. Thus, the purpose for which water will be used and not the source (borewell) is 
given due importance, and is the deciding factor for the villagers when buying water 
in relation to caste purity and pollution. 155 
Lower castes (Harijans) and Adivasi feel a sense of prestige when people from other 
castes buy water from them. In addition, they also happen to be members of the check 
dam user groups, so are better off than others from their own community. This has 
created intra-hierarchy amongst these groups, as those who participate in the 
groundwater market as sellers are power brokers within their community.   
As described earlier in this chapter, the most borewells are owned by the upper caste 
(Jadejas and the Thakores), assuring them of a plentiful water supply and regular 
cropping patterns, as they are able to grow crops throughout the year. Pump irrigators’ 
social status is also represented by their big houses, spending at village festivals and 
donations made for religious matters in the village. The owners of borewells in each 
caste group also have the maximum say in their caste panchayat and represent their 
caste interests in the village matters and in groundwater market exchange. Hence, the 
groundwater market in Mathnaa is depended on social structure, social norms and 
practices of the Mathnaa which is deeply embedded in caste trajectory in regards to 
irrigation and drinking water which developed at the village level. 
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 The sample survey on 25 water buyers of different caste groups, it was unambiguously stated that 
they will buy drinking water only from their own caste or caste upper than their own but for irrigation 
from any caste group. 
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6.8 Conclusion and Discussion 
Caste dominates all spheres of Mathnaa’s interactions and negotiations in the 
CBNRM intervention setting.  
Social networks play an important role in human interactions, and are made up of 
direct and indirect relationships and exchanges. In addition, various types of social 
network are used to achieve a particular goal or action (Long, 2001). For example, 
networks are needed for carrying out specific collective action for the maintenance of 
check dams, which is done by user groups whose members have common borewell 
ownership traits and are related to each other through kinship and blood ties, as well 
as caste affiliations. Consequently, user groups members become ‘collective actors’– 
those who at any given moment have the same common goals, situations and interests 
and agree tacitly or unambiguously to follow a definite course of social action. Thus, 
‘collective actors’ are attributed as having power of agency, along with the capacity to 
make decisions and implement them; moreover, they can be formally or informally 
constituted and strategically organised (Long, 2001). Therefore, members of common 
borewell user groups in Mathnaa can be classed as ‘collective actors’.  
Gender relations are socially constructed through gender norms, meaning and 
practices within a particular community. Men and women are not homogenous, as 
they are divided by caste, class and ethnicity based dynamics operating at the 
maintenance of the check dams and in participation in the user groups and water 
committee. Although women are represented in the formal domain, such as in the 
watershed committee structure, this does not necessarily guarantee that they actually 
take an active role in proceedings. Women, irrespective of their caste, also take no 
part in the groundwater market, which is considered an all-male arena. Hierarchies 
have been created amongst genders on the lines of caste and class difference, whether 
it is in the management of the check dams or being a member of the watershed 
committee. As such, gender disparity exists in line with caste hierarchies in the 
representation of women from different sections of the rural society of Mathnaa. 
Equity in terms of achieving the benefits of check dams built on common property 
land is one of the key issues in Mathnaa. In the property regimes of water, 
groundwater does not belong to common property and is accessed and used more as 
private property by those who own borewells or tubewells. The water pumped is the 
property of the pump owner, and in the groundwater market the water seller neither 
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owns nor produces the water he sells; in effect, they sell the service of their irrigation 
equipment and enjoy ownership rights over the community’s groundwater resources 
(Shah, 1993). In the case of Mathnaa check dams further complement this process 
because although they are built on common property land to serve the community, 
instead their benefits are privately held by the borewell owners who happen to be in 
the user groups set up for the maintenance of the check dams.  
What is more, common property rights exist in the maintenance of the check dams’ 
structures, which are community-based because they are built on common property 
land. In Mathnaa, actors with borewells belonging to different castes are able to tap in 
to the maximum benefit of the check dams, which are built on common property land, 
hence leading to inequity in access to groundwater. Most of the borewells are owned 
by the upper castes, who have membership of the user groups and land near the 
command areas of the check dams, giving them the advantage of having better access 
to groundwater than the lower caste and Adivasis. Due to the absence of well-defined 
property rights to groundwater, rapidly growing groundwater markets and the 
widespread use of modern water extraction technologies, groundwater is being used 
as private property. 
As a result, it has united people in the form of collective ownership user groups. Kin 
and caste ties facilitate joint action in check dam maintenance and in the ownership of 
the borewells. Thus, people are homogenous in regard to forming user groups around 
the check dams and in the ownership of borewells, as they have common interests in 
accessing water for longer periods. Consequently, various small groups form around 
the borewells, user groups, check dams and caste-based groups of water sellers.  
In the village, economic class is indicated by landholding, which ties in with the 
control of water via caste and borewell ownership. Ownership of the borewells in 
Mathnaa started as a collective partnership in the form of finance partnerships, in 
order to cover expanding construction costs. Caste networks played a key role in this 
process, but because of the small numbers involved they cannot be classed as 
‘tubewell companies’.  
The groundwater market was a new development in Mathnaa owing to new 
technology and the subsequent drying up of open dug wells. Moreover, the 
government indirectly provided incentives for its spread through the availability of 
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electricity at a flat tariff rate and the construction of check dams near the borewells as 
part of watershed project activity. Therefore, by default, each of these factors has 
promoted the groundwater market in Mathnaa. 
It is suggested that the groundwater market depends on social structure, social norms 
and practices deeply embedded in caste traditions, the next chapter summarises the 
findings of this thesis.  
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Chapter 7 Summary, Conclusion and Future Research 
7.1 Introduction  
Failure of state-led development projects and growing concerns for participation, in 
the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to community-based natural resource management 
(CBNRM). The 1992 Rio Summit of the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) issued statements advocating a combination of 
government decentralisation, devolution of responsibilities to local communities for 
natural resources, held as commons, and community participation as solutions for 
global environmental problems (Leach et al., 1999). Since the Rio Summit, the 
international focus on community management of natural resources has resulted in 
many participatory conservation interventions sponsored by international donor 
agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank, 
Department for International Development (DFID), International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) and Deutsche Gesellschaft Fur Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmBH. The main agenda of such interventions is to involve 
communities in the management of natural resources for sustainable development 
through community participation and the subsequent empowerment of communities.  
CBNRM, which is a natural resource management intervention, is a paradigm shift 
model that focuses on the state-centered to community-based participatory approach. 
It has been loaded with complexity in its implementation. One of the most important 
critiques of CBNRM projects has been that different advocates visualise the word 
‘community’ differently. As a result, it has become more of an abstract idea loaded 
with non-pragmatism and ambiguity. The past few decades have witnessed a growing 
number of projects for natural resource management with the word ‘community’ 
attached to them as a prefix. Different experiences and varied results in the field of 
CBNRM have led to various reactions from diverse quarters. 
In CBNRM interventions, decentralisation has come to occupy a prominent place, 
whereby the state gives the responsibility for natural resource management to the 
local community through institutions such as watershed committees and water 
associations. The advocates of decentralisation justify this concept on the grounds that 
it could lead to more participation, efficiency and equity; however, most of the efforts 
end up not increasing the negotiating power of the local community (Agrawal and 
Ribot, 1999). Actors who take charge of these institutions tend to engage in constant 
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negotiations and interactions while simultaneously participating directly and 
indirectly in formal institutions, like watershed committees, and in informal 
institutional structures such as local social networks. The formal participatory arenas 
and institutions created by the process of decentralisation do provide opportunities for 
marginalised community members to participate, but the power imbalance in a given 
community is less likely to guarantee ‘equitable participation’ as an intervention 
outcome. International donor initiatives for CBNRM interventions have less scope in 
their blueprint to accommodate the dynamic power relations that characterise a 
community during its project life, as participation in these CBNRM intervention is 
considered complete and real when it happens in the ‘formal invited arena’.156 
Nonetheless, the actors participating in these formal invited arenas do not have a 
social life just made simply of formal relations, interactions and negotiations alone. 
Hence, there is a need to understand what the ‘informal’ holds in the functioning of 
‘formal participatory arenas’.   
A growing body of literature acknowledges the problematic policy and its 
implications, vis-à-vis ignoring the issue concerning the difference and portrayal of 
village communities as homogenous and harmonious (see, inter alia, Leach et al., 
1997a; Li, 1996; Guijt and Shah, 1998; Mehta, 2005; Shah, 2003). Portraying the 
village community in a unified manner leads to its members being seen monolithically 
instead of as different social actors/agents with varied interests and inspirations. 
Hence, due to the widespread notion of the theories of smallness (Schumacher, 1973), 
there is an inherent assumption that small is always beautiful; it is believed that if a 
project is small, it will be successful and egalitarian in nature and lead to true 
representation and participation of all sections of the society – in a true sense working 
on the principles of democracy and equity. Furthermore, there is a need to see the 
village community as a heterogeneous body, consisting of different social actors who 
form various small groups in terms of caste, class and gender. They also have 
different, often conflicting, perceptions of and claims to natural resources. Thus, 
social differences,157 which are an important aspect in the community, are not 
stagnant but are fluid entities and interlinked with each other, structurally and 
                                                           
156
 Arena is helpful concept to study development project which is usually an outside intervention 
process and consist of intricate set of interlocking arenas of struggle. 
157
 By social differences it is meant asymmetries arising due to variables such as caste, gender, wealth, 
historical legacies, power, and politics (Mehta, 2005).   
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symbolically (Mehta, 2005). Such is the case of Mathnaa village. Caste, apparently, is 
a foremost source of inequality in issues concerning water use and access, as water-
caste relations in the village shape related practices and their management.  
Most of the earlier literature on watershed development projects, in particular in 
Gujarat, has focused on the impact of projects and emphasised income generation for 
the participating communities, changes in groundwater level and minimising dreadful 
land conditions in the micro-watershed (Groetschel et al., 2000; Shah, 2000, 2001, 
2004; Shah and Menon, 1999; Sreedevi et al., 2006). This study is an ethnographic 
study of micro-level analysis along the lines of the actor-oriented approach in a 
socially stratified context. The thesis has taken up the analysis of socio-cultural 
aspects affecting actors’ participation and the strategies used in various water-related 
community groups’ formal and informal participatory arenas of managing water. 
Caste, class and gender dynamics influence various water-related community groups 
such as ex-watershed committees, user groups, water sellers and buyers in the 
groundwater market, while collective borewell ownership is analysed using the ‘actor-
oriented’ approach.  
This thesis investigated the micro realities of Mathnaa community members by 
exploring their everyday interactions and negotiations within various water-related 
groups formed in the village around community-based water management. The thesis 
explored how socio-cultural factors influence the various water-related community 
groups in negotiating, gaining access to and controlling the benefits of community-
based water management. The specific research objectives were i) to look into the 
socio-cultural meanings attached to water in the community-based water management 
and ii) to scrutinise the linkages between formal and informal institutions that shapes 
actors’ participation in community-based water management. iii) It further identified 
the major actors and their interests, roles and power in the formal and informal 
participatory arenas in the community-based water management.  
Social research in a development project context, as in my case, requires the use of 
more than one method. Thus it is imperative so that the dynamism of numerous 
intricate processes of social interaction can be extensively covered. Ethnographic and 
qualitative orientation guided the data collection process for this study. The use of 
multiple methods reflects an attempt to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomena in question. Objective reality can never be captured, so we know of 
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something only through its representation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000:5). Hence, the 
most vital tools used for the collection of qualitative data were in-depth interviews, 
participant observation, field notes, dialogue and focused group discussion.158 These 
were integral to understanding the problems of scarcity, the process of participation 
and the role of formal and informal institutions in community-based ground water 
management. Therefore, different methods were employed simultaneously to 
maximise the reliability of the data collected and to triangulate the data gathered 
through participation observation.  
7.2 Findings 
Caste is the cause of conspicuous inequality, which this study established, but it is not 
the only reason for hierarchies. The findings from Mathnaa reveal that there are 
diverse interpretations of high and low ranks in rural India. The study demonstrates 
that any kind of community water-related intervention is building on and feeding into 
existing social and power relations. The advocates of community-based management 
projects tend to have this naïve assumption that just because a project is small, it will 
be egalitarian and successful, while the underlying assumption that actors’ 
participation will be facilitated through the adoption of participatory approaches and 
by creating a participatory arena is misleading. This is because the goal of social 
equity is difficult to achieve, as actors are neither homogenous in composition and 
concerns nor necessarily harmonious in their relations.  
The field study seems to suggest that community-based water management 
approaches such as rainwater harvesting have several potential social risks and 
dangers. In the case of Mathnaa, few people in the name of the development of the 
whole village hijacked the project, which was small because it was just one specific 
village. This study argued that actor participation in the formal participatory arena and 
interaction in the Mathnaa water management context is shaped by the actor agency 
and networks, their relative power positions, interests and interactions. The findings 
confirm the assertions of actor-oriented scholars in that social action is actor-oriented 
and is at the same time embedded in the larger social setting that manipulates the 
choice of actors in a situated manner (Long, 1992; Long and van der Ploeg, 1989).   
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 Total number of interviews and focus group discussion (FGDs) carried out for data collection has 
been discussed in chapter 1: Introduction. For details on FGDs see annexure-IV.  
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Often, development agencies overlook the fact that most beneficiaries of small 
interventions will be the village landed or historically advantaged groups, which is 
demonstrated in the case of Mathnaa. In order to start gaining legitimacy, the project’s 
implementing agency operated through Mathnaa’s traditional power brokers, thus the 
project, despite its condescending agenda of participation and equity, led to the 
invariable perpetuating of existing forms of social inequalities. In Mathnaa, an NGO 
implemented the watershed project to harvest rainwater by building check dams. The 
existing social structure of the village in terms of caste, wealth, class and gender 
facilitated the functioning of user groups formed around the check dams for 
maintenance purposes. Consequently, it became apparent that caste, which leads to 
differentiation in society, played a key role in the maintenance of the check dams, 
ostensibly because the members of the user groups were mostly from the same caste 
and related to each other though kinship and blood ties. 
Some of the major theoretical findings of this study are discussed around the issues of 
communities, the cosmology of water, water and power and the co-existence of 
diverse property rights to substantiate the answers found through the lens of research 
objectives.  
a) Conceptualising Communities 
The fundamental assumption in CBNRM and the decentralisation discourse on the 
notion of homogenous local community has been challenging (Agrawal and Gibson, 
1999, 2001; Chambers, 1994; Guijt and Shah, 1998a; Leach et al., 1999; Mosse, 
1994) and opened up a Pandora’s box of analytical issues such as the heterogeneity of 
communities and its relationship between gender, caste, class, ethnicity and the 
community in natural resource management interventions. It has been demonstrated 
through this thesis that Mathnaa is typically complex, just like many other rural 
communities, and far from idealistic. From an actor-oriented approach, which 
emphasises actors, actions, agency and power relations, communities cannot be 
treated as static and rule-bound, as they are composed of people who actively 
monitor, interpret and shape the world around them (Long and Long, 1992; Long and 
van der Ploeg, 1989). The actor-oriented perspective does not reject the notion of 
community altogether though; rather, it contextualises, by describing it as more or less 
temporary unity of situation, interest or purpose. For example, in the case of the 
election of the village headman, the community did cut across caste and class divides 
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towards a collective good. Hence, differences were accommodated superficially in 
order to secure consensus in the panchayat elections. Similarly, the caste and Adivasi 
leaders, having traditional authority in the Weberian sense, played the role of creating 
a democratic space in order to build consensus for the Mathnaa watershed project. 
Community-based actors are highly differentiated with varying socio-economic and 
political backgrounds as well as diverse perceptions, capabilities and institutional 
attributes. The image of shared beliefs and interests propagated by the classic notion 
of a homogenous community has been taken over by the diverse, and often 
conflicting, values and resource priorities pervading social life. Actors’ varying 
interests and interactions have also resulted in the relative transformation of their 
socio-economic positioning in the community over time. The Harijans and Adivasis 
have a considerable level of upgrading and mobility in their relative position within 
the Mathnaa community. Their ownership of borewells and participation in the 
groundwater markets as sellers, as well as members in the user groups of the 
watershed committee, has contributed to their mobility pattern going up.  
Gender differences do exist in Mathnaa in terms of caste hierarchy, and gender 
relations are characterised as socially constructed through gendered norms, meanings 
and practices.159 Gendered power relations operating in the watershed committee and 
user group have serious implications for women’s participation in watershed 
interventions. There was gendered exclusion in the formal, i.e. the watershed 
committee and user groups, and inclusion in the informal spheres, i.e. cleaning and 
maintaining of the check dam structures happened concurrently, as women were 
influenced by patriarchal norms, caste-based differentiations and practices operating 
at the informal level. It was observed that female members in the watershed 
committee were merely token representatives. Though not formal members in the user 
groups, they were mainly responsible for the maintenances of the check dams. In 
caste-based differences, which also exist in the female domain, women of the lower 
caste and Adivasi group participated in the process of check dam maintenance, thus 
leaving out the upper caste Jadejas and Thakores women from this work. Hence, 
gender-based hierarchy on the lines of caste stratification existed in Mathnaa, which is 
                                                           
159
 The aspects of gender differences, relations, norms and meanings in Mathnaa are discussed in detail 
in chapter 5: The World of Water in Mathnaa and in chapter 6: Social Organisation in Watershed 
Development Project of Mathnaa.  
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apparent from the task allocation for women of different groups. The complex 
interplay of gendered perceptions, power relations and gendered division of labour 
influenced their participation in formal participatory arenas. Evidence from Mathnaa 
also shows that actors’ self-image and perceptions do have a strong influence on their 
strategies, agendas for participation and relationships with one another. For example, 
the gendered self-image of Harijan and Adivasi women as members in the watershed 
committee gave them a sense of pride, in spite of just being a mannequin member 
with a patronising sense of participation in the committee. Similarly, Harijan and 
Adivasi men considered it a matter of pride to be recognised as watershed committee 
members. Therefore, this thesis established that in highly stratified communities, 
restricting gender analysis and attention to formal institutions alone is not sufficient 
for understanding complex gender dynamics operating at the grassroots level.  
Moreover, the separation of roles between formal and informal institutional structures 
in the intervention context is not entirely clear. They have always been interwoven, as 
the actors who engaged in both these realms do not separate them in the true sense. 
For example, the traditional caste panchayat leaders, the Harijans, Adivasis and the 
upper caste leaders engaged with each other, and with external actors like the 
implementing NGO. In practice, there are inter-linkages and overlaps that make the 
boundaries very fluid between the formal and informal institutions. In Mathnaa, a 
diverse set of social, economic, cultural and power dynamics operating in a given 
society influence relations between formal and informal resource management 
institutions. Evidence from the village proved that there is coexistence and 
cooperation between formal and informal institution structures in the intervention 
setting, whereby community-based actors constantly interacted and negotiated with 
each other through their power relations.  
b) Cosmology of Water 
Mathnaa’s world is rooted deeply, religiously and cosmologically in terms of water-
related practices. Water occupies a central place in the lives of the people, 
exemplified by the fact that various sources of water in the village have social, 
ecological and institutional principles governing their use. Water and caste inter-
linkages are the dictating factors regarding the distance to be maintained between 
factions in the village. As a result, water is used as a metaphor to assert these social 
differences. For instance, any water-related practices in the village such as the 
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keeping of drinking water pots next to the idols of gods and goddesses and performing 
puja (prayers) before any water-related structures are constructed, or appeasing the 
local village deity and other gods and goddesses by offering prayers to the rain god, 
ascribe immense religious significance to water in Mathnaa. Collective practice 
relating to appeasing the rain god further reinforces caste and social differences 
among the villagers.  
The findings of this study explain the role of water as a tool, used to reproduce 
untouchability practices in the village by having clearly defined rules pertaining to 
caste groups for buying drinking water, regulated by the sanctum of pollution and 
purity. However, water takes on a different meaning all together when it comes to 
buying it for irrigation. Caste rules are bent when buying irrigation water, irrespective 
of caste status in the local caste hierarchy, as buyers state that water for irrigation is 
used for a secular purpose, i.e. for irrigation, and hence carries no traces of pollution 
if brought from a lower caste borewell owner engaged in the groundwater market. The 
groundwater market in Mathnaa is dependent on social structure, social norms and 
practices deeply embedded in caste in regards to irrigation and drinking water 
developed at the village level. Therefore, the caste system helps in understanding the 
notions of purity and pollution and how these are used in the local culture for 
determining and reinforcing inequitable access to the control and distribution of water 
and water use rights. All this forms an important element in understanding the various 
meanings and management practices attached to water by the local community. 
Water is so interwoven into the life of Mathnaa people that selection of a wedding 
groom is decided within the larger realm of water scarcity. Marriage rituals are said to 
be completed with the involvement of water rituals, associated to combat water 
scarcity, as described in Chapter 5. Moreover, various beliefs and practices are 
associated with water management and scarcity through which actors such as rural 
elite practice symbolic capital. This is demonstrated and put on show in the case of 
milk used for bathing the idols of God in a collective gathering at the village festival. 
In other depictions, water is seen as sacred and profane in relation to how it is used; 
for instance, drinking water is considered sacred, as it is kept near to religious idols. 
Thus, water, which is a natural resource, has symbolic, cultural, religious and 
economic meaning attached to it, and is highly differentiated in its use in the local 
context (Mehta, 2007).  
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c) Water and Power 
In Mathnaa, any aspect of water-related management is dominated by caste in terms 
of access, distribution, ownership and participation in water-related arrangements. 
Whether they are government or NGO operated, water-related programmes such as 
hand pumps, borewells, dug wells, watersheds or piped water supply schemes, 
everywhere caste regimentation is followed. Chapter 5 makes it evident that, in 
Mathnaa, inequality in landholding and caste are directly related, which means that 
the higher the caste status, the higher will be the landholding, which is directly linked 
with the ownership of water. As a matter of fact, people who own and have access to 
water – read who own the borewells – are indeed the wealthiest and most powerful 
actors in the village. With water as a male-centric arena, all the matters related to it 
are controlled by men. Whether it is the watershed committee or user groups in the 
formal participatory arena or the informal groundwater market and social practices 
associated with water rituals or management, men dictate and call the shots. 
Women who happen not to belong to user groups do the maintenance of check dams. 
Hence, gender disparity exists, even between upper caste and lower caste women, 
because it is the responsibility of the lower caste (Harijans) and Adivasi women to 
work on the check dams of the upper caste. Even the scarcity of water is felt the most 
by the women of lower caste and the Adivasi; the upper caste is devoid of any such 
burden or scarcity. Thus, the hierarchy between women is manifest if not rampant. In 
addition to this, water issues in the village are in juxtaposition with caste, gender, 
wealth, politics and power.  
The social organisations formed around the project are believed by development 
agencies to replicate traditional organisation and reproduce the assumed effectiveness 
of a traditional past. In reality though, as demonstrated by Mathnaa’s case, the village 
community is portrayed by its powerful actors, who indeed tend to benefit the most 
out of check dams due to their land and borewells. This gives a picture in terms of 
temporary unity of a situation, interest and purpose to secure benefits from 
development implementing agencies. This was exemplified in Mathnaa in the 
formation of user groups, self-help groups and the watershed committee and 
association, in the process supporting Adivasis and Harijans to become watershed 
committee members, and even an Adivasi in the village panchayat election. Thus, this 
wider community representation is seen as one created and manipulated by powerful 
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people for a particular purpose, and not necessarily as a shared purpose or a 
temporary outcome of dynamic interaction between differentiated social actors. 
Community-based actors like the Harijans and Adivasis participating in the formal 
watershed committee and in user groups were influenced by the power relations they 
engaged in at the informal level. This could be seen in their negotiating power to 
access free drinking water during drought conditions, and in their livelihoods as 
agricultural labourers. Moreover, their participation as watershed committee members 
and user group members was also coloured by their loyalty to the upper caste. 
Marginalised actors like the Harijans, Adivasis and women from these groups were 
nominated as members of the watershed committee as per official guidelines. Upper 
caste leaders under the surveillance of the traditional panchayat leaders of each caste 
group presided over their nomination. The decision-making activities of the Mathnaa 
watershed committee were vested with the upper caste represented by village elders. 
Through participant observation, it was established that whole exercise of nomination 
by the upper caste village elders was laden with tokenism, which was largely 
voluntary on the part of these relegated community-based actors like female, lower 
caste and Adivasi members. Mathnaa’s case proves that this voluntary tokenism had 
its roots in the opportunity cost incurred by the marginalised actors, whose agency to 
draw on these formal participatory arenas depended directly on the opportunity costs 
they incurred in the form of water access and benefits from the project.  
Female members were shown as important figures in formal participatory arenas for 
legitimising the watershed committee, but its core activities, such as consultation and 
decision-making, remained more or less out of reach and beyond the purview for 
these marginalised actors. On the brighter side, the marginalised sections that were 
participating in the formal participatory arenas were able to extract and derive 
tangible benefits. This was made possible by being members of the user groups while 
their relatives were check dam members. The Harijans and Adivasis made situational 
choices, guided primarily by endogenous institutional structures like informal norms 
and practices. And this would deliver more concrete results in the face of dynamic 
power relations than the exogenous, top-down institutions like the watershed 
committee because these marginalised actors were very clear that their source of 
getting free drinking water during dry periods was from upper caste people. 
Moreover, they were employed as agricultural labour in the farms of these rural elite 
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and as such were entitled to receive donations and gifts at weddings and festivals. The 
following statement of one female watershed committee member further illustrates 
this point: 
“We all knew very well that this watershed committee and other 
such arrangements would never make us equal and powerful. 
Hence, we did not feel the need to fight for real decision-making 
power in the committee. In any case, we will always need help 
from the upper caste because of their complete hold and access-
based control over maximum land and water resources. Moreover, 
being in their good books leads to benefits in terms of access to 
free water and donations and gifts during festivals and weddings. 
Besides this, one’s status in one’s community enhances if one 
enjoys a good rapport with the rural elite”.  
Hence, despite the creation of formal institutions and arenas for participation, 
Mathnaa community members, actively depended on the traditional informal 
institution’s practices and norms such as caste for engagement. And in the face of 
socially embedded, informal institutional structures, a formal watershed committee 
ended up being another means for co-opting into already existing power asymmetries. 
It is evident from the case study of Mathnaa that the power relations operating at the 
grassroots level thoroughly influence the participation of various actors within formal 
participatory arenas.  
It may be hasty to label the formal participatory arenas and institutions opened up in 
Mathnaa as ‘inefficient’ because they did not deliver what the interventionists had 
intended. Evidence shows that actors benefiting from the Mathnaa watershed project 
interventions have done so despite abstaining from direct participation due to strategic 
reasons. The substantial developments experienced by the Mathnaa community such 
as the building of check dams might not have taken place in the absence of 
participatory arenas. Through the formal institutional structure of the watershed 
committee and user groups, Mathnaa’s case demonstrates the level of social 
interaction for opportunities to achieve economic gain. The emerging intervention, 
operated within a gamut of ‘bounded rationality’, reconfigures and makes individuals 
and groups realise the costs and benefits of participation, as opposed to being guided 
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by a ‘calculated rational choice’.160 This study also highlighted that actors’ opinions, 
responses and preferred extent and form of participation, as well as abstinence from 
participation, are embedded in informal institutional practices, patriarchal norms and 
power relations, which are reproduced continuously in Mathnaa. Therefore, relations 
between formal and informal institutions in resource management are influenced by a 
diverse mix of social, economic and power dynamics in a given community. Thus, in 
practice, there are inter-linkages and overlaps that make the boundaries between 
formal and informal institutions fluid. 
The distribution of power within and between the various levels of community is 
central to the debate about decentralisation and participation in natural resource 
management. Power is seen as a capillary, which is acting in the daily enforcements 
of social practices, independent of the legal power of the formal institutions (Robbins, 
1998). Hence, this approach shifts in analysis from the dichotomy of formal and 
informal resource management institutions to an essential investigation into the kinds 
and effectiveness of social power. This is deployed through the formal and informal 
authority systems of hegemony, domination and control (Ibid), as decentralisation 
processes often tend to impact negatively on power relations within the local 
community. The ‘gramscian hegemony’ of rural elite influences the management 
process for their own vested interests.   
Moreover, Mathnaa’s evidence showed that situational rationality in a way prompts 
actors to volunteer to perform as ‘front stage’ actors, a role expected of them by grand 
actors like the NGO. For example, marginalised actors such as lower caste men, 
women and Adivasi members in the watershed committee were asked to meet 
government officials inspecting the work of the project, and were supposed to inform 
them about progress and the fair working of the watershed project activities. Hence, 
all actors involved seemed to be enacting their respective roles on the ‘front stage’161 
                                                           
160
 The concept of calculated rationality assumes that individuals are capable of making rational 
choices without any restrictions and; the principle of bounded rationality refers to the idea that actors 
are incapable of confirming to a model of absolute rationality because they cannot apprehend all the 
possible choices (Steins, 1999). 
161
 Front stage and back stage concept given by Kothari (2001) for post structuralist critique of 
participation. Kesby summarizes the Kothari critique by highlighting ‘front stage’ as a place in which 
performances are enacted in order to make an impression in public life. These project arenas cannot 
allow performers to be sincere because they are devoid of ‘back stage’ places where unrehearsed, 
private performances are not intended for public consumption take place in rehearsal for the production 
of front stage performances. Participatory performances are contrived by stage-managing facilitators 
who script to meet the project objectives (Kesby, 2005:2043). 
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of participatory institutions. This was enacted to achieve their share of social power at 
the informal ‘backstage’ or rear curtain of everyday life. In Mathnaa’s cultural 
landscape, this act of performance is staged by the lower caste to gain better 
negotiating power in the groundwater market. Thus, community-based projects cannot 
be dissociated from local power politics. Consequently, water issues in Mathnaa are in 
cognisance with caste, gender, wealth, politics and power.    
d) Co-existence of a Diverse Property Regime 
In the case of water resources, ownership and user rights vary across water sources 
and usage. Water use is guided by multiple property regimes such as common 
property, state-owned and private resources, open access, etc. The efforts of a 
community in conserving rainwater, which is open access through check dams, is a 
common property regime and has helped in recharging the borewells. This has 
resulted in building the private property regime of groundwater, which is not 
equitably shared by all the members of the community. Hence, recharging of the 
borewells, which are private property, by the publicly funded watershed development 
programme leads to a public investment becoming a private property. In India, there 
are five possible property regimes, and water has presence in all of them, which is 
illustrated in Table XV.  
         Table XV: Property Right Regime in India and Source of Water 
Property Rights Regime in India Source of Water 
Individual private property Groundwater 
State or public property Surface Water Resources 
Common Property Tanks with Panchayati Raj 
Institutions 
Common Pool Resources Access to identified group but no 
one has a right eg. Village tanks 
Non property or open access Open Access water bodies 
Source: adapted from NAAS, 2005 
 
Although groundwater is ‘open access’, its extraction is effected within the realm of 
private property rights, which alludes to the economic disparity among the famers 
investing capital in the extraction of groundwater. Therefore, the control and 
ownership of water are linked with the ownership of land and irrigation structures. 
Even among landowners, access is restricted only to those who have locational 
advantages, as small farmers and other marginalised weaker sections of society often 
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miss out on these developments. Therefore, one can speak of groundwater open 
access as a ‘restricted or skewed’ open access regime.  
Inequities exist in the benefit of the structure built for the community and also in 
access to groundwater. The water system operates in the private property regime 
through the check dams, which are constructed on common property. Borewells, 
which are collectively owned due to kinship blood ties, encourage members to take a 
keen interest in the user group allocated to maintaining the check dam. This in turn 
ensures double membership – one in the user group and another in the borewells, 
which plays an instrumental part in groundwater recharge management. 
Water is a problematic issue in terms of achieving equity. In most cases, it is treated 
as private property because water rights are tied to land rights in terms of both 
location and size. It also determines, on the basis of one’s land holding, eligibility for 
how much water can be received. Generally, those who have land near the valley and 
close to the water harvesting structures get most of the water. Thus, equitable water 
distribution is rarely part of the mainstream watershed agenda, because the ground 
reality ensures the loss and gain mechanism for different parties. Having a watershed 
development augments groundwater, which is currently private property and is tapped 
by the people who own the borewells. There is no doubt that recharging of the 
groundwater level has taken place due to check dams (farmers near the check dams 
agree on this, but this also depends upon good rain and affects the borewell’s ability 
to help grow three crops a season; even in summer months, the water situation isn’t 
bad, courtesy of the borewell). The benefits are not evenly distributed due to 
topography, which affects the social distribution of gains from soil and moisture 
conservation. Thus, in Mathnaa, groundwater is a ‘restricted open access’ resource 
and becomes private property once the pump owner has extracted it from the ground. 
Who sells it in the groundwater market to the fellow villagers and, moreover, 
groundwater development are facilitated by the check dams, which are a common 
property resource. Therefore, in Mathnaa, we see the co-existence of three property 
regimes working simultaneously, and the community using them to gain access to 
water, by using different technologies such as borewells and check dams. 
Groundwater development through borewells has united people in the form of 
collective ownership and user groups. Kin and caste ties facilitate the joint action in 
check dams maintenance and in the ownership of the borewells. Thus, people are 
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homogenous on the aspect of forming user groups around the check dams and the 
ownership of borewells. They have common interests in both to manage groundwater, 
which in turn benefits their fields and means it is extremely important to nurture 
short-term commonalities. Consequently, various small water-related groups within a 
village community are formed around the borewells and check dams in the form of 
user groups, which happened due to intervention in the form of the watershed project 
and the introduction of borewells, simultaneously, in the village. The groundwater 
market started in Mathnaa with the introduction of collectively owned borewells, and 
the government indirectly provided incentives for its spread and extraction in the form 
of a flat rate electricity tariff. All this was possible before JGS (Jyotirgram Scheme), 
under which there was no uniform price for water selling in Mathnaa’s groundwater 
market. This created competition, but after JGS, the water market followed a uniform 
price for irrigation water every season. Due to a change in the electricity tariff, the 
scope for competition in the groundwater market was reduced, hence uniting all the 
water sellers, irrespective of caste. 
The social structure of Mathnaa in the form of caste and kinship affiliation promotes 
groundwater extraction and the market through common borewells. Thus, the 
groundwater market unites people in the form of having collective borewells due to 
social structure, and then as water sellers after JGS. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that people are homogenous on certain aspects such as 
caste and kinship (kutumb). Having the same interests in managing groundwater, due 
to common stakeholding in the borewells, and in the user groups formed around the 
check dams, brings them onto the common platform to manage groundwater. Hence, 
they form a community around borewells – not in the way common property theorists 
advocate, but due to default by having land adjacent to each other, shares in common 
borewells, membership in user groups due to landholding patterns, a flat electricity 
tariff scheme.  
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7.3 Policy Implications 
Often in a government/NGO-implemented project, importance is given to ‘village 
community’ and ‘participation’. The participatory and village community rhetoric 
tends to often ignore the social composition of village community and conflicts of 
interest within and between the communities. This has serious implications on the 
success of a project and on its actors, who are the real participants in the project; it is 
not necessarily the case that a successful experiment in one location will be successful 
in another, because every rural social setting in Indian society is different. With the 
rise of a new dominant caste in twenty-first-century India, newer definitions and 
paradigms have sprouted through traditional patriarchal flavours rooted in feudalism. 
Although India is a rising power, even today its society is very much gripped by and 
encapsulated in the caste system. This was one of the points in consideration for the 
Indian government when it conducted its caste census in 2011.  
Having discussed the concept of community from various perspectives, it is evident 
that the images of community often seen in CBNRM policies are a reflection of poor 
empirical reality, and are, as a consequence, a misleading guide to practical 
intervention strategies. A village community is made up of diverse small social 
groups, each with different agendas and inspirations. This is not to dispute that they 
do have value in the current context of wider debates for achieving sustainable NRM 
goals, but there have been several studies in which ‘romanticised’ representations of 
community and its implementation have shown successful results. Thus, 
implementing CBNRM is inevitably controversial, and various examples have shown 
that progress is clumsy and an extremely bumpy ride. Flaws within the process stem 
from the underlying assumptions that community is homogeneous and will work 
together for the overall development of the whole, and thus equity will be achieved. 
Hence, in order to make the project reach every section of the village society, 
participatory management must evolve along different lines in different rural cultural 
settings, keeping in mind the specific and particular composition of the village 
community. Moreover, community-based ownership and understanding of social 
differences relating to resource access are major determinants for the successful 
functioning of any formal participatory institution (natural resource management in 
general and CBNRM in particular fall under this umbrella). 
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7.4 Future Research  
1) This is a micro level study, which takes into account the socio-cultural context of 
the village community rather than a broader picture of the state of Gujarat. Hence, it 
would be an important hypothesis attempt to test not only socio-cultural but also 
ecological Gujarat state characters in the main theoretical framework. For example, 
the effect of various state legislations concerning water management on different 
ecological zones in Gujarat would be a fruitful line of enquiry. 
2) It would also be worth exploring initiating a comparative study based on two or 
more villages, and looking into the different mechanisms by which caste, gender and 
religious affiliation play a role in explaining groundwater management.  
3) It would be interesting, as a further point of analysis, to study the socio-cultural 
practices centered around water scarcity and the kind of effects it has on the local 
community in terms of health and sanitation issues. The health, sanitation and other 
human development indices aspect emerging due to the scarcity of water are beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. 
The idea of water management, with its far-reaching and expounding consequential 
reasoning, is accompanied by its own pitfalls and the nature of inequality. The 
questions hovering over the bordered segmentation of infrastructure, state planning, 
welfare economics and the discontent of hyper rationality present a telling case for 
democratisation to be achieved in reality. All of that contemplation and planning on 
the part of civil society should not see the light of development facing aberration from 
several quarters. Thus, the role of water should be seen in totality and reality, 
witnessing the dynamism of Durkheim in culture-specific societal settings.  
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Annexure I: Politics of Carrying out the Fieldwork 
I gathered data and insights through observation and participatory engagement. The 
qualitative methods were largely influenced by phenomenological approaches, and 
this played a role in my collection of data. The empirical investigation was framed 
largely as a case study along with the ethnographic observation of social realities. I 
conducted a baseline household survey of Mathnaa village in order to collect 
demographic data pertaining to all the households, which helped me to gain general 
insights into the social differentiations of community members. Most importantly, this 
gave me an opportunity to introduce myself to the villagers and nurture a rapport with 
them in general.  
During the initial days the observations made in the field dairy proved very handy, as 
they helped me to compare, sporadically, people’s views and perceptions including 
the formal and informal positions they took on a variety of issues concerning village 
politics, water, the watershed project, JGS, borewells, groundwater markets and caste 
and social relations. I realised that there was a qualitative difference in the perceptions 
I had of the Mathnaa community as time passed, and this contributed immensely 
towards a better understanding and analysis of the villagers’ perceptions and events. 
I first stayed in the taluka, but then gradually shifted to the village where I chose to 
stay with the Adivasi family, who were at the midway position between the upper 
caste and the Harijans (Jadejas and Thakores). Mathnaa is an ankada village, where 
the leading Adivasis (tribal heads) are made ankadedars of the villages and are 
responsible for populating the hilly regions, serving the border land of the state and 
collecting revenues for the state in the form of fixed amounts called ankada 
(Gazetteer of India, 1974).  
Due to its ankada roots, Mathnaa Adivasis enjoy good relations with all the other 
castes in the village, as they believe that their ancestors were the founders of the 
villages in this region. The connotations for this research and my relationship with the 
community would have been extremely different if I had stayed with the Harijans, 
Thakores or Jadejas families. In due course, suspicions were bound to arise as I spent 
my time with women from the Adivasi and Harijan communities; however, I also 
faced suspicion from the elites of the village, due to this intermingling. 
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Although the villagers originally knew I was dining with the Harijans and Adivasis on 
occasion, the upper caste initially allowed me inside their kitchen, but when they 
came to know I was dining with untouchables, they did not afford me the same 
courtesy. Nevertheless, I still maintained cordial relations and they fed me tea. 
Considering my urban and Muslim background, certain prejudices were ignored on 
my part such as the lack of a rigid caste system based on the principle of ‘pure and 
impure’ within my faith. Thus, on this basis exceptions were made for me. In spite of 
having relations with Harijans I was welcomed. My upper caste, metropolitan Muslim 
identity made my entry point easier and helped me gain acceptance because of my 
tolerant, pluralistic approach towards their caste rituals. 
The fieldwork process presented occasional hurdles due to my language skills 
limitations and religious and gender identity, but overall the Mathnaa community was 
very accepting and approachable from the moment of my arrival. In the initial days an 
NGO representative was always present when I conducted my interviews or met the 
ex-watershed committee and user group members on the pretext of helping me. In his 
presence the villagers were very careful in what information they provided and in the 
manner in which they interacted. Moreover, he only introduced me to certain people 
who happened to give a rosy picture of the watershed project. Furthermore, during my 
initial dealings with the women, they interacted with me only in the presence of their 
male members and were not allowed to speak to me directly when I asked any 
questions; either their husband, older brother or some elder male members gave 
answers to my queries.  
It was later, when I started staying constantly within the Mathnaa community, that it 
became possible for me to gain access to all the strata of the community and have 
moments of privacy with individuals and groups of respondents, especially women. 
As time elapsed, it was in closed group discussions and informal meetings that the 
participants revealed the informalities of Mathnaa community involvement in the 
watershed project, as well as other important water-related issues. 
The Essence of Participant Observation   
As a participant observer, I chose to live within the Mathnaa community, in order to 
observe and comprehend the everyday processes, interactions and life events of actors 
in the village. Participant observation as a method encourages researchers to immerse 
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themselves in the day-to-day activities of the people they are attempting to understand 
(May, 2001:148). As a result, this method helped me as a researcher to understand 
and study complex socio-cultural and political phenomena as they arose, and provided 
me with an excellent opportunity to gain deeper and better insights through firsthand 
experience. The method helps the researcher to collect information about every aspect 
of a culture, even if the researcher is investigating only one particular area. A holistic 
hypothesis, i.e. the idea that the various aspects of culture are interrelated and that 
knowledge of the nature of this interrelationship is crucial to the understanding of 
how even a single institution or set of institution works (Srinivas, 2002:545), makes 
participant observation an important tool in research. 
An interpretative approach includes the researcher’s beliefs and behaviour as part of 
the evidence presented and considered in a research activity (Harding, 1987). 
Following this argument, my own role and biases as a researcher with multiple 
identities (which I shall explain in detail later on in subsequent paragraphs) involved 
in this process are duly acknowledged. When one enters rural India, it paves an 
opening to the world of caste and its influences on research in many ways (Srinivas, 
2002). Hence, in the larger socio-cultural field, being Ashraf162 in the Muslim caste 
hierarchy, which traces its roots from a high caste Brahmin family converted to Islam 
centuries ago, played a significant part in my research in the form of facilitating and at 
times hindering my research. My conversion to Islam created conditions for me to 
break away from some of the rigid traditional Brahmin mores of social relation, 
especially caste-based distinctions, and helped me to interact with and reach out to the 
different caste groups in Mathnaa.     
During the fieldwork in Gujarat, my various identities were enacted in relation to 
different research subjects; at times bringing opportunities and at times challenges for 
my research. My interaction with the local NGO was of a researcher with an urban 
background and studying in Germany for a PhD. The NGO members always felt I 
was trying to monitor their project work in terms of their impact benefits for 
overcoming water scarcity, and whether their efforts would lead to community 
                                                           
162
 The Indian muslim society is divided into three broad categories i) Ashrafs are those who trace their 
origins to foreign lands such as Arabia, Persia, Turkistan or Afghanistan and all those upper caste 
Hindus who converted to Islam; ii) Ajlaf are middle caste converts whose occupation are ritually clean 
iii) Arzal are those who consist of the lowest caste and mostly untouchable castes who converted to 
Islam (Sachar, 2006). 
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participation in the truest sense and on realistic grounds. Conversely, my interaction 
with the Harijans (untouchables) and Adivasis made them feel proud because of my 
Brahmin roots and that I had been able to reject the rigidity in my life. I could sense a 
‘feeling of self pride’ in them when I was drinking and dining with them. For them I 
was ‘ben’ (sister). The Harijans and the Adivasi always felt that I would bring about 
some change for them in terms of overcoming water scarcity through my work, which 
they viewed as the purpose behind me being in their village. Moreover, through my 
work I could highlight the plight of discrimination carried out against them in 
Mathnaa. However, on numerous occasions I had to clarify my stand as a researcher 
and my purpose of visiting their village. I was introduced by the NGO’s people as a 
researcher from Delhi who was studying in Germany. As Delhi is the national capital 
and the seat of the central government, this made them feel that through my work 
their grievances over water would reach and be heard in Delhi, or at least in 
Gandhinagar, the state capital of Gujarat. 
For the government officials at the taluka and district headquarters, I was a non-
Guajarati Muslim woman researcher, wanting to study Gujarat water issues. I often 
encountered questions about psychosis and apprehensions concerning Gujarat. As the 
state witnessed communal riots on a massive scale in 2002, such inquiry was natural, 
if not obvious, on their part. Questions bordering around my safety and insecurity 
were subtly raised. The selection of the district (Sabarkantha) on my part brought with 
it twists and discomfiture, often from official ranks.  
The upper caste members in the village, on the one hand, identified with me, because 
being an upper caste Muslim with Brahmin roots gave them a sense of ease and caste 
purity, although they were disappointed to know that my family had converted to 
Islam. The upper caste at times felt that I was some kind of government spy, who had 
come to record the rampant practice of land grabbing carried out by powerful upper 
castes and the way the watershed project was implemented and monopolised by 
certain people. Hence, these social identities played a role the moment I was 
introduced and entered into the village, and when I met with organisation and 
government officials. During various interactions I always maintained and clarified 
my manifest identity as a researcher studying their village, but still had to encounter 
several contradictions and inhibitions based on their perceptions about my identity. 
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Hurdles in Carrying out the Research 
Being a non-Guajarati, language posed a challenge in my research. In order to 
overcome this hurdle, I took Gujarat language lessons before going into the field; it 
was a challenging and daunting job. The Gujarati language has various dialects; 
however, my workable knowledge of the language made my fieldwork and gaining 
acceptance easier in the Mathnaa community. Aeries of other events also posed a 
challenged in the research, such as the serial bomb blasts which rocked the city of 
Ahmedabad on 26th July 2008 and then in Modasa on 29th September 2008. I was still 
carrying out my fieldwork during this period, and the bomb blasts led to communal 
tensions in Gujarat, in general, and in the city of Ahmedabad, in particular. Gujarat 
society is highly communally sensitive and polarised completely after the 2002 riots. 
In addition, incidents like these often lead to ‘emotions running high in the open’. 
Being a non-Gujarati Muslim woman researcher, it was a tough situation and fear 
gripped me about the viability and adaptability concerning fieldwork, as the aftermath 
of those blasts could have incensed and stoked internal civil disturbance. 
Nevertheless, and contrary to my thoughts, the people of Mathnaa did not allow this 
communal tension to affect our research relationship; in fact, despite knowing my 
religious identity, they showered me with their support, love and affection. 
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Annexure II: Colonial Myth of Kudimaramat 
 
In order to bring all the bigger tanks under the direct control of Public Works Departments (PWDs) 
for repair and maintenance, a modern centralized administration for irrigation was evolved. The 
Public Works Department (PWD) tried to induce kudimaramat (people’s maintenance by donated 
labor) in the mistaken belief that local communities would undertake voluntary labor to maintain the 
tanks as a tradition (Maloney and Raju, 1994; Mosse, 1999). The colonial government enacted the 
Madras Compulsory Labour Act of (1858) known as the Kudimaramat Act and later several 
Kudimaramat Bills were drafted (1869, 1883) to enforce the custom by law (Vani, 1992; Mosse, 
1999).   
Eventually, all this led to more destruction of the traditional management institutions as the Public 
Works Department (PWD) did not have the budget or the staff to take care of such widely scattered 
independent systems of tanks; besides people were under the impression that state would look after 
these tanks structure with the formation of Public Works Department (PWD) (Bottrall, 1992). The 
Kudimaramat was recreated as a myth; of a traditional autonomous village institution by the colonial 
government in order to invent a village tradition in the image of the state’s planned irrigation 
administration (Mosse, 1999). The myth was build by the colonial government that the village 
communities would undertake voluntary customarily labor of kudimaramat, which they had 
abandoned (Agarwal and Narain, 1997).  In fact in the pre-colonial time, cultivators did not 
voluntarily donate their labor for the maintenance of the tanks but were paid from the funds mobilized 
at the village level (Ibid). 
Nonetheless the kudimaramat tradition of official discourse was recreated in order to fulfill two 
administrative crucial aspects. Firstly, diverse local irrigation maintenance practice was empirically 
fixed and rendered as a generalized standard, and this was set by engineering standards of efficiency; 
secondly the government’s demands on village labor, resources and management acquired the 
legitimacy of custom (Mosse, 1999: 311-312). But in spite of all this the colonial government failed 
to get the support of the villagers for the upkeep of the tanks.    
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Annexure III: Watershed Map of Mathnaa 
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Annexure IV: Details of Focus Group Discussions 
 
 
No of 
FGDs 
Representativ
e 
No. of 
participants 
Male 
(M)/Female 
(F) 
Date of 
Discussion 
Place Theme of Discussion Significant Findings 
FGD1 User group 5 M 1-11-2008 Darbar was 
chopal 
formation, working of the 
user group; quality and 
maintenance of the check 
dams 
Members in the user group are from extended family and  
also own the borewell collectively; check dams in the 
vicinity of the upper caste is maintained by the lower 
caste women; full trust on the design and quality of the 
check dams. 
 
FGD2 User group 7 4-M 
3-F 
27-10-2008 Harijan was formation, working of the 
user group; quality and 
maintenance of the check 
dams 
Check dams are made from cement and can stand heavy 
rainfall; upper caste check dams are maintained by lower 
caste women, elderly women distribute maintenance 
work of the check dams; women formally not members 
of the user groups but do all the maintenance work; no 
complete sense of ownership when it come to pay for 
damages on repairing the check dams. 
FGD3 women of 
households of 
the user groups 
6 F 17-10-2008 Harijan was work distribution amongst 
members women for 
cleaning of the check 
dams 
Yearly on rotation bases each family of the user groups 
distribute the work of maintenance amongst it women 
members in household, the distribution of work is done 
by the mother-in-law and all the maintenance work is 
managed by the women. 
FGD4 same as above 5 F 15-10-2008 Tindoli Falia work distribution amongst The elderly women (mother-in-law) distribution of work 
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members women for 
cleaning of the check 
dams 
is respected by the women of the participating household 
in the user group for the maintenance of the check dams. 
FGD5 same as above 4 F 21-10-2008 Jadeja 
Household 
work distribution amongst 
members women for 
cleaning of the check 
dams 
Upper caste check dams are maintained and cleaned by 
the lower caste and adivasi women; upper caste men nor 
women are involved in the cleaning process of check 
dams, existence of some kind of jajmani system in crude 
form in Mathnaa, (where the lower caste provide labor to 
upper caste). 
FGD6 Farmers 
engaged in 
water market 
5 M 31-12-2008 Village 
chopal 
benefits of check dams 
and borewell 
Groundwater level increase due to check dams; borewell 
owners in the command area of check dams are engaged 
actively in groundwater, being stakeholder in borewell 
and check dams leads to taking initiatives in the 
maintenance of check dams. 
FGD7 First Harijan 
farmers to get 
borewell 
6 M 13-11-2008 Harijan was reason for installing 
borewell 
Borewell technology make groundwater access easier; all 
the members in user groups are also having stake in the 
common borewells 
FGD8 water sellers 
(consisting of 
different caste 
and adivasi) 
5 M 5-01-2009 Village 
chopal 
prevailing price of water 
in the groundwater market 
Price are favored for the buyers related through caste and 
kinship ties for drinking water; In Post-JGS water market 
has shrieked (as electricity is expensive) and uniform 
water price prevail in Mathnaa; During Pre-JGS 
competition existed in water selling, hence there was no 
fixed water price in village 
FGD9 same as above 6 F 3-01-2009 Tindoli Falia prevailing price of water 
in the groundwater market 
JGS shrink the market, water expensive due to JGS; Post-
JGS uniform price for irrigation water through Mathnaa. 
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